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Preface
Dear Colleagues, Friends, Ladies 
and Gentlemen,
I would like to welcome the latest 
Alzheimer Europe Ethics Report. 
This report is a result of work 
carried out by a panel of experts 
coordinated by Dianne Gove. The 
members of this panel included 
a spectrum of Alzheimer societies representatives, scien-
tists and professionals, amongst whom ethicists, lawyers, 
psychiatrists, philosophers and dementia specialists, and 
especially a representative of the European Working Group 
of People with Dementia, because Alzheimer Europe values 
the contribution of this group in all its work.
This ethics report leads us through subtle, complex and 
complicated issues of legal capacity and decision making 
of people living with dementia, and considers the ethical 
implications of lack of legal capacity on their lives. As usual, 
the introductory part provides a general overview of the key 
issues, and explains frameworks that present a basis for fur-
ther consideration. The issue of legal capacity and decision 
making of people with dementia is complex and di  cult in 
principle, here even more so, because the task of the expert 
group was to consider legal capacity not only in the indi-
vidual, local or national context, but also to address this 
problem from the European perspective. Therefore, the eth-
ical questions concerning this topic are discussed not only 
from the perspective of di erent disciplines, professions 
and stakeholders, but also drawing on the diversity of Euro-
pean legislation.
The report leads us through the most important topics: the 
exercise of legal capacity in the everyday lives of people 
with dementia and their families, participation in research, 
coercive measures, restrictions of freedom and the use of 
restraint etc. Also of importance, it looks at civil and polit-
ical life, including the right to vote, formal relationships, 
making a will and other important situations that occur 
during the life course.
I am convinced that the readers of this report will be able 
to  nd important information about most areas that are 
connected to legal capacity and decision making of people 
with dementia. However, sometimes questions are raised 
and discussed in this report without necessarily providing 
clear guidance and conclusions and I think that this is also a 
very positive feature of this publication. In ethical consider-
ations usually it is not possible to  nd only straightforward 
solutions, norms and guidance. These have to become part 
of di erent levels of legislation and standardization. The 
main role of ethics is to question the most important prac-
tices and procedures and to open the way to  nding better 
solutions. I think that also in this regard this latest ethics 
report has fully achieved its goal.
Iva Holmerová 
 Chair of Alzheimer Europe








This report is about ethical issues surrounding legal capacity 
insofar as these relate to the lives and wellbeing of people 
with dementia. Having legal capacity means being consid-
ered as a subject before the law. It also means having certain 
rights (including human rights) and having the opportunity 
to exercise those rights, albeit with appropriate support if 
needed, that is acceptable and freely chosen. Over the years, 
Alzheimer Europe has explored ethical issues in relation 
to key topics a ecting the lives and wellbeing of people 
with dementia such as assistive technology, restrictions 
of freedom, disability, inclusive research and the way that 
dementia is perceived and portrayed. It has also looked at 
di erent legal provisions of relevance to some of those top-
ics (e.g. laws on mental capacity, guardianship, involuntary 
internment, marriage, voting, healthcare and participa-
tion in research). This report re ects on the relationship 
between law and ethics with regard to decision making in 
key areas of the lives of people with dementia. It will also 
touch on a wide range of topics such as disability, equity, 
wellbeing, respect for autonomy and dignity, human rights 
and quality of life.
It is generally assumed that law is morally justi ed. Law not 
only de nes the obligations and rights that people have 
(along with any relevant exceptions), but also implicitly or 
explicitly claims that this established order is morally right (i.e. 
this is what ought or ought not happen). Failing to observe 
law or respect people’s legal rights would in many cases 
not only be illegal but also unethical and immoral. It would, 
for example, be illegal but also immoral to marry someone 
against their will, to move into someone else’s house without 
their permission, to force someone to move into a care home 
or to dictate to them how they should or should not spend 
their money. This is, amongst other things, because acting 
in this way would fail to respect personal autonomy, integ-
rity, personhood and privacy, and would run counter to the 
principles of bene cence and non-male cence (doing what 
is good for a person and not something that is harmful to 
them). Following the law does not, however, exempt people 
from the necessity to re ect on whether their behaviour is 
morally justi ed. In a recent statement, made in reaction to 
the shooting of an African American in Atlanta and as part 
of her resignation speech, the police chief stated:
 “…I  rmly believe that there is a clear distinction between 
what you can do and what you should do” (BBC 2020a, 
14/6).
Similarly, morality and law is not a mere duplication. As 
Gardner points out:
 “Law ena ble[s] us to do, or to do better, what morally we 
already have reason to do. Yet it does not merely duplicate 
morality’s existing content. Morality already told us what to 
do, but law added, by its authority, a suitable way to do it .”
 “O en law is gappy and needs morality’s help to make it 
less so” (Gardner 2013, p.422).
Legislation and guidelines at national and European level 
may determine and provide guidance on how to protect and 
promote people’s rights and how to behave ethically towards 
each other. This emphasises the importance of distinguish-
ing between law and ethics despite the close relationship 
between the two. Particular attention is o en paid to mem-
bers of society who are potentially vulnerable (e.g. people with 
dementia). The following list provides examples of some of 
the key European and international conventions, directives, 
charters and codes which lay out some of the common val-
ues and principles of relevance to the issue of legal capacity 
in general and in relation to people with dementia :
 the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union1
 The International Council of Nurses (ICN). Code of Ethics 
for Nurses (2012, revised version)
 the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons 
with Disabilities (CRPD) (2006)2
 the Committee of Ministers to Member States Recom-
mendation No. R (99) 4 on Principles concerning the Legal 
Protection of Incapable Adults (1999)3
 the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine (1997)4
 the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(1976)5
 the World Medical Association Declaration of Helsinki 
(1964)6
 the European Social Charter (1961, 1996)
 The Nuremberg Code (1947).
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These and other documents provide valuable guidance 
which inevitably in uences re ection and subsequent 
action related to the recognition of and respect for peo-
ple’s legal capacity. However, actual legislation as well as 
practices, attitudes and procedures within and between 
countries in Europe di er and are evolving at di erent paces 
and in di erent ways. These documents touch on ethical 
and legal issues but there are also considerable di erences 
with regard to the objectives and attitudes of lawyers and 
philosophers. They may address the same issues and use 
the same terminology but sometimes mean di erent things 
and draw di erent conclusions. Van der Burg (2010, p.20) 
describes this as follows:
 “A connected di erence is that law is oriented towards 
a closure. Legal procedures are designed to reduce the 
complexity of the con ict, to restrict, neutralise, and 
end it. This focus on a peaceable closure is an atti-
tude that many lawyers have internalised, whereas 
for ethicists it o en seems the reverse. Philosophical 
discussions may continue endlessly, until one of the 
parties no longer bothers to respond, or has died. The 
basic attitude of many philosophers seems to be to 
add new complexities, hypothetical cases, and rele-
vant dimensions. In too simple words: a er one has 
consulted a lawyer, the problem may seem simpler 
because the lawyer has focused on only a few relevant 
aspects; a er a philosopher has been consulted, the 
problem will only seem more complex.”
The above di erences are quite clear in discussions about 
ethical issues linked to legal capacity in the CRPD, which 
are quite central to this report. A er this introduction, the 
report is divided into two sections. The  rst addresses some 
of the key concepts of relevance to the overall topic of legal 
capacity, with a focus on ethical issues of relevance to peo-
ple with dementia. The second re ects on some of the key 
areas where restrictions of legal capacity have an impact 
on the lives of people with dementia (e.g. guardianship, 
treatment and care, research, freedom of movement and 
participation in civil and political life).
This report was dra ed by the ethics working group, which 
was set up by Alzheimer Europe in 2020 to explore legal 
capacity and dementia, drawing on the expertise and expe-
rience of the di erent members of the group. Because of 
the COVID-19 pandemic, the group had to operate virtu-
ally but still managed to address a broad range of issues 
and perspectives, and arrive at a consensus on the di er-
ent positions re ected in the document. A short bio and 
photo of each member of the ethics working group can be 
found in Appendix 1.
The aims of this document are:
 to raise awareness about situations and practices sur-
rounding legal capacity,
 to highlight grey zones and controversial issues linked 
to these and in relation to human rights and ethics, and
 to make recommendations to ensure that the rights 
and wellbeing of people with dementia are respected 
and promoted.
The main target audience of this report is health and social 
care professionals, lawyers and legal representatives (i.e. all 
those who may at some point may play a role in decisions 
related to the exercise and/or loss of legal capacity of peo-
ple with dementia). A shorter report, for a broader audience, 
has also been prepared and can be accessed  at: https://www.
alzheimer-europe.org/Ethics/Ethical-issues-in-practice
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2. Cross-cutting concepts and 
issue s
7 See section “About legal capacity and decision-making capacity” (p.14).
Dementia
Dementia is an umbrella term which describes the symp-
toms that occur when the brain is damaged as a result of 
one or more diseases or conditions. There are over a hundred 
di erent types of dementia, the most common ones being 
Alzheimer’s dementia, vascular dementia and dementia 
with Lewy bodies. A person may actually be a ected by more 
than one type of dementia. Dementia is a syndrome. This 
means that it consists of a common cluster of symptoms 
linked, for example, to memory, language, comprehension, 
reasoning and orientation. Dementia is usually a progressive 
or chronic condition. The symptoms tend to develop slowly 
but steadily over several years. Consequently, in combina-
tion with external factors, dementia makes it increasingly 
di  cult to carry out everyday tasks. Although the prevalence 
of dementia is higher amongst older people, dementia is 
not a natural part of growing old.
Aside from legal capacity, which focuses on the right to 
make binding decisions, the capacity to do things and 
make decisions (decision-making capacity), is also impor-
tant in the context of dementia.7 There is not one but 
numerous capacities covering a range of tasks (such as 
making co ee, driving a car, following the thread of a 
conversation and doing calculations etc.) and a range of 
decisions. Such decisions could, for example, include what 
to have for dinner, where to go on holiday, whether to 
attend a concert, as well as decisions with more serious 
consequences such  as whether to have an operation, how 
to invest or spend large sums of money and whether to 
get married or divorced.
People carry out tasks with varying degrees of success and 
skill. However, having dementia tends to make it more 
di  cult to carry out routine activities, which used to be 
straightforward and taken for granted, such as cleaning, 
getting dressed or washing the car, as well as more com-
plex activities such as driving or managing  nances. People 
o en devise coping strategies so they can manage relatively 
independently for longer. Many people with dementia at 
some point need some kind of assistance or care, as well 
as measures to support decision making. It is important 
that the right level of appropriate support is provided when 
needed so that people with dementia can maintain their 
independence and exercise their autonomy for as long as 
possible. Choosing the kind of support needed and who 
should provide it are also ways to exercise autonomy.
The kind and level of support needed may  uctuate because 
di erent capacities (i.e. to do things as well as to make deci-
sions) are dependent on the task, context and situation. 
This covers a wide range of factors such as the time of day, 
the complexity of the task or decision, levels of awareness, 
noise and other distractions, stress, the e ects of med-
ication and so on. The ability to successfully carry out a 
task, which includes making certain decisions, cannot be 
explained solely in terms of people’s impairments or medi-
cal conditions. Practices, attitudes and the way that society 
is organised can also help or hinder capacities and a ect 
the full participation of people with dementia in society.
Disability
In keeping with the social model of disability, the impair-
ments that people with dementia have and the interaction 
of these within society (e.g. lack of appropriate support 
and adaptations, as well as ignorance and lack of consid-
eration) may result in disability. This means that people 
with dementia o en do not bene t from the same rights 
and opportunities as other people to participate in society. 
The United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons 
with Disabilities (CRPD) is an international human rights 
treaty. It was adopted in 2006 and has been rati ed by all 
Member States of the European Union (EU) and by the EU 
itself in December 2010. The EU and its Member States are 
therefore committed to ensuring respect for the human 
rights of everyone with disabilities and to achieving this 
through the adoption of new legislation and policies, and by 
reviewing existing measures. Article 1 of the United Nations 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD 
2006) states:
 “Persons with disabilities include those who have long-
term physical, mental, intellectual or sensory impairments 
which in interaction with various barriers may hinder 
their full and e ective participation in society on an equal 
basis with others.”
The early disability movement was set up by people with 
physical disabilities and many people still associate dis-
ability with physical impairments (as still re ected in the 
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universal symbol of disability as a person in a wheelchair). 
It has expanded over the years to incorporate people with a 
more varied range of impairments and disabilities. Alzheimer 
Europe, for example, recently established closer ties with the 
European Disability Forum and emphasises that article 1 of 
the CRPD also applies to people with dementia.8
The provisions of the CRPD re ect the social model of disa-
bility and a human rights discourse, which seeks to ensure 
independence, freedom of choice, and full and active par-
ticipation of people with disabilities in all areas of life and 
society. This may be achieved through rules, regulations 
and laws, as well as through carefully planned and mean-
ingful involvement of people with disabilities in society. 
The PANEL principles are:
Participation (of rights holders),
Accountability (of duty holders towards rights holders),
Non-discrimination and equality (of duty holders towards 
rights holders),
Empowerment (of rights holders),
Legality (of duty holders’ actions).
The European Commission has provided further guidance 
to using the PANEL principles in the form of the FAIR  ow-
chart. This consists of establishing the:
Facts , 
Analysing the rights at stake,
Identifying who is responsible for bringing about change and
Reviewing any action taken.9
Not everyone with dementia considers themselves as hav-
ing a disability or wants to identify with disability. Similarly, 
not everyone who experiences dementia has the same 
objectives. Positive and supportive actions, based on the 
principles of solidarity, justice and mutual respect should 
be encouraged, whilst taking care to avoid generalisations 
about what people want. People should not be obliged to 
de ne themselves and should not be o  cially labelled on 
the basis of disability or of particular care needs (e.g. being 
referred to as a ‘P egefall’ in German, which literally means 
a ‘care case’) (Deutscher Bundestag 2010). Shakespeare et al. 
(2017) suggest that whilst people with dementia will vary 
in terms of their willingness to be identi ed as disabled, 
they, like other groups in society, can still use the CRPD 
as a ‘tool to advance their rights’. It should be noted that 
the term ‘disabled’ is o en used as a political statement 
which suggests that people are disabled by society, rather 
than as a description of a personal, intrinsic characteristic. 
Morris (2001, p.3) states:
8 See: Dementia as a disability? Implications for ethics, policy and practice. A discussion paper (Alzheimer Europe 2017) . 
9 See the Scottish Human Rights Commission lea et for more details: www.scottishhumanrights.com
 “We therefore use the term “disabled people” to describe 
what is done to us. This language politicizes our experi-
ences and it takes the focus away from our impairments 
being the problem and puts the responsibility onto the 
society in which we live.”
The CRPD gives disabled people certain rights because the 
countries which have rati ed the CRPD have committed to 
certain obligations towards disabled people.
The CRPD does not provide a list of conditions which count 
as disability. This is perhaps in keeping with a move away 
from the medical model of disability which locates disabil-
ity within the person and their condition, without making a 
distinction between impairment and disability and without 
acknowledging the role of the environment in contributing 
towards disability. The absence of such a list may, never-
theless, sometimes make it more di  cult to challenge and 
eventually change perceptions of what disability is amongst 
relevant governmental agencies and authorities. To com-
plicate matters, in some countries there is no legislative 
de nition of disability. This is the case in Denmark and Fin-
land. Moreover, in some countries which do have a legislative 
de nition of disability, such as in the Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Latvia and Poland, the concept of disability is narrower than 
in the CRPD (Council of Europe 2020). Consequently, the CRPD 
does not always succeed in practice in promoting the rights 
and wellbeing of people with dementia.
Finally, it is important to avoid looking at disability in terms 
of ‘them’ and ‘us’. Disability (including that linked to demen-
tia) is not always visible, and impairments may result in 
varying degrees of disability or indeed none at all. Some peo-
ple with disabilities, especially resulting from impairments 
acquired later in life, may already have deeply ingrained 
negative views about disability. This may also a ect their 
self-esteem and willingness to be de ned as disabled. It 
has also been suggested that people with disabilities con-
sider some disabilities more or less acceptable or desirable 
than others (Deal 2003).
Discrimination
Stigmatization
Stigmatization is a process and a complex social phenome-
non which is relevant to the discussion about discrimination 
against potentially vulnerable groups. It involves:
 the identification and labelling of socially salient 
characteristics,
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 negative stereotyping,
 cognitive separation (considering people with those 
characteristics as ‘other’ in the sense of ‘them’ not ‘us’, 
as mentioned above),
 devaluation/loss of social status,
 discrimination,
 and emotional reactions (Link and Phelan 2001, 2006).
The social construction of stigma is also inextricably bound 
to the exercise of power and to social structures (Parker 
and Aggleton 2003, Link and Phelan 2006, Mahajan et al. 
2008 and Scambler 2009). Discrimination can occur in the 
absence of stigmatization but it is also an essential compo-
nent of it. A particular characteristic/attribute comes to be 
considered as a stigma (sometimes called a mark) because 
of the meanings associated with it. These can change over 
time and di er from one social setting to another (e.g. in the 
case of having tattoos, being divorced, being le -handed or 
having an arti cial limb). Some attributes are fairly stable 
in being considered as stigmas whereas others gradually 
become less socially salient. Whilst a great deal of progress 
has been made, people with certain disabilities and medical 
conditions (e.g. dementia, schizophrenia, learning disabili-
ties and leprosy) continue to experience stigma, and hence 
discrimination.
In the literature on stigma, the emphasis is o en on per-
ceived di erence and on a range of contributing factors such 
as concealability (and visibility), course/progression (how 
the attribute develops or worsens over time), disruptive-
ness, aesthetics and origin (perceived responsibility) (Jones 
et al. 1984). Perceived threat or ‘peril’ plays a key role in the 
social construction of stigma (Jones et al. 1984, Stangor and 
Crandall 2003) and may increase the tendency to emphasise 
di erence (Levey and Howells 1994). Perceived threat can 
take several forms. It can, for example, be linked to a chal-
lenge to the established moral order or to the stability and 
cohesion of the dominant social group, to contagiousness 
or even to behaviour which risks violating personal space 
or physical integrity) (Hinshaw 2007).
Perceived similarity can be worrying as it may heighten 
people’s fears that something bad could happen to anyone, 
including themselves (Lerner 1980). People who have made 
a separation, such that they see people who have demen-
tia as completely di erent to those who haven’t (including 
themselves), may feel protected. Stereotypes and negative 
images of advanced dementia (which are o en generalised 
to dementia in general) may thus have a double function 
in amplifying perceived di erence and thereby providing 
a sense of security, but also contributing towards stigma 
(Gove et al. 2016). The role of powerful emotions, particularly 
deep-seated fear, and the lack of power of certain groups 
in society, makes it di  cult to overcome discrimination. 
Restrictions of legal capacity by de nition involve some 
loss of power.
The nature of discrimination
A common feature of various de nitions of discrimination 
is that discrimination consists of people being treated dif-
ferently on the basis of certain characteristics and that 
such di erential treatment is in some way detrimental to 
them or unfair. The issues at stake usually revolve around 
advantages and opportunities. This can also include the 
opportunity or right to do things that contribute towards 
society, such as donating money to charities, serving on 
a jury, giving blood or taking part in research. There are 
di erent types of discrimination such as direct, indirect, har-
assment, instruction to discriminate, discrimination based 
on perceived disability and discrimination by association 
(as described by the Council of Europe 2020). Anticipated 
discrimination (like the threat of coercive measures or the 
assumption that freedom will be restricted) can be equally 
damaging, especially in the  eld of mental health and for 
people whose legal capacity has been restricted.
Discrimination is described in the CRPD as being a viola-
tion of the inherent dignity and worth of the human person 
(Preamble, paragraph 8). Scholten, Gather and Vollmann 
( 2021) point out that the CRPD is the  rst human rights 
document that speci cally refers to disability as one of the 
socially salient attributes that should not be considered 
as a justi able grounds upon which to make a distinction, 
exclusion or restriction. The CRPD set out to eliminate dis-
crimination against people with disabilities. It takes the 
stance that it is discriminatory to deprive people with disa-
bilities, including those who lack decision-making capacity, 
of their legal capacity. According to Scholten, Gather and 
Vollmann ( 2021), a combined supported decision-making 
model, which may involve substitute decision making if 
deemed necessary, does not constitute discrimination. One 
reason for this is that the potential loss of legal capacity is 
not based on belonging to a particular group (e.g. a mar-
ginalised or socially salient group), on a diagnostic label or 
on an irrelevant property. Rather, it is based on an assess-
ment to make a speci c decision about a speci c issue at 
a speci c moment in time, having been provided with all 
possible appropriate support. Please see subsection on ‘Dif-
ferent approaches to support and empowerment’  (p.18) for 
a brief overview of some of the other approaches. For a full 
discussion about the concept of discrimination in relation 
to legal capacity in the context of the CRPD, please refer to 
the article by Scholten, Gather and Vollmann ( 2021).
Reasonable accommodation
The justi cation to treat people di erently sometimes is 
re ected in the CRPD in the concept of ‘reasonable accom-
modation’ which means:
 “necessary and appropriate modi cation and adjust-
ments not imposing a disproportionate or undue burden 
where needed in a particular case, to ensure to persons 
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with disabilities the enjoyment or exercise on an equal 
basis with others all human rights and fundamental 
freedoms” (CRPD 2006, §5.3).
The duty to provide reasonable accommodation applies to a 
wide range of stakeholders, including healthcare providers 
and providers of goods and services amongst others. It is 
a means and also an obligation to put an end to any situ-
ation of discrimination based on disability. This could, for 
example, involve making adjustments to buildings or buses, 
such as ramps and signposting, to make them accessible 
to everyone. It could also involve adapting procedures and 
services so that everyone can bene t from them and pro-
viding advice and support so that people can all enjoy not 
only the same opportunities but the same outcomes. It is 
therefore not unethical to treat people di erently, even on 
the basis of shared characteristics, provided that it does not 
disadvantage certain people based solely on their member-
ship of a socially salient group. An understanding of the 
di erence and relationship between equality and equity is 
important in this context. An approach based on equality 
involves treating everybody in the same way without tak-
ing into account di erences between people, which may be 
inherent, linked to circumstances or structurally determined.
Equity is therefore not about simply providing everyone with 
the same opportunities but about fairness and equality in 
outcomes. Issues related to inequity need to be addressed 
when striving for equal opportunities and outcomes. With 
regard to the image of a baseball match10 (please see  Figure 
1 on page 10), it is not about giving everyone the same box 
to stand on regardless of whether they need it (image on 
the le  of equality) but it’s about giving people as many 
boxes as they need to be able see over the fence and watch 
the match that others might be able to watch without need-
ing to stand on a box (image on the right of equity). The 
concept is also linked to that of solidarity. In the context 
of shared or supported decision making and inter/personal 
interactions with people with dementia, it is important to 
consider what reasonable accommodation would mean 
and what would be considered ‘reasonable’ as opposed to 
disproportionate or interfering.
Respect for personal autonomy
Individual autonomy
The concept of legal capacity is closely linked to that of 
autonomy. In Western ethics and political philosophy, 
autonomy is o en described as “a state or condition of 
10 By Craig Froehle (2016) . 
11 See Life’s Dominion: An Argument About Abortion, Euthanasia, and Individual Freedom by Ronald Dworkin (1993) . 
12 For a more detailed discussion on the issue of personhood, please see  Alzheimer Europe reports on de nitions and approaches , and 
on disability: https://www.alzheimer-europe.org/Ethics/De nitions-and-approaches/Other-ethical-principles/Personhood, https://
www.alzheimer-europe.org/Ethics/Ethical-issues-in-practice/2017-Dementia-as-a-disability-Implications-for-ethics-policy-and-practice/
Personhood-and-the-personal-experience-of-disability
self-governance, or leading one’s life according to reasons, 
values, or desires that are authentically one’s own” (Taylor 
2017). Much of the current debate surrounding autonomy is 
linked to the work of the 18th and 19th century philosophers 
Immanuel Kant and John Stuart Mill, as well as to the earlier 
work of René Descartes and John Locke (Gómez-Virseda, de 
Maeseneer and Gastmans 2019). However, the term ‘auton-
omy’ dates back to ancient Greek times when it was used 
in connection with self-rule or sovereignty of city states. 
It stems from the Greek term ‘autos’ (meaning ‘self’) and 
‘nomos’ (meaning ‘rule’). The original concept of self-gov-
ernment in relation to a city state has been extended to 
that of self-government in relation to individual human 
beings. The opposite of autonomy is heteronomy, which 
means being governed by outside in uences or external 
constraints. Autonomy is o en described in terms of the 
ability to make individual, fully-informed and independ-
ent decisions (Gómez-Vírseda et al. 2019), which renders it 
almost synonymous with decision-making capacity, with a 
focus on isolated decisions rather than decision making as 
an ongoing dynamic process. It is also o en associated with 
necessary conditions and capacities for having it, such as:
 freedom of will (not being unduly in uenced or forced),
 independence (in this context, not being dependent on 
others to make decisions and not being restricted in the 
range of options available due to being dependent on 
others for care or support),
 self-determination (being able to take decisions and 
act in ways that allow people to lead the life they want 
to live, albeit within certain unavoidable constraints, 
linked to living in civilised societies),
 sense of self (decisions and acts should re ect people’s 
sense of self - which has led to debates about critical 
and experiential interests11, as well as about current and 
past ‘selves’),
 individuality (recognition that people’s acts and deci-
sions should re ect their own wishes and desires, unique 
character and even eccentricities).
Autonomy was referred to in the Belmont report (1978) in 
relation to the principle of ‘respect for persons’ in terms of 
treating people as autonomous agents and protecting those 
with diminished autonomy. This was further developed by 
Beauchamp and Childress in their in uential publication 
on biomedical ethical principles (2001) where it was one of 
four broad moral principles, namely respect for autonomy, 
nonmale cence, bene cence and justice. Gómez-Vírseda et 
al. (2019) point out that discussions about autonomy are 
o en linked to the concepts of personhood12 and dignity. 
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According to Hanssen (2004), the desire to act ethically 
sometimes results in professional carers feeling that they 
are not respecting a person if they do not act in accordance 
with that person’s wishes (even if the person is unable or 
unwilling to make a decision, or if respecting those wishes 
would result in serious injury or harm). This is perhaps linked 
to the terminology of respect associated with the concept 
of autonomy (i.e. respect for persons and respect for auton-
omy) and/or to growing recognition that personhood ought 
not be considered as dependent on the possession of var-
ious capacities, but rather on merely belonging to the 
community of human beings.
The exercise of autonomy is usually dependent on peo-
ple having certain information, as typically emphasised in 
debates about informed consent to treatment or to par-
ticipation in research. O en, it does not give su  cient 
attention to key values such as justice, social responsibil-
ity (Gómez-Vírseda et al 2019) and the  duciary relationship 
between doctors and their  patients. See also subsection on 
informed consent  in Part 4 of this report (p.27). Hanssen 
(2004) describes the provisions in the Norwegian Nurses’ 
Code of Ethics as requiring respect for the patient’s right 
to make choices and the provision of opportunities to 
make independent choices, as well as adequate, individ-
ualised information to enable them to do so. For example, 
13 See subsection on “Legal capacity in the context of the CRPD”, particularly in relation to article 12. 
determining whether or not to move into a residential care 
home may depend on knowledge about how good it is, 
whether the sta  are friendly, speak one’s language and are 
competent, how much it costs, whether friends and visitors 
would be able or likely to visit, what the other residents are 
like, how much privacy there is, what other options there 
are instead of going there etc. These questions need to be 
considered alongside other questions such as:
 Was there a real choice or was it necessary to choose 
between two or more unsatisfactory options (e.g. linked 
to structural discrimination or to socio-economic 
inequalities)?
 Whilst the choice may have been made freely, could 
there have been some form of subtle pressure in u-
encing the decision (i.e. at the interpersonal or societal 
level)?
 Was the information suited to the person’s level of edu-
cation, literacy and understanding of the language in 
which it was written?
 Was appropriate support available to help the person to 
obtain and understand the relevance of the information 
for their life or situation?
Discussions about autonomy frequently focus on deci-
sion-making capacity13 but justice, equity and solidarity 
Source: https://medium.com/@CRA1G/the-evolution-of-an-accidental-meme-ddc4e139e0e4
Figure 1: The relationship between equality and equity
Equality Equity
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are also linked to autonomy. People with dementia do not 
necessarily have the same options and the threshold for 
accommodation that is considered ‘reasonable’ may well be 
di erent to that for other groups (e.g. for people with other 
disabilities who are in paid employment). Consequently, the 
possibilities for self-governance may well be restricted to 
a smaller world with fewer potential roads to go down (i.e. 
limiting the exercise of autonomy to the choice between 
a rock and a hard place).
Relational autonomy
Di erent people attach greater or lesser importance to dif-
ferent factors commonly associated with autonomy and 
may have a di erent understanding of what autonomy is. 
In a systematic review carried out by Gómez-Vírseda at al. 
(2019), individual autonomy is described as being based on 
a ‘misconception of the individual self’ (i.e. on an autono-
mous agent being an atomistic self, sovereign and uni ed, 
self-transparent to their individual beliefs and values and 
self-interested in their strategic choices). They further argue 
that individualistic autonomy, as portrayed in bioethics, 
has an ethnocentric bias and overlooks other values such 
as family harmony,  lial piety and community fealty. Loza 
and Omar (2017), for example, emphasise the focus in the 
Arab culture on a doctor–patient–family relationship, not 
on a doctor–patient relationship, and point out that 20 
Arab States included a reservation to article 12 of the CRPD, 
namely against everyone having the right to exercise legal 
capacity. Such oversight is problematic in today’s increas-
ingly multicultural societies.
Hanssen (2004) suggests that in Western culture, auton-
omy is very much focused on what Childress described as 
‘ rst order autonomy’. This stands in stark contrast to the 
concept of autonomy promoted in more collectivist or inter-
dependent societies where it is common for decisions to be 
made collectively and for some members of society to defer 
decision making to others (e.g. married women to their hus-
bands, unmarried women to their parents or brothers, or 
people in general to healthcare professionals). This would 
constitute ‘second order autonomy’.
It could be questioned whether handing over decision-mak-
ing power to others (e.g. to fathers, husbands or brothers) 
is really an autonomous decision, given that those who do 
so did not choose their social position within society or the 
cultural traditions surrounding decision making. In some 
contexts, as mentioned earlier, the concept of autonomy 
as an ethical principle and even a condition for respect for 
the individual is so deeply ingrained that there is a risk 
of putting pressure on people to take decisions that they 
would rather defer to others or make with others. This is 
14 See subsections on “ Supported decision making” and “ Shared decision making”  (pp.18-19).
also relevant to the issue of shared and supported decision 
making and to the importance of respecting cultural diver-
sity and promoting intercultural care and support. There is 
a need to be sensitive to cultural traditions whilst avoiding 
leaving the door wide open to paternalism.
There has also been increasing criticism of the emphasis 
on independence in relation to autonomy. Agich (2003), for 
example, suggests that:
 “the standard concept of autonomy in bioethics stresses 
the ideals of independence and rational free choice, ide-
als that appear ephemeral in the face of the wide range 
of impairments that cause individuals to need long-term 
care” (Agich 2003, p.1).
He further suggests that with people who are dependent 
on others, or faced with obstacles due to illness or disa-
bility, autonomy may be expressed through attempts to 
adapt and cope irrespective of whether reasons for actions 
or choice can be rationally explained. According to Boyle 
(2014), people all pass through varying degrees of depend-
ence and interdependence in their lives and are never fully 
independent. We all rely in some way on others. Similarly, 
Kittay calls for dependency to be reinstated as a central 
part of any human relation (2011) and for assistance to be 
viewed as a resource, not a limitation. Autonomy has also 
been described as the way that a person expresses their 
sense of self, in their relationships and in their values and 
preferences (Nu  eld Council on Bioethics 2009).
In debates about legal capacity, we need to move away from 
the emphasis on respecting autonomy as the sole means 
 of promoting independence. Care ethicists emphasise that 
autonomy is not the same as independence and that it can 
only be developed in relationships with others (Widder-
shoven and Abma 2011). Subtler approaches to autonomy 
empower a broader section of society in that they avoid 
discriminating against people who have characteristics 
which di er to those of the typical/hypothetical rational 
and independent person  that lawmakers have in mind. 
They promote equity by insisting on the right to receive 
appropriate and necessary support to make decision-mak-
ing possible whilst questioning the need to demonstrate 
decision-making capacity. They also allow for di erent 
approaches to life, accepting the valid role of emotions 
and relationships in decision making. We live in multicul-
tural societies and ethnic groups do not all have the same 
priorities and values. People from di erent ethnic groups 
must have opportunities to make decisions which re ect 
their will and preferences, re ecting di erent priorities and 
values. Relational autonomy  ts well with the concept of 
shared-decision making.14 However, drawing on Herring 
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(2001), Mäki-Petäjä Leinonen emphasises the need to con-
sider the nature of relationships and the level of incapacity:
 ..although bene cial relationships are an important part 
of people’s lives, relationships and social structures can 
also be oppressive and destructive of autonomy. There-
fore, if a person with diminishing capacity lives within 
a relational context where their carers de facto restrict 
their liberty, it is hard to see relationality as bene cial 
to their autonomy” (2016, p.149).
Paternalism
Respect for autonomy needs to be balanced with other 
principles, values and ethical approaches. There has been 
some criticism of the tendency to over-emphasise respect 
for autonomy in the context of healthcare and research 
(e.g. through the overriding emphasis on informed con-
sent). Some scholars and healthcare professionals call 
for a greater focus on the principles of bene cence and 
non-male cence (i.e. acting for the bene t of others and 
not in icting harm), especially in the context of dementia 
care (Smebye, Kirkevold and Engedal 2015). We would argue 
against creating a hierarchy of ethical principles (i.e. against 
claiming, for example, that autonomy is more important 
than bene cence, or that bene cence is more important 
than justice etc.). The unique factors in every situation need 
to be considered. This includes the context, the people con-
cerned and the relevance of di erent ethical approaches, 
principles and values in that situation.
Re ection on the relationship between respect for auton-
omy and concerns about bene cence and non-male cence 
should remain part of any debate surrounding legal capacity, 
but needs to be accompanied by re ection about paternal-
ism and best interests. However, there is a risk in making 
things too  exible that people will not know what to do. 
A structured framework for re ection would therefore be 
helpful such as, for example, the dignity-enhancing eth-
ical framework for nursing care developed by Gastmans 
(2013). This has a series of components, which people are 
encouraged to work through. One of these is for people to 
do what they think and feel is ‘right’. Another is to act on 
the decision in the knowledge that they can justify it to 
themselves and others and that they can communicate it 
to the people involved. The  nal step of the framework is to 
re ect a erwards on what happened and to consider, with 
hindsight, what could perhaps be learnt from the situation.
Certain legal provisions resulting from a restriction of legal 
capacity could be considered as being paternalistic. Accord-
ing to Dworkin (2020):
 “Paternalism is the interference of a state or an individual 
with another person, against their will, and defended 
or motivated by a claim that the person interfered with 
will be better o  or protected from harm.”
A distinction has been made between so  and hard pater-
nalism. So  paternalism consists of listening to and trying 
to determine what a person’s wishes are and either taking 
measures, attempting to persuade someone to do or not 
do something, or trying to guide them so that they do not 
make poor choices or make decisions that are likely to have 
negative consequences for them. Hard paternalism also 
has the aim of bene ting the person and/or preventing or 
mitigating harm but measures are imposed regardless of 
what people feel is best for them and of their decision-mak-
ing capacity.
Dworkin summarises the key issue, with regard to so  or 
hard paternalism, as being whether the person (to whom 
the paternalistic act is directed) is acting knowledgeably and 
voluntarily or not. Mill argued against paternalism, describ-
ing it as interfering with a person’s liberty and freedom of 
choice, which is dependent on having opportunities to make 
responsible choices and on re ective decision making, but 
did consider so  paternalism as sometimes being morally 
acceptable (see below).
These issues can be teased out through di erent approaches 
to Mill’s hypothetical case of someone crossing a broken 
bridge. Mill suggested that preventing someone from cross-
ing a broken bridge would be an acceptable form of so  
paternalism if the person does not know that the bridge 
is broken, but as unacceptable if the person is informed 
about the condition of the bridge and then wants to cross 
it (but is prevented from doing so). A hard, paternalistic 
approach would condone preventing the person from cross-
ing the bridge even if fully informed about the danger and 
still keen to take the risk. In keeping with Conly’s notion 
of ‘coercive paternalism’, it would be justi able to try to 
prevent the person from crossing the bridge if they lacked 
the ability to make a ‘rational choice’ and would be likely to 
make a poor choice. The justi cation given for this coercive/
hard paternalism is that the person’s exercise of autonomy 
is not su  ciently valuable to o set what would be lost if 
they were to decide for themselves (Devi 2013). Both forms 
of paternalism suggest that someone knows what is best 
for someone else.
Paternalism (at least hard paternalism) attributes greater 
value to protection from harm than to respect for personal 
autonomy and fails to consider the right or freedom to 
take risks, individual interpretations of what constitutes 
acceptable risk and issues related to probability (the real 
likelihood of harm occurring). The normalisation movement 
began in the 1970s and was linked to intellectual disabil-
ity and deinstitutionalisation. It is relevant to the debate 
about paternalism as it promotes ‘the dignity of risk’ rather 
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than protection. This means promoting respect for auton-
omy and the right to take part in everyday life (including 
the right to take risks in order to do so) but also complying 
with the duty of care where necessary (Peisah et al. 2013).
In keeping with the ‘harm principle’, Mill argued that a per-
son’s freedom (and hence their right) to make decisions 
which involve some degree of risk should not be restricted 
unless it harms or puts other people in danger. This suggests 
that people should all be allowed to make their own deci-
sions, even ones that are risky or do not seem to be  for their 
own good, so long as they don’t endanger others. However, 
Mill also emphasised that other people may be harmed by 
the harm that a person causes themself, because people do 
not live in isolation but in relationships with other people.
Theoretically, this would radically reduce people’s options 
as many people could claim that someone else’s decision 
was harmful to them personally. A person may, for exam-
ple, decide to forego essential treatment or pain relief and 
it may be extremely stressful for others to witness their suf-
fering. Someone else might decide to give away property to 
a casual acquaintance or leave millions to their cat, which 
their children or partner would otherwise have inherited (i.e. 
causing great sadness, disappointment and depriving them 
of  nancial means/stability). In some countries, people are 
considered as having the legal and moral right to behave 
in this way, but if actions should, ethically speaking, not 
harm others, it logically follows that most decisions should 
be made in group consultation. Indeed, in some countries 
and communities, decision-making focuses on the family 
unit or the community rather than the individual, but this 
is not the cultural norm of the majority ethnic communi-
ties in Europe. Also, many people with dementia in Europe 
live alone and have no wider family unit or community to 
support them. Ethical decision making, especially in the 
context of shared decision making, is nevertheless moving 
in the direction of involving members of a person’s entou-
rage in the decision-making process.
For people with dementia, there is always a risk of perva-
sive paternalism based on assumptions that they do not 
understand the issues at stake (e.g. due to stereotypes that 
because of their cognitive impairments they are unable to 
understand or remember the information provided or to 
assess risks), that other people are responsible for their well-
being (e.g. due to blanket labelling of people with dementia 
as vulnerable) and that other people’s peace of mind (i.e. 
their wellbeing) justi es restrictions. Box 1 below provides 
a real-life example of a situation involving concerns for the 
wellbeing of a person with dementia who is able to assess 
certain risks and wishes to take those risks.
Box 1: Point for refl ection
Hilary, a lady with dementia regularly walked her dog, Tilly, in a nearby forest. Her husband was concerned 
about her getting lost and constantly reminded her to at least take her mobile phone with her. She o en went 
out without it either because she forgot or because she thought he was exaggerating. One day, she tripped up 
and broke her ankle. There was no one around and she lay there for several hours until someone passed by and 
got help. She continued to go out walking in the forest a er this incident because that’s what made her life 
meaningful (i.e. feeling needed and nurturing the relationship with her dog, getting fresh air, meeting people 
and keeping physically  t). She was fully aware that one day she might get lost or have another accident but 
considered this a risk worth taking, and vowed to always take her phone with her.
Questions:
 Was Hilary’s husband right in trying to insist on her taking her mobile phone with her?
 Should he have perhaps also tried to persuade her not to go out alone?
 Should other more restrictive measures have been taken before or a er the accident?
 Were the concerns that Hilary’s husband had about her safety (which can be linked to her wellbe-
ing as well as his peace of mind) su  cient to override respect for her autonomy?
 How would you justify your responses to the above questions if you were asked?
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3. About legal capacity and 
decision-making capacity
Rights and abilities
So far, we have been looking at issues related to autonomy, 
independence and decision-making capacity. We now turn 
to the issue of legal capacity and its relevance to decision 
making by and for people with dementia. ‘Legal capacity’ 
is the term used to refer to the right to make decisions for 
oneself, within the constraints of the law, which must then 
be recognised as being legal and hence respected (Devi 
2013). Having legal capacity means having the right to make 
choices about everyday matters such as buying clothes, 
going on holiday, whether or not to smoke or drink alco-
hol and having certain hobbies and friends. It also means 
having the right to make choices about things with more 
serious consequences such as getting married, buying a 
house, moving into a care home or having a risky operation.
People don’t always have the opportunity to exercise their 
legal capacity (or their ‘legal capacity to act’). A common 
reason for this is that they are not considered as having the 
ability to make a decision, which is known as lack of deci-
sion-making capacity (i.e. they are considered unable to 
understand, retain and weigh up information that is relevant 
to the decision and the implications for themselves, and to 
communicate their decision). It is generally accepted that 
making an unwise or foolish decision does not necessarily 
mean that a person lacks decision-making capacity. People 
o en make decisions based on their emotions rather than 
on rational reasoning but it is probable that people with 
dementia are given less leeway in this respect. Mäki-Petä-
jä-Leinonen calls for re ection on:
 “how much rationality is to be expected in decision mak-
ing of a person with dementia (competent or not) when 
it is well known that even decisions made by healthy 
people are not always based on rational reasoning but 
merely on emotions ” (2016, p. 151).
The functional approach to legal capacity (see below) argues 
that the level of a person’s decision-making capacity deter-
mines whether they are considered as having legal capacity. 
The CRPD (see next subsection), on the other hand, argues 
that people should not need to have decision-making 
capacity to be considered as having legal capacity. This is 
a signi cant di erence of opinion with considerable implica-
tions for the rights and wellbeing of people with dementia. 
We will come back to this debate at several points in this 
report. The fact that both concepts share the word ‘capacity’, 
and that sometimes ‘capacity’ is used on its own, can some-
times lead to confusion.
There are several di erent approaches to conceptualising 
legal capacity insofar as it relates to conditions for its with-
drawal and o en, this is linked in some way to the ability 
to do things and/or make decisions :
 The ‘status approach’ equates a medical condition or 
impairment with decision-making capacity and con-
siders this su  cient grounds to revoke legal capacity, 
regardless of a person’s actual capacities. It re ects the 
medical model of disability and makes assumptions 
based on stereotypes.
 The ‘outcome approach’ focuses on the reasonable-
ness of decisions that are made, whereby a decision 
that others consider unreasonable (a refusal of treat-
ment considered by others as being essential would 
be a typical example) and might lead to the person’s 
capacity being revoked. It suggests that there are ‘right’ 
and ‘wrong’ decisions and denies people the right to 
individuality and to live their lives according to cultural, 
social, philosophical, political and religious beliefs and 
values which di er from those of the majority popu-
lation. It denies people the right to make mistakes 
and take risks.
 The ‘functional approach’ makes legal capacity depend-
ent on actual decision-making capacity. This approach 
means that a person needs to demonstrate that they 
can make an informed decision on their own. This 
would include, for example, being able to understand 
the nature and potential consequences of a particular 
decision. Gurbai argues that if mental capacity assess-
ments were to be justi ably used to determine legal 
capacity, they would have to be applied to people with 
and without disabilities and that this does not happen, 
which is why it is discriminatory (Craigie et al. 2019).
 The ‘sliding scale approach’, which is one version of the 
functional approach, provides a system of legal pro-
tection whereby a person is permitted to make certain 
decisions, either alone or with support, whereas others 
have to be made by a legally appointed representative. 
Some decisions are considered as requiring higher lev-
els of ability than others (e.g. decisions with life or 
death consequences versus decisions with more trivial 
potential consequences). The threshold for functional 
decision-making capacity is linked to the level of risk 
associated with a particular decision.
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Scholten et al. ( 2021) argue that the status approach and 
the version of the outcome approach most likely to be used 
in liberal democracies discriminate against people with 
dementia, whereas the functional approach, if employed 
correctly and when combined with supported decision-mak-
ing, does not. All approaches still make it possible for a 
person to lose legal capacity and for decision-making power 
to be handed over to other people. Nilsson (2012) suggests 
that an analysis of a person’s decision-making capacity (like 
in the functional approach) should only be used to deter-
mine the level and type of support needed and not as a 
yardstick by which to withdraw legal capacity. Scholten and 
Gather (2018), on the other hand, contend that an assess-
ment of decision-making capacity should serve not only to 
determine the level and type of support needed but also to 
determine whether the support provided su  ces to enable 
people to make their own decisions
The European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA 
2013) distinguishes between formal and informal restric-
tions of legal capacity. Formal and informal restrictions 
of legal capacity result in the loss of the right to make 
decisions recognised by law. Unlike the former, informal 
restrictions are not based on a legal or even administrative 
process but on assumptions, paternalistic attitudes, igno-
rance and institutional procedures. Whatever the nature of 
the restriction, any loss of the right to make decisions can 
have a considerable impact on people’s lives and wellbe-
ing. Being formally and publicly declared as having no or 
limited legal capacity15 may have a devastating psycholog-
ical, emotional and practical impact, a ecting self-esteem, 
constituting an a ront to a person’s dignity and a ect-
ing their personal relationships with other people and 
their standing in the community. It has been suggested 
that depriving a person of their legal capacity amounts 
to considering them as a non-person. Legal capacity is 
therefore not just a legal matter. Legal capacity and deci-
sion-making capacity are interrelated and have social and 
ethical implications.
Legal capacity in the context of 
the Convention on the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities
Article 12 of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities (CRPD) states that everyone, irrespective of dis-
ability, has the right to be considered as a person before 
the law in all aspects of life, that their decisions must be 
legally recognised and that appropriate measures must be 
taken to provide them with access to the support that they 
may need to exercise their legal capacity.
15 An example of this is the German term ‘entmündigt’.
16 2006, Ch. 6, cited by Parker 2016.
General comment No. 1 (2014), published by the Commit-
tee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities in connection 
with the CRPD, a  rms that all people with disabilities have 
full legal capacity and that:
 “the right to equal recognition before the law implies 
that legal capacity is a universal attribute inherent in 
all persons by virtue of their humanity and must be 
upheld for persons with disabilities on an equal basis 
with others” and
 “Article 12 of the Convention on the Rights of Persons 
with Disabilities, however, makes it clear that “unsound-
ness of mind” and other discriminatory labels are not 
legitimate reasons for the denial of legal capacity (both 
legal standing and legal agency)” (Committee of the 
CRPD, 2014, p.3).
The Committee further claims that the denial of legal capac-
ity to people with disabilities has led to many being deprived 
of certain fundamental rights. Kanter (in Craigie et al. 2019) 
goes one step further and argues that the right to support 
(in relation to the new right of universal legal capacity) 
has become a new human right. Whilst legal capacity is 
described as a universal human attribute (perhaps along 
the same lines as dignity), this does not mean that it can-
not be taken away. Even within the CRPD and the General 
Comment of the Committee of the CRPD, it is stated that 
this can happen (e.g. in case of bankruptcy or criminal con-
viction) but must be applicable to everyone and not based 
on personal traits such as “gender, race, or disability, or 
have the purpose or e ect of treating the person di erently”.
The CRPD does not actually de ne legal capacity and 
this may have serious consequences for the very people 
whose legal capacity the CRPD and associated measures 
are intended to promote and protect. Furthermore, it has 
raised some controversy about whether it should be inter-
preted as meaning that everyone can be supported to make 
their own decisions (which many would argue is simply 
not feasible) and that substitute decision making should 
never occur.
In the Handbook for Parliamentarians on the CRPD,16 there 
seems to be an indication of the need to have the capacity 
to understand information, appreciate consequences, act 
voluntarily and communicate a decision independently. It 
is stated that such criteria for legal capacity do not need to 
be proven if a person simply demonstrates trust in a desig-
nated supporter. Therefore, whilst everyone is assumed to 
have legal capacity, the exercise of legal capacity still seems 
to be dependent on decision-making capacity. People who 
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with all possible support cannot make a decision can use 
the supporter as a substitute, not as a substitute decision 
maker (i.e. typically de ned as a person who takes a deci-
sion on someone else’s behalf) but as a substitute possessor 
of decision-making capacity, by demonstrating trust. The 
supporter would e ectively then take a decision on that 
person’s behalf (classed as ‘total support’). This would not 
be considered as substitute decision making but as the per-
son exercising legal capacity by arranging for someone to 
act on their behalf. It is unclear to what extent and on the 
basis of which criteria a demonstration of ‘trust’ in a sup-
porter would be considered su  cient for such a decision 
(which would then be considered as constituting the exer-
cise of legal capacity of the supported person). Assumptions 
about trust could leave people open to abuse.
The CRPD implies that people may not only require sup-
port to exercise their legal capacity but that such support 
might need to be total. Article 28 of General Comment No. 
1 (Committee of the CRPD 2014) clearly states:
 “The development of supported decision-making sys-
tems in parallel with the maintenance of substitute 
decision-making regimes is not su  cient to comply 
with article 12 of the Convention.”
In accepting the possible need for 100%/total support whilst 
at the same time stating that any kind of substitute deci-
sion making is unacceptable, the CRPD makes it clear that 
support, irrespective of the level needed, does not constitute 
substitute decision making. However, the suggestion that 
some people may need total support seems to contradict 
the assumption that everyone with su  cient support can 
make their own decisions.
Some ardent defenders of a rigid interpretation of article 12 
of the CRPD argue that there may be extreme cases where a 
tiny percentage of decisions needs to be made and where a 
supporter would not be in any position to determine what 
the person would have wanted, but that a model of legal 
capacity should not be based entirely on such cases.17 Rather, 
it should be su  ciently  exible to accommodate them 
(Flynn and Arstein-Kerslake 2014). They do not, however, 
call for every wish and preference to be respected in case 
of danger, and condone over-riding wishes (in the context 
of the duty of care) but insist that this still amounts to 
respecting a person’s will and preference.18
17 For more on this topic, please see subsections on “Total support and substitute decision making - how to decide” (p.20).
18 Same as above.
According to Scholten and Gather (2018), article 12 does seem 
to call for an absolute ban on denying legal capacity and for 
all regimes of substitute decision making to be abolished 
and replaced by supported decision making. They elaborate 
several adverse consequences linked to the pursuit of these 
goals for people with mental disabilities:
 Insisting that people know what is best for them and 
are therefore best placed to make decisions overlooks 
cases where people (e.g. with seriously impaired deci-
sion-making capacity) do not necessarily know what is 
best for them (i.e. in keeping with their own values and 
priorities) and/or which decision will result in what they 
feel is best for them.
 Supported decision making emphasises the provision 
of support but there is little recognition of the risk 
of supporters being biased and either deliberately or 
unconsciously projecting their own interests onto the 
person whom they are supporting. It may be di  cult for 
third parties to challenge decisions made because the 
supported person retains legal capacity and has there-
fore made the decision themselves. Teasing out possible 
undue in uence is likely to be more di  cult than chal-
lenging a decision made on someone else’s behalf.
 Linked to the above, the person who makes the decision 
is entirely responsible for any consequences resulting 
from the decision made. Supporters may have consider-
ably in uenced that decision but it would be di  cult to 
trace the exact nature, extent and possible underlying 
motives of such support, and to hold them account-
able for the decision. Collective responsibility is hard 
to determine.
 Support for decision making requires time, money and 
e ort so it is important to decide on conditions for 
its provision. It is stated in the CRPD that support to 
exercise legal capacity should not be based on mental 
capacity assessments but on non-discriminatory indi-
cators. Scholten and Gather question what these might 
be other than decision-making capacity.
 Advance care planning is inextricably linked to the 
notion of decision-making capacity. Advance direc-
tives, for example, come into force when a person is 
declared as lacking decision-making capacity and hence 
no longer being considered as having legal capacity.
DEMENTIA IN EUROPE ETHICS REPORT 2020 | 17
Current legislation in the light of the 
CRPD
Although the CRPD, as mentioned earlier, has been rati ed 
by all member states of the European Union, some meas-
ures of legal protection currently involve and are dependent 
on the restriction or withdrawal of a person’s legal capacity, 
resulting in people no longer being allowed to make certain 
decisions about their lives. Nilsson (2012) suggests that the 
bulk of European legal capacity systems is outdated and 
that there is a need for law reform based on the assumption 
that everybody enjoys legal capacity, with a move away from 
a focus on de ciencies. Many people in Europe continue to 
be deprived of their legal capacity and placed under meas-
ures of plenary or partial guardianship (Nilsson 2012). Some 
laws still re ect a paternalistic approach re ecting a per-
ception of the need to protect individuals and society from 
harm, which may partly re ect stereotypes about people 
with mental health conditions being dangerous and vio-
lent (Pathare and Shields 2012). Certain conditions, such as 
schizophrenia, tend to be more associated with danger to 
others through violence (Reavley, Jorm and Morgan 2016),19
whereas others, such as dementia, tend to be more associ-
ated with unintentional harm to self and others (Crisp 2005, 
Werner 2005). A common response to each has been to limit 
people’s legal capacity and to restrict various freedoms.
With regard to the imprecise and sometimes misleading use 
of language in the CRPD and in relation to legal and deci-
sion-making capacity in general, Gardner states :
 “Indeterminacies of language and intention on the part 
of lawmakers, moreover, can a  ict law in such a way as 
to frustrate its role as a  ller of moral gaps” (2010, p.423).
The CRPD is not a law but its provisions are legally bind-
ing for the countries which have rati ed it. It therefore has 
great potential but the ambiguity of terminology and con-
cepts in it may impact on its ability to improve the lives and 
wellbeing of the very people it targets. Such ambiguity was 
reportedly intentional, serving as a means to achieve con-
sensus, but it may be detrimental to people with disabilities 
in that it allows for diametrically opposed interpretations 
(Pearl 2013).
The way that article 12 of the CRPD is interpreted will, accord-
ing to Pathare and Shields (2012), determine future practices 
and legislation. They describe the key problem as not being 
in understanding the ideals of article 12 but in truly shi -
ing from substitute decision-making to a more supportive 
mode. Di  culties of implementation have also been linked 
19 Note: This is a matter of perceptions o en fuelled by the media. Several mental health organisations refer to research which suggests that alcohol 
and drug use is a more reliable predictor of violent behaviour than is mental disorder and that the vast majority of violent acts are committed by 
people who do not have a mental disorder.
20 Labour Senator Mary Moran quoted in “thejournal.ie” – 17/12/ 2015.
to a risk of the provisions in article 12 being reduced to 
mere rhetoric (Pearl 2013) and to substitute decision mak-
ing under a new name (Nilsson 2012). However, di erent 
patient and interest groups campaigning for law reform 
are also driven by di erent interpretations of article 12 of 
the CRPD and di erent interests and values of the groups 
they represent. The World Network of Users and Survivors 
of Psychiatry, for example, have a strict interpretation based 
on a complete refusal of substitute decision making. Some 
disability organisations interpret it as permitting guardi-
anship measures subject to certain safeguards as a last 
resort (Pearl 2013), which is the approach supported by the 
authors of this report.
The model implicitly proposed in article 12 of the CRPD is 
based on the need to assess what kind and level of support 
is needed rather than whether a person has decision-mak-
ing capacity and should have a substitute decision maker 
appointed (Devi 2013). Whilst governments in Europe are 
obliged to bring their legislation into line with the CRPD and 
to replace substitute decision making, based on the prin-
ciple of best interests, with the more inclusive supported 
decision-making approach, there remains a considerable 
disconnect between the CRPD and national legislation.
The recent Assisted Decision-Making (Capacity) Act 2015 of 
the Republic of Ireland, for example, has a clear structured 
approach to ‘assisted decision-making’ which includes the 
appointment of a decision-making assistant and/or co-de-
cision maker, as well as provisions for advance healthcare 
directives. It does not abolish guardianship as it allows for a 
decision-making representative to make one or more deci-
sions on a person’s behalf. However, a co-decision maker 
must be
 “a relative or friend of the appointer who has had such 
personal contact with the appointer over such period 
of time that a relationship of trust exists between them” 
(Part 4, 17, 2a).
This means that people who live alone or do not have a rel-
ative or friend  tting this criterion would be more likely to 
be deprived of their legal capacity. Nevertheless, this act, 
which replaced the Lunacy Act of 1871 and abolished the 
use of terms such as ‘lunatic’ and ‘idiot’, has been hailed as 
marking a historic point in the  ght for equality.20
Irrespective of how article 12 of the CRPD is interpreted, it 
could be argued that the CRPD has been useful in reinforcing 
the gradual transition away from approaches based solely 
on best interests and substitute decision making to others 
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based on shared and, more speci cally, supported decision 
making, both of which are inclusive approaches to decision 
making. This is re ected in recent changes in legislation 
related to legal capacity, in favour of approaches which 
require the involvement of people lacking decision-mak-
ing capacity in the decision-making process and/or provide 
the necessary support to enable them to make a decision.
Diff erent approaches to support 
and empowerment
The move away from the concept of substitute decision 
making and of acting in other people’s ‘best interests’ has 
been perceived as a challenge to the deeply entrenched 
paternalism. This has been particularly noticeable in the 
context of guardianship measures, as well as in the con-
text of healthcare and involvement in research, where the 
concepts of shared and supported decision making are 
increasingly common. Indeed, it is now widely accepted 
that there is a moral imperative to involve people who lack 
decision-making capacity in decision making concerning 
their lives. It re ects respect for human rights and may 
help reduce unnecessary treatment and improve outcomes. 
There is evidence to suggest that people with dementia do 
not receive the same level of treatment as people without 
dementia, even when they have a higher clinical need,21 sug-
gesting structural discrimination and the need for possible 
support to ensure respect for their rights. 
Supported decision making
Recognition of legal capacity in di erent domains (e.g. 
consent to treatment or moving into residential care) has 
long been dependent on an evaluation of decision-making 
capacity and other capacities, such as the capacity to live 
independently etc. Such evaluations have typically sought 
to ascertain whether a person is able to provide informed 
consent (i.e. whether a person is able to understand rele-
vant information, apply it to their own life, decide freely/
voluntarily and communicate their decision by whatever 
means available or possible for  them). This could include, 
for example, whether a treatment would be risky, what the 
possible alternatives might be, what kind of side e ects 
there might be and how it might a ect the person’s prog-
nosis and everyday life.
The concept of supported decision making is about pro-
viding the necessary support for someone to make a 
decision whereby that person retains their legal capacity, 
even though they would not have been considered capable 
21 One example is the under treatment of osteoporosis in people with dementia, even though osteoporotic fractures are common amongst people with 
dementia (see Haasum et al. 2012).
22 https://www.nice.org.uk/guidance/ng97/resources/antipsychotic-medicines-for-treating-agitation-aggression-and-distress-in-people-living-with-
dementia-patient-decision-aid-pdf-4852697005
of deciding in the absence of that support. The person or 
people providing the support are not necessarily relatives 
but could be anyone whom the person trusts. This support 
might, for example, involve providing information, explain-
ing issues, describing di erent possible consequences of 
various options or helping the person to communicate the 
decision.
Various decision aids have been developed to facilitate the 
process of shared and supported decision making. One 
Scotland (Scottish Government), for example, has produced 
guidelines on supported decision making for people with 
dementia. This covers the provision of relevant information, 
facilitating communication, various aids (including docu-
ments, websites, DVDs and devices), choosing the best time 
and place and involving other people. The National Insti-
tute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE) has a range of 
decision aids including one on antipsychotic medicines for 
treating agitation, aggression and distress in people living 
with dementia, which is described as consisting of “infor-
mation to help people living with dementia, their family 
members and carers and their healthcare professionals dis-
cuss the options”. This contains a non-technical summary 
of the di erent options, what NICE recommends, how peo-
ple are likely to bene t, possible side-e ects, other things 
to think about and visual representations of the risk of 
stroke and death.22
Support might also include the supporter actually com-
municating the decision but, in such cases, the supported 
person would still be considered as having legal capacity. 
The important point is that the supporter or supporters 
must advise and act according to the person’s will and pref-
erences, in keeping with the person’s identity and respecting 
the right to take certain risks and to make decisions that 
other people might consider wrong.
As mentioned earlier, some people interpret the CRPD as 
implying that if supported, everyone or virtually everyone 
can make their own decisions (i.e. has decision-making 
capacity) and that supported decision making can replace 
substitute decision making (Parker 2016). Supported deci-
sion making is thus presented as the practical means and 
justi cation for the claim that everyone has legal capacity. 
However, it remains unclear what ‘decision-making capac-
ity’ means, whether it is essential to have it (because all 
people have legal capacity according to the CRPD) and if it 
isn’t, what the justi cation is for providing necessary sup-
port. Clari cation would also be needed on where the law 
stands in this case on issues such as consent to treatment, 
the legality of testaments and people’s right to decide to 
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continue living at home regardless of any danger they may 
pose to themselves or others.
If supported decision making is not linked to an evaluation 
of the capacity to make a decision (i.e. under the CRPD), it is 
unclear at what point or how much support should be pro-
vided, but also how decision making is conceptualised. As 
decisions always involve at least two options, is it su  cient 
to indicate which one it will be or is some level of under-
standing nevertheless necessary of the di erence between 
and implications of each option? There must be some level 
of understanding as opposed to arbitrarily selecting option 
A or option B. If so, then as Parker (2016) suggests, deci-
sion making must involve the fundamental ability to make 
choices or as Smith and Sullivan (2012, p.33) describe it “the 
ability to evaluate options and recall having made a choice”.
Shared decision making
Shared decision making is one form of support that recog-
nises the validity of the experience, views and preferences 
of the person directly concerned by a particular decision (in 
this case the person with dementia) but also that people 
live and move within networks of relations, and challenges 
paternalistic attitudes and practices. The concept of shared 
decision is in keeping with the concept of relational auton-
omy. Gómez-Vírseda et al. (2019) suggest that the in uence 
of other people in the decision-making process enhances 
rather than impedes autonomy, and should therefore be 
actively promoted. They point out that relatives and health 
care professionals can promote decision-making capacity 
by presenting di erent options, providing emotional sup-
port, removing social barriers and bridging gaps between 
the person making the decision and the social environment.
Shared decision making should be seen as health and social 
care professionals and patients each laying all their cards on 
the table and then working together to reach consensus on 
the preferred treatment plan (Peisah et al. 2013). Peisah and 
colleagues emphasise the role of assent in shared decision 
making (e.g. in cases where people are unwilling or unable 
to play a more active role in the decision-making process). 
The exercise of power and in uence (presumably on the part 
of the health and social care professionals) is perceived in 
terms of best serving patients’ needs. Some see it as a means 
to redress the imbalance created by transferral of the locus 
of authority from doctors to patients, which resulted from 
legitimate societal demands to promote patients’ rights but 
which some consider unhelpful (Truog 2012). Truog (2012) fur-
ther emphasises that doctors are experts in facts and that 
such knowledge cannot hold sway over questions of values 
and preferences, hence the need for a collaborative approach 
between doctors and patients.
23 See subsection on “Ethical persuasion and in uence in the context of shared or supported decision making (p.20).
 “This division of labour re ects a recognition of the natu-
ralistic fallacy, the erroneous notion that one can derive 
ethical conclusions from scienti c facts; in truth, an 
“ought” cannot be deduced from an “is” (2012, p. 581) .
A collaborative approach to  decision making extends 
beyond mere assent (whereby patients come to identify 
with a decision and make it their own) to one which gives 
greater room for patients to determine di erent levels of 
participation and to engage in a more equal exchange in 
which they provide information about their values, goals 
and non-medical factors which make life meaningful to 
them and contribute towards their identity. The collabora-
tive approach is broader, involving a wider range of people, 
not only health and social care professionals but also sup-
porters, assistants and relatives etc. in the context of a care 
plan rather than isolated decisions. It is not clear, however, 
how this is coordinated.
Any in uence should not take the form of pressure and in u-
ence should not be ‘undue’ (i.e. to a level that is more than 
is necessary, acceptable or reasonable). On the other hand, 
an over-emphasis on avoiding undue in uence and the exer-
cise of power by doctors may lead to a kind of mandatory 
autonomy, lack of advice and lack of adequate support for 
people making di  cult medical decisions (Peisah et al. 2013). 
This would involve doctors limiting themselves to the pro-
vision of facts and di erent options but withholding their 
own experience and recommendations.23
Shared decision making is a means to promote auton-
omy, especially within the context of real-life situations of 
interdependency (Peisah et al. 2013). It is a more positive 
approach to autonomy, which is much more than simply 
having a right to self-governance or a right to be le  alone 
(Agich 2003). Widdershoven and Abma describe autonomy, 
in keeping with a care ethics approach, not as self-deter-
mination without the interference of others, but as “the 
ability to direct and shape one’s own life based on and in 
relationships with others” (2011, p.27).
For many people with dementia, participating or sharing in 
the decision-making process is as important as, if not more 
important than, making the actual decision (Daly, Bunn and 
Goodman 2018). However, there are a few potential barriers 
to e ective shared decision making such as not feeling suf-
 ciently informed or supported, fears about the ability to 
engage in shared decision making or of being considered 
a di  cult patient, the impact of cultural factors linked to 
help-seeking on willingness to share decision making and 
having no family or friends to involve (Pathare and Shields 
2012). Moreover, some people may have relatives but not 
necessarily wish to involve them. In some cases, relatives 
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might take advantage of people with dementia under the 
guise of supporting them.
Ethical persuasion and infl uence in the context 
of shared or supported decision making
Appropriate persuasion and in uence may be ethically jus-
ti able in the context of shared and supported decision 
making. When healthcare professionals decide which infor-
mation to give patients and how to explain or frame key 
options, they are inevitably also in uencing the decisions 
that patients and their families make. Dubov (2015) sug-
gests that they should assume responsibility for this and 
use it constructively to help their patients to reach a solu-
tion that from a medical perspective makes most sense and 
from a personal perspective corresponds to patients’ val-
ues and long-term goals. Doctors are o en best placed to 
know what the options are and which ones would be best 
for their patients, provided that they know their patients 
well and understand their values.
Doctors need to  nd out about their patients’ values so 
as to be able to match those values with the medical 
facts relevant to each patient’s situation. They also need 
to be able to recognise, validate and respond appropri-
ately to people’s emotions. Emotions are considered as 
being connected to beliefs in the sense that people fear 
something (e.g. grizzly bears, taking exams or losing their 
jobs) because of associated beliefs (e.g. being killed, being 
labelled a failure or ending up homeless). O en, emo-
tions are directed at people because of reasons or beliefs 
(e.g. feeling anger towards someone or disappointment 
with someone), although the cognitive aspect of emo-
tions may be conscious or unconscious (Dubov 2015). They 
are not just bodily reactions. People with dementia, who 
have di  culties with abstract thought, may sometimes 
have limited awareness of the possible reasons for their 
emotions or be able to explain them. The emotions may 
nevertheless be a way for doctors to reach out and try to 
understand what is important to them, and to use this 
to provide decision-making support.
When done in the right manner (i.e. as a collaborative/
shared exercise with patients and their families), Dubov 
claims that the careful choice and framing of the infor-
mation provided and taking into consideration people’s 
emotions would not constitute paternalism, manipulation, 
coercion or deception, and can be a positive tool in medical 
communication. In the context of possible restraint or invol-
untary placement (see section  4), the issue is more complex 
because there is a pending threat of coercive measures 
being applied if the ‘right’ decision is not made.
Total support and substitute decision making – 
how to decide
In addition to the obvious example of a person who is in 
a coma, many people with extremely advanced dementia 
(who o en have di  culties with verbal communication) 
or in a state of delirium lack decision-making capacity for 
many decisions. Scott Kim describes the justi cation for 
substitute decision making as follows:
 “The best reason (and the only reason) why we sometimes 
need to make decisions for others – why we cannot jetti-
son the concept of mental capacity altogether - is that it 
is just a basic fact that some people cannot make deci-
sions for themselves in any commonly accepted sense of 
the word ‘decision’” (In Craigie et al. 2019, p .164).
Given improvements in healthcare, there are a lot of peo-
ple living with advanced dementia. This does not represent 
a tiny percentage of decisions that need to be made for 
which it is extremely di  cult, and sometimes impos-
sible, to determine people’s wishes. It is therefore not 
helpful or even ethical to promote a concept (such as 
everyone having legal capacity irrespective of the ability 
to make a decision) which only works well or makes sense 
in relation to the majority. It leaves the door wide open 
to abuse and discrimination. If the needs and the situ-
ation of this subgroup of the population were properly 
addressed, without having to twist or distort the con-
cept to make it work, their legal capacity could be better 
respected and promoted.
Moreover, Parker (2016, p.387) asks, “what exactly does a 
requirement for support in decision-making amount to, par-
ticularly in relation to people who cannot understand relevant 
information, appreciate consequences, act voluntarily or com-
municate decisions?” People may  nd themselves faced with 
unrealistic expectations if it is assumed that they can be 
supported but support is not available or appropriate. People 
from minority ethnic groups, for example, who do not have 
a good command of the national language, are not known 
to the people charged with their support and have no fam-
ily, would in many cases lack culturally appropriate support.
In the context of total support, which critics might argue 
amounts to substitute decision making, the CRPD calls for 
determinations of people’s best interests to be replaced by 
determinations of ‘will and preferences’. Where it is not pos-
sible to know this/these, a ‘best interpretation of will and 
preferences’ is proposed so as to ensure that people with 
disabilities enjoy the right to legal capacity on an equal 
basis with others (Committee of CRPD 2014, p. 5).
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It is problematic, however, when there is no information 
available at all about a person’s will and preferences, and 
also when the person in question did not provide any indi-
cation of trust in a supporter. Various solutions have been 
proposed such as the observation of people ‘in a friendly 
manner’ over a period of time, paying attention to their 
gestures and as far as possible involving them in decision 
making through activities which enable the exploration of 
their likes and dislikes (Devi 2103). Provided that people are 
able to communicate in some way, even if not in the con-
ventional way, this might help guide supporters but it is 
doubtful whether such an approach would be feasible in all 
situations (e.g. when supporters have been appointed by a 
court, are not familiar with the person concerned and have 
many people to support within a limited period of time).
Flynn and Arstein-Kerslake (2014) describe the role of facili-
tators (in the context of total support) as being to imagine 
what a person’s will and preferences would be, but one 
could ask whether this is realistic. In some cases, the only 
knowledge one has of a person is certain characteristics 
such as age, gender and diagnosis, and perhaps some 
visible signs which might (rightly or wrongly) suggest eth-
nicity, religious beliefs and socio-economic background. Any 
assumption of will and preferences can therefore only be 
based on stereotypes and personal bias, and risks re ect-
ing and perpetuating prejudice and discrimination. In some 
cases, it could be claimed that appropriate and adequate 
support was provided and that the person was properly 
involved in the decision-making process. However, this is, 
a er all, a matter of opinion. In some cases, such claims 
could hide an abuse of people’s rights and constitute sub-
tle coercion.
One approach proposed is to look for subtle signs in a 
person’s behaviour and another is through a narrative con-
struction of personal identity, which involves other people 
 nding an answer to the question “who is the disabled per-
son?” – based on their life story of values, aims, needs and 
challenges (Pearl 2013). Both approaches, however, neces-
sitate the involvement of someone who knows the person 
very well, and are open to abuse. Questions arise such as:
 Does a certain facial expression or gesture really com-
municate agreement or could the opposite be the case?
 Does the person’s life story of values really correspond 
to the decision being made?
 How well does the supporter really know the person 
with dementia and their values and needs?
 How long is it since the supporter spent much time 
with them?
 How close was this person, ever, to the person with 
dementia?
Skowron (2019) draws attention to the ambiguous nature of 
the term ‘best interpretation’, pointing out that it could be 
referring to the outcome or the process of interpretation. A 
key issue is whether supporters should be doing their best, 
even when extremely di  cult, to involve people in decisions 
about their lives or simply adopting the best approach to 
e ective interpretation. Skowron suggests that “interpre-
tation implies familiarity with the thing interpreted” (2019, 
p. 126) and that the Committee of the CRPD asks support-
ers to interpret the unknown rather than to determine it. 
One way of understanding the term ‘best’ in this context 
would be ‘true’ in the sense of one interpretation that is 
not better than another interpretation but rather one that 
is the closest to ‘fact’ (i.e. to what the person does actually 
want). A person’s will and preferences are not, however, set 
in stone. Kvale and Brinkmann (2009) describe the collec-
tion of qualitative data using the analogy of a miner and 
a traveller, whereby data is not a treasure to be uncovered 
intact if you dig deep enough with the right tools but rather 
like a story that a traveller pieces together through inter-
action with people in the course of a journey and which is 
constructed and developed as a consequence of that inter-
action. The same could perhaps be said of a person’s will and 
preferences. These do not lie there intact but are constantly 
constructed and reconstructed in a particular context within 
a changing environment and social context.
This has led to debates about di erent levels of will and a 
distinction being made between preferences related to a 
particular matter and more general beliefs and desires based 
on deeply held, reasonably stable and reasonably coherent 
personal values (Smuzkler 2017, cited in Skowron 2019). This 
is slightly reminiscent of Dworkin’s (1993) experiential and 
critical interests and aside from the persistent problem of 
interpretation, there is a risk of deciding on other people’s 
behalf what is most important to them, and failing to val-
idate their right to evolve in terms of what they consider 
important in life. The experience of having a condition, such 
as dementia, can lead to signi cant changes in priorities 
and wishes and there is a risk of trapping people and fail-
ing to recognise their right to change.
Skowron (2019) concludes that ‘best interpretation’ is not 
solely an approach to be adopted as a last resort when it 
is impossible to determine people’s will and preferences. 
Rather, it is a call to include people with disabilities in every-
day interpretive practices, for clarity on how to interpret 
will and preferences in general, and for a realisation that 
will and preferences are not static but dynamic. This calls 
for attention to the way that people (including supporters) 
are always in some way making assumptions. It could also 
be understood within the context of the social construc-
tion of meanings.
Combined supported decision-making model
In this last subsection, we consider a practical and ethical 
way forward based on the model developed by Scholten and 
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Gather (2018). They argue that supported decision making 
should not necessarily completely replace substitute deci-
sion making but should be perceived in the framework of 
reasonable accommodation. They propose a ‘combined sup-
ported decision-making model’ which combines supported 
 decision making with competence assessment (2018). This 
is based on the view that it is sometimes permissible to 
deny people the right to make their own decisions but that 
this should only be the case for people whose functional 
decision-making capacity is substantially impaired and 
if all resources of supported decision-making have been 
exhausted.
The combined supported decision-making model respects 
and promotes the autonomy of people with dementia in 
three ways:
1. it respects the decisions of people with dementia who 
have decision-making capacity 
2. it promotes the autonomy of people with dementia 
whose decision-making capacity is impaired by sup-
porting their decisions and
3. it respects the precedent autonomy of people with 
dementia whose decision-making capacity remains 
impaired despite the provision of support by basing 
substitute decisions on the will and preferences of the 
person.
At the same time, it protects people with dementia who 
are vulnerable due to impaired decision-making capacity 
against abuse and undue in uence.
The combined supported decision-making model proposed 
by Scholten and Gather (2018) consists of the following six 
steps.
1. Presumption of decision-making capacity: Everyone 
in our society should initially be deemed competent to 
make their own decisions and their decisions should be 
treated as carrying legal e ect. This also holds for peo-
ple with dementia.
2. Rebuttal of the presumption: The presumption of deci-
sion-making capacity can be rebutted only if there are 
concrete indications that a person might lack deci-
sion-making capacity. A diagnosis of dementia is not 
enough to rebut the presumption of decision-making 
capacity. A diagnosis of dementia is, however, a relevant 
factor, since dementia is a risk factor for impaired deci-
sion-making capacity (Kim 2010, pp. 42-44). A diagnosis 
of dementia should trigger an assessment of deci-
sion-making capacity only if other factors also exist, for 
example, the person shows abrupt changes in their men-
tal state, refuses recommended treatment or consents 
to particularly risky or invasive treatment (Grisso and 
Appelbaum 1998, pp. 61-76). A refusal of recommended 
treatment should be considered in the context of the 
stakes involved. This should be based on re ection about 
the balance between the consequences of refusal and 
the possible e ects of treatment on the person’s health, 
potentially resulting in a more structured assessment 
of a person’s decision-making capacity.
3. Assessment of decision-making capacity: An assess-
ment of decision-making capacity consists of a 
semi-structured conversation of 20-30 minutes about 
the decision to be taken. During this conversation, the 
assessor should assess whether the person is able  to: (a) 
understand the potential consequences of the various 
options, (b) apply this understanding to their own sit-
uation, (c) evaluate the consequences of the treatment 
options in light of their values and commitments, and 
(d) communicate a treatment choice (Grisso and Appel-
baum 1998, Kim 2010).
4. Supported decision-making: If the assessment shows 
that the person possesses the required abilities, they can 
make their own decisions and these decisions will carry 
legal e ect. If, on the other hand, the assessment shows 
that the person’s decision-making abilities are substan-
tially impaired, supported decision-making should be 
provided in order to enhance the person’s abilities and 
bring them in the position to make their own decisions. 
As examples of supported decision-making, Scholten 
and Gather (2018) mention everyday interventions (e.g. 
giving time to adapt or providing tranquil surroundings), 
interventions that improve the quality of the disclo-
sure information (e.g. enhanced consent procedures), 
interventions that facilitate communication (e.g. plain 
language, braille or sign language) and social support 
from family, friends or peers. Support could also incorpo-
rate elements of shared decision making, subject to the 
person with dementia being in favour of such support.
5. Monitoring: During the provision of supported  decision 
making, the conversation about the decision to be taken 
should continue and it should be monitored whether the 
support provided enhances the person’s abilities up to 
a point at which they are in the position to make their 
own choices. In this process, it should also be monitored 
whether support people (consciously or unconsciously) 
exert undue in uence on the person.
6. Substitute decision making: If it turns out that sup-
ported decision making enhances the person’s abilities 
to a su  cient extent, they can make their own deci-
sion and this decision carries legal e ect. If supported 
 decision making proves insu  cient and all reasonably 
available resources for support have been exhausted, a 
substitute decision maker should make a decision on 
behalf of the person. The guiding question for substi-
tute decision makers is not what they prefer, nor what 
they would prefer if they were in the person’s situation. 
Rather, they should ask themselves what the person 
would want in the situation if they had decision-mak-
ing capacity. The answer to this question can be seen 
as the “best interpretation of the person’s will and 
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preferences” (Szmukler 2019). Evidence for the person’s 
will and preferences is provided by (a) an advance direc-
tive, (b) previously communicated preferences with 
regard to the choice at hand, (c) the person’s values and 
commitments, and (d) the person’s best interest. This 
is a prioritised list, meaning that substitute  decision 
makers should make decisions based on, for example, 
the best interest of the person only if all the other 
sources of evidence about the person’s will and pref-
erences are unavailable or insu  ciently clear.
Recommendations on legal capacity and decision making
1. The following recommendations should be considered in combination with those related to the various 
issues discussed in Part 4 of this report.
2. It should be presumed that a person with dementia has legal capacity unless:
 there is reason to suspect that the person’s condition may be negatively a ecting their decision-making 
capacity (not merely that they have a diagnosis of dementia)  and
 all possible measures have been taken to support them to make a particular decision and this has not 
been successful.
3. Any restriction of legal capacity:
 should be in relation to a speci c decision, skill or area of  decision making
 should take into account possible  uctuations of decision-making capacity and the possibility of some-
one being able to decide on the same issue on another occasion 
 should not be based on the assessment of a skill that a person has not yet acquired but may be capable 
of learning with time and support 
 should not be more extensive/far-reaching than necessary 
 should have been made a er a legal or o  cial procedure, recognised by the State and for which the per-
son with dementia was involved, heard and supported 
 should be open to being challenged  and
 should not be irreversible.
4. The provision of necessary, relevant and timely support should be organised in a systematic and structured 
manner such as the combined supported decision-making model (please see  pages 22-23).
5. People with dementia who lack legal capacity in relation to a particular decision or area of decision making 
(e.g. managing  nances or making a will) should not be publicly labelled (e.g. as ‘incapacitated’ or ‘incom-
petent’) or asked to reveal such information unless strictly necessary.
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4. Ethical issues related to the 
exercise of legal capacity in 
everyday life 
24 Corrigendum of 26 January 2018.
In Part 4 of this report, we explore di erent issues and areas 
of daily life for which legal capacity and decision-making 
capacity are relevant to the lives and wellbeing of people 
with dementia. The topics addressed include:
 Guardianship,
 Treatment, care and support,
 Advance care planning,
 Participation in research,
 Coercive measures (including restrictions of freedom, 
the use of restraint and measures adopted during the 
COVID-19 pandemic),
 Civil and political life (including voting, marriage/part-
nerships and making a will/testament).
Each section includes a set of recommendations, which 
should be considered in addition to the general recommen-
dations on legal capacity and decision making on  page 23.
Guardianship
Guardianship is particularly relevant to debates surrounding 
legal capacity and dementia. In this fourth section of the 
report, we will address broad issues linked to guardianship. 
As explained in the previous section, situations arise where 
some people with dementia are unable to make decisions 
a ecting their own lives and wellbeing. Most countries still 
have legal provisions, which are applied in such situations 
and which result in some loss of legal capacity. The Commit-
tee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (2014) points 
out that substitute decision-making regimes can take many 
di erent forms, including plenary guardianship, judicial 
interdiction and partial guardianship. Article 27 of General 
Comment No. 124 provides details of certain characteristics 
that these regimes have in common, namely that they are 
systems where: 
1. legal capacity is removed from a person, even if this is 
in respect of a single decision,
2. a substitute decision-maker can be appointed by some-
one other than the person concerned, and this can be 
done against that person’s will, and
3. any decision made by a substitute decision-maker is 
based on what is believed to be in the objective ‘best 
interests’ of the person concerned, as opposed to being 
based on the person’s own will and preferences.
Guardianship therefore refers to situations where a legal 
representative (a guardian) takes legally binding decisions 
for a person placed under a protective measure. Several 
countries use other terms such as curatorship, tutorship, 
legal representation, proxy decision making and surrogate 
decision making either instead of or alongside guardian-
ship. In this report, we are using the term ‘guardianship’ as 
a generic term and in order to distinguish between the kind 
of substitute decision-making regime described above and 
other approaches to legal representation such as powers 
of attorney which can be granted and used irrespective of 
decision-making or legal capacity. Guardianship is also sep-
arate from supported decision making whereby a person 
is assisted in the decision-making process but retains the 
full power to make decisions under the law. The ‘personligt 
ombud’ (personal ombudsperson) is a system which oper-
ates in Sweden and is sometimes cited as a good example 
of supported decision making, re ecting the spirit of the 
provisions of article 12 of the CRPD depending on one’s inter-
pretation of it. It does not, however, replace guardianship 
measures which are still in force. Appendix 2 provides an 
overview of the support o ered by a local NGO for ombud-
speople in the county of Skåne.
Concerning the point made earlier about what constitutes 
autonomy, Shakespeare’s concept of independence implies 
that having a guardian does not mean having no autonomy. 
On the contrary, the choice and control over possible assis-
tance required should be considered as an example of the 
exercise of autonomy (Morris 2001). Nevertheless, insofar 
as the provisions of the CRPD are concerned, guardianship 
is not in keeping with respect for a person’s legal capacity 
as it restricts or limits their right to make decisions that 
would be recognised by the law. The   h paragraph of arti-
cle 12 of the CRPD states that people with disabilities have 
the right to own property and to manage their  nancial 
a airs. The management of  nancial a airs is o en a key 
aspect of guardianship measures for people with dementia.
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Whereas some guardianship measures consist of one 
measure which is su  ciently  exible to be adapted to the 
needs of the person designated as requiring support (e.g. 
in Germany), others have two or more di erent measures 
corresponding to the person’s needs (e.g. in France and Lux-
embourg). Partial guardianship is o en considered better 
in that it is linked to less loss of legal capacity as opposed 
to a global loss of legal capacity. Also, it is in keeping with 
the move away from totally depriving people of their legal 
capacity. This respects the principle of proportionality 
whereby the least restrictive measure should always be 
considered  rst. The di erence between partial and plenary 
guardianship is not, however, always respected, resulting 
in guardians abusing their decision-making power and the 
people under guardianship not knowing which decisions 
the latter can and cannot take (Nilsson 2012). It should also 
be borne in mind that members of the public and even 
government o  cials do not always know the extent of a 
guardian’s decision-making power. In situations where the 
person with dementia has di  culty making a decision and 
communicating it but has a known guardian who is pres-
ent, there is a risk of the guardian being expected or asked 
to take certain decisions. This amounts to informal loss of 
legal capacity, based on ignorance and in some cases the 
desire for everyone concerned (except perhaps the person 
with dementia who might not even be aware that a deci-
sion is being made) to  nd a practical solution to a di  cult 
situation. Procedures which can result in the global loss of 
legal capacity are diametrically opposed to the provisions 
of the CRPD and in many cases do not correspond to the 
real needs and capacities of people with dementia.
Within the context of guardianship, people have certain 
rights (e.g. to challenge decisions made on their behalf, to be 
present and heard during the legal process surrounding the 
measure and the accompanying loss of legal capacity, and 
to be noti ed). In practice, this does not necessarily happen. 
People wishing to challenge a particular decision do so as a 
person who has been legally declared as lacking legal capac-
ity, and perhaps also as someone who has been malignantly 
positioned as ‘defective’ (Sabat 2008) and hence unable to 
decide what is ‘good for them’. Awareness of this situation 
is likely to a ect a person’s self-esteem and con dence to 
challenge a decision. In some cases, there would also be 
relational issues involved and dilemmas linked to living with 
and being dependent on the guardian for care and support. 
This may also be applicable in the case of court procedures 
to determine legal capacity in that the person concerned 
may feel (probably rightly so) that they are already con-
sidered as lacking capacity by highly quali ed healthcare 
professionals and o en also by their families. It therefore 
takes a lot of courage, determination and self-con dence 
to go against the whole system alone (i.e. with no psycho-
logical and emotional support). In court procedures, the 
right to be present and heard can be denied on the grounds 
that attendance in court would be detrimental to a person’s 
wellbeing (Nilsson 2012). Nilsson argues that people should 
always retain the legal capacity to apply for the restoration 
of their full legal capacity within a certain period of time.
Mechanisms to monitor the activities of guardians o en 
require annual reports, with the main focus on the manage-
ment of  nancial assets. People under guardianship do not 
necessarily see these reports and in some countries, rela-
tives who are guardians are not required to submit reports 
and their activities are not monitored (Nilsson 2012). This 
puts people with dementia who are under guardianship in 
a vulnerable position. The  aws in many guardianship pro-
cedures and practices result in people who are subject to 
them not being properly protected and in some cases open 
to abuse (e.g. guardians using their  nances in ways they 
would not normally accept, putting them in care homes 
and dictating to them what they can and cannot do). Their 
lack of legal capacity puts them in a vulnerable position, 
which is the opposite of what is intended.
Procedures to assess decision-making capacity, where this 
still happens despite the requirements of the CRPD, and 
guardianship measures need to be transformed so as to 
provide reasonable accommodation to people with disa-
bilities who are subjected to them. This also coincides with 
the requirement to provide access to support (mentioned 
in article 12.3). Such support should ideally not be provided 
by individuals with an interest in or link to the procedure 
or its possible outcome (e.g. such as relatives).
With regard to the points raised earlier about the problems 
of interpreting and implementing the provisions of article 
12 of the CRPD, the recent Irish Assisted Decision-Making 
(Capacity) Act 2015 (Number 64) is an example of progress 
in promoting supported decision making but some would 
argue  of failure to fully implement article 12. Section 14, for 
example, states:
“(1) In exercising his or her functions as speci ed in the deci-
sion-making assistance agreement, the decision-making 
assistant shall —
a) assist the appointer to obtain the appointer’s relevant 
information,
b) advise the appointer by explaining relevant information 
and considerations relating to a relevant decision,
c) ascertain the will and preferences of the appointer on a 
matter the subject or to be the subject of a relevant deci-
sion and assist the appointer to communicate them (…./…),
d) assist the appointer to make and express a relevant 
decision, and
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e) endeavour to ensure that the appointer’s relevant deci-
sions are implemented
(2) A decision-making assistant shall not make a decision 
on behalf of the appointer
(3) A relevant decision taken by the appointer with the 
assistance of the decision-making assistant is deemed 
to be taken by the appointer for all purposes.”
There are also provisions covering the appointment of co-de-
cision makers. The court nevertheless reserves the right to 
formally declare that a person lacks the capacity to make 
decisions relating to their personal welfare or property and 
a airs (section 37) (even with the assistance of a co-deci-
sion-maker or where a suitable co-decision maker is not 
available) and to establish substitute decision-making 
arrangements on their behalf (section 38).
It could be argued that lawmakers are responding to the 
spirit of article 12 which is to start from the assumption 
that every person has legal capacity, including those with 
disabilities, but that they are leaving room to protect the 
rights and interests of people who cannot exercise their 
legal capacity, despite all possible attempts to support them, 
namely the particular situation on which the CRPD does not 
provide a coherent and meaningful solution.
Recommendations on guardianship
1. Guardianship legislation should be reframed as decision-making support for which substitute decision 
making would be the most extensive level, only to be applied when all other options have been realistically 
considered or tested, and have not proven su  cient to protect the rights of people with dementia.
2. There should be no automatic loss of legal capacity or obligatory appointment of a guardian, even if a per-
son with dementia lacks decision-making capacity in certain domains or situations, if a less far-reaching 
solution (e.g. a lasting power of attorney) can be found or a situation has not arisen for which a decision 
needs to be made.
3. Legislation and procedures related to such decision-making support should:
 provide a structure which re ects the principles of shared and supported decision making, and reason-
able accommodation 
 enable people to formally name any person currently providing support and/or sharing in the deci-
sion-making process (also in the context of substitute decision-making). This procedure should be 
 exible and unbureaucratic, designed to promote transparency, enable potential monitoring and help 
reduce the likelihood of abuse 
 enable people to formally request the future appointment of a particular person to act as guardian (i.e. 
legally appointed substitute decision maker), with the possibility to annul or amend this choice at any 
time. This includes the right to state such preference in an advance directive 
 not involve the automatic loss of any legal rights, such as the right to marry, divorce, vote, make a will, 
drive or make a contract. A guardian should not have the right to contract a marriage, divorce, make a 
will or vote on behalf of a person with dementia 
 promote the establishment of organisations providing trained and independent supporters and guard-
ians (e.g. for people who prefer this solution or have no one else to take on this role) 
 ensure that the appointment of one or more substitute decision makers is established by means of a 
judicial procedure 
 ensure that this procedure is a ordable and not unnecessarily burdensome 
 permit a su  ciently  exible approach to decision-making support that is proportionate to the actual 
needs and capacity of the person with dementia. This might involve a series of di erent measures or 
one measure which can be adapted to the person for whom it is intended 
 ensure that any actions taken by guardians correspond to the will and preferences of the person with 
dementia and are not primarily in their own interests or those of a third party 
 include measures to handle con icts of interests between people providing decision-making support 
and the person with dementia 
 include measures for the anonymous reporting of suspected mistreatment or abuse of people with 
dementia by people actually or allegedly providing decision-making support.
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Treatment, care and support
We have already explored some of the key issues and 
debates related to supported decision making. In this sec-
tion, we focus on issues related to medical treatment, care 
and support, particularly with regard to informed consent 
and to situations where this cannot be provided by people 
with dementia.
Informed consent
There are a few important documents of relevance to the 
ethical conduct of medicine, such as the Nuremberg Code, 
which was introduced in 1947 a er the trial of doctors in the 
wake of World War II, the Declaration of Geneva of 1948 and 
the physician’s oath known as the Hippocratic Oath, which 
set out guidelines for members of the medical profession 
based on humanitarian and ethical standards for treatment 
and care. In the context of medical treatment and care, doc-
tors have a duty, under the Hippocratic oath, to act in each 
patient’s best interests and to refrain from exploiting their 
patients. This  duciary relationship between doctors and 
their patients is the cornerstone of ethical clinical practice. 
The relationship of trust is based not only on personal and 
professional integrity but also on patients’ expectation that 
doctors (and other healthcare professionals where appro-
priate) have the necessary expertise and training to justify 
putting their health and wellbeing into their hands. Accord-
ing to Beauchamp and Childress (2001, p.430).
 “The patient-physician relationship is a  duciary rela-
tionship—that is, founded on trust or con dence; and 
the physician is therefore necessarily a trustee for the 
patient’s medical welfare.”
Patients must nevertheless be asked to provide informed con-
sent to any treatment they are o ered by a doctor (and are of 
course entitled to withhold consent and refuse the treatment 
- subject to certain exceptions). Decision -making capacity 
remains in many situations the condition for valid informed 
consent, based on widely accepted criteria, including:
 the ability to understand information relevant to the deci-
sion, including that related to risk,
 the ability to retain, use and weigh up such information, 
to relate it to one’s own values and goals, and the likely 
consequences of deciding one way or the other,
 the ability to communicate a choice.
4. With regard to the establishment of a guardianship measure (i.e. involving substitute decision making), 
people with dementia should:
 be involved as much as possible in the process of setting it up and for the duration of the measure, 
including the choice of guardian and the guardian’s duties 
 be seen and heard in person by the judge or equivalent authority 
 be allowed to appoint a person to speak on their behalf in court (without this altering the necessity to 
be seen and heard) 
 always be considered as having the legal capacity to challenge the appointment of a guardian, the loss 
of legal capacity or certain decisions made by a guardian (and be provided with necessary support to 
enable them to exercise this right if needed).
5. The activities of a substitute decision maker should be subject to supervision and regular review, and should 
be monitored by a judge or another independent authority. This should apply to all guardians, both appointed 
by the court and personally appointed, including relatives and close friends.
6. Everyone involved in decision-making support should be obliged:
 to take into consideration the wishes of the person with dementia when trying to determine that per-
son’s will and preferences 
 to take into consideration the previously expressed wishes, values and preferences of the person with 
dementia (i.e. expressed in an advance directive or based on the knowledge of signi cant others) 
 to involve spouses, partners, relatives and close friends when making decisions on behalf of people with 
dementia unless it is impracticable or the person with dementia objects to their involvement 
 to inform and consult the person with dementia about decisions being made even when they lack 
decision-making capacity. Information should be given in the way most appropriate to the person’s 
remaining capacity 
 to ensure that the  nances of people with dementia are used for their direct and current bene t (if and 
when appropriate and desired by the person concerned) and not to have as principal aim the augmenta-
tion or maintenance of their capital (unless this corresponds to the clear wishes of the person concerned) 
 to keep track of support provided (formal records in the case of substitute decision making) for the sake 
of transparency and accountability (if challenged).
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There are, however, numerous decisions that doctors and 
other health and social care professionals do not make with 
patients because they are part of the process of a professional 
evaluation of di erent options, drawing on their knowledge 
and expertise (e.g. which boxes to tick on a request for a 
blood analysis or which type of scan to propose), which occurs 
before it is decided what to o er the patient (whether or 
not to have a blood test or scan to help identify the cause 
of their problem). This still re ects the  duciary relationship 
and respects the autonomy and dignity of patients.
In the vast majority of cases, such trust is well-founded 
but the  duciary relationship rests on the principle of best 
interests, which is increasingly being challenged on the 
grounds that it is paternalistic (unless used solely as a last 
resort). People are questioning whether the doctor really 
does know what would be best for them but also how to 
balance trust and reliance on the  duciary relationship with 
respect for autonomy. As mentioned earlier, there are ethi-
cal arguments which emphasise the importance of respect 
for autonomy, dignity, individuality and freedom. They are 
based on the premise that people are best placed to know 
what is best for them and that they should con rm what 
it is that they want, based on the information and options 
provided. Some people may do this on the basis of blind 
trust in the members of the medical profession, their own 
gut feeling or evaluation of options and/or consultation 
with others and nowadays, of the Internet. When a person 
is deemed as having legal capacity, ‘gut feeling’, blind trust 
and various approaches not re ected in the above criteria 
would usually go unquestioned. For people who lack or are 
assumed to lack decision-making capacity or whose legal 
capacity has been restricted, this is not necessarily the case.
A rigid application of article 12 of the CRPD would help pre-
vent such discrimination where decisions are made by other 
people with potentially di erent values, principles, life expe-
rience and world views to the person in whose interests 
they claim to be acting, on the basis of best interests. Many 
people (because they have dementia or for other reasons) 
have di  culty organising their thoughts and feelings about 
a particular issue, understanding what is at stake and the 
implications of di erent options for them and commu-
nicating what they want. This is not a reason to exclude 
them from the process but rather a reason to provide them 
with the support they need to make a particular decision, 
and this is the spirit of the provisions already described 
in the CRPD.
Informal restrictions of legal capacity in relation to treat-
ment, care and support occur when people with dementia 
are not consulted about decisions, not only those which 
25 The UK Care Quality Commission (CQC) is undertaking further  eldwork across seven clinical commissioning groups to understand the extent to 
which DNARs may have been misused during the pandemic. A  nal report is due to be published in February 2021.
26 When the covert medication is aimed at controlling or changing someone’s behaviour, it would be classed as chemical restraint (see page  44). 
may have an obvious and signi cant e ect on their lives 
and wellbeing but also on the many small decisions that 
people all take every day. They might, for example, not be 
told that they are entitled to some form of support because 
it is expensive and they live with someone who has not 
objected to providing a particular aspect of care. A health-
care professional might agree with an informal carer not 
to propose some kind of therapy that might require them 
to accompany the person to an appointment every week. 
Similarly, someone might not be told that there is an alter-
native form of treatment available, which might have fewer 
side e ects, compared to the treatment they have been on 
for over a decade etc. Consequently, the decision to con-
tinue taking the medication and su ering the side e ects 
does not constitute ongoing informed consent.
Some decisions, for which people’s legal right to be involved 
in decision-making is overridden, are literally a matter of 
life and death. There have been reports during the COVID-
19 pandemic of the blanket use of DNAR (‘do not attempt 
resuscitation’) orders for people in care homes, o en with-
out the knowledge of the residents, their families or their 
guardians. This was the case for many people with demen-
tia but also people with other conditions such as autism 
and Down’s Syndrome. It resulted in ambulances and doc-
tors not being called when urgently needed. There are risks 
involved in DNARs (i.e. attempting cardiopulmonary resus-
citation) such as punctured lungs, broken ribs and severe 
bruising, which people need to be aware of. However, the 
blanket application of DNARs and the failure to appraise 
the individuals concerned and involve them and/or their 
loved ones (if they lack decision-making capacity) has been 
described as totally unacceptable and a breach of people’s 
human rights (BBC 2020b).25
Covert medication involves the intentional administra-
tion of medication in a disguised form, usually in food 
and drink, resulting in someone unknowingly taking med-
ication (i.e. without their consent).26 The Mental Welfare 
Commission for Scotland (MWCS) (2017) has issued good 
practice guidance on this which emphasises the need to 
establish necessity, the legality of such an act, and whether 
it is proportionate in relation to bene t and potential dis-
tress. The Commission suggests, for example, the need to 
consider whether covert medication might sometimes 
be the best way to avoid administering medication by 
force, which would be degrading. It also emphasises the 
need to provide support, consult relevant people (relatives, 
close friends, welfare attorneys or guardians), as well as 
advance statements, and to take into consideration past 
and present known wishes. As with capacity to consent 
to treatment in general, covert medication to a person 
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who has capacity to consent would be considered assault 
and a breach of human rights. The MWCS guidance con-
tains examples of covert medication care pathways which 
provide a means to record how decisions are made and 
potentially to defend or challenge speci c covert medica-
tion decisions. It should, however, be noted that medicines 
are usually licensed to be administered in a certain way 
and that tablets, capsules and liquids may become ‘unli-
censed’ when crushed, emptied or mixed with other liquids. 
The issue of implicit consent to various forms of medical 
treatment is o en overlooked. Medication is frequently pre-
scribed or handed out in hospitals and care homes (without 
even the packaging or patient information lea et to indicate 
what it is). Many patients obediently take the prescribed 
medication, thereby implicitly consenting to it. Requests 
for clari cation are received in various ways, ranging from 
irritation about taking up precious time to oversimpli ed/
euphemistic explanations, with a proper explanation lying 
somewhere between the two. This may leave people not 
knowing what the medication is for, whether there are 
potential side e ects and what the consequences would 
be of not taking it. The compliance of a person known to 
be lacking  decision-making capacity (i.e. to take or not take 
one or more tablets) cannot be considered as implicit con-
sent in the same way that it might for a person who has 
 decision-making capacity but decides not to bother and 
just to take the tablet on the basis of trust (coming back 
to the  duciary relationship with healthcare professionals). 
It cannot be assumed that the medication is necessary. It 
might, for example, be a sedative, administered at the dis-
cretion of nursing sta  for their own tranquillity. The issue 
of unequal power relations between people with demen-
tia, who are dependent on others for care or treatment, and 
those responsible for various treatment and care, must 
also be considered.
Recommendations on treatment, care and support
1. All treatment, care and support of a person with dementia should require that person’s informed consent 
(see also conditions and exceptions mentioned in the recommendations on legal capacity and decision 
making, and on guardianship).
2. Consent should be voluntary, informed and made by a person who has the capacity to decide on the par-
ticular issue, with as much appropriate support as needed.
3. The consent to or refusal of a particular treatment should be respected even if detrimental to the person’s 
health and wellbeing if such consent or refusal re ects that person’s wishes (if they have legal capacity) or 
has been made in an ethical manner (taking into account the person’s will and preferences) by a person or 
people legally authorised to consent on their behalf (if they lack legal capacity).
4. Medication should not be concealed in the food or drink of a person with dementia who is able to consent 
to drug treatment unless they have given prior consent.
5. Whenever medication is administered through food and drink to a person who has the capacity to consent, 
that person must be informed and provided with the reason for this approach as well as details of the med-
ication administered in that way.
6. Covert medication should only ever be a last resort, based on a team decision and part of a clear covert 
treatment plan.
7. Covert medication should be regularly reviewed (at least once a week), should not be extended to additional 
drugs without further review and should be recorded.
8. Relatives and loved ones should be consulted, where appropriate, in order to re ect on ways to encourage a 
person with dementia (who lacks the capacity to consent) to take necessary medication.
9. Advice should be obtained from a pharmacist about whether, and if so how, a particular form of medication 
can be safely administered in another way (e.g. opening capsules or crushing tablets).
10. People with dementia should be permitted to communicate their consent (or refusal of consent):
 verbally (e.g. the person saying that they agree to a particular treatment) 
 in writing (e.g. the person signing a consent form, a er having read and understood it) 
 non-verbally (e.g. by holding out an arm for a blood test).
11. In emergency and life-threatening situations, where there is no time to obtain informed consent from the per-
son with dementia or from other people authorised to provide substitute consent, treatment or care should 
be provided and the reasons for this explained to the person and any substitute decision makers a erwards.
12. Do not attempt resuscitation orders (DNARs) should always be made on an individual basis, with the involve-
ment of the person concerned and, where appropriate, with that of relatives and informal carers.
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Communicating the diagnosis of dementia
Irrespective of whether legal capacity is dependent on deci-
sion-making capacity, if people have the right to make 
autonomous decisions, they should also have the right 
to receive information relevant to the issue to be decided. 
The communication of a diagnosis of dementia is central 
to the promotion of autonomy because people need that 
information when weighing up the pros and cons of issues 
such as continuing to live alone, whether to continue man-
aging personal  nances or seek decision-making support 
and so on. It is a matter of trustworthiness, which might 
be described as a virtue to strive for (e.g. in virtue ethics). 
It is also linked to respect for a person’s dignity, which is 
essential when providing support for decision making. Arti-
cle 10 (Private life and right to information) - paragraphs 1 
and 2 - of the Council of Europe’s Convention on Human 
Rights and Biomedicine states:
 1) “Everyone has the right to respect for private life in 
relation to information about his or her health.
 2) Everyone is entitled to know any information collected 
about his or her health. However, the wishes of individ-
uals not to be so informed shall be observed (Council 
of Europe 1997).”
Knowledge of the diagnosis may, amongst other things, 
give the person with dementia the possibility to:
 con rm suspicions and put an end to uncertainty,
 gain a better understanding of di  culties they are 
experiencing,
 come to terms with personal changes and losses caused 
by the disease,
 obtain information about the progression of the disease, 
treatment, care and services,
 develop positive coping strategies and set short-term 
goals,
 give informed consent for anti-dementia drugs and/or 
to participate in clinical trials,
 make decisions about future care preferences,
 write an advance directive,
 sort out personal  nances and take decisions regarding 
property and assets.
Another ethical consideration, sometimes mentioned by 
those not in favour of informing people with dementia of 
their diagnosis, is non-male cence (i.e. not causing harm), 
accompanied by the belief that it would be bene cent to 
withhold such information. A third article of the above 
Convention provides for the right to be informed to be 
overridden in certain circumstances. Harm is sometimes 
described in terms of harm to the doctor-patient relation-
ship and ‘unnecessary’ psychological harm (van den Dungen 
et al. 2014). This may re ect views that nothing can be done 
(Moore and Cahill 2012) and fails to recognise the potential 
harm that not knowing or vague or ambiguous information 
may have on people with dementia (Bamford et al. 2004).
In keeping with respect for legal capacity, the desire not to 
be informed must be respected because it represents the 
exercise of autonomy. There is, however, a grey zone when 
it comes to interpreting the will and preferences of people 
who have di  culty communicating and of opting in favour 
of non-disclosure on the grounds that the person would not 
understand or would be distressed. These may be genuine 
concerns, as opposed to paternalistic attitudes or the wish 
to avoid a di  cult situation. Keightley and Mitchell (2004) 
describe some of the pros and cons of disclosure as follows:
 “Although by being truthful you may con rm someone’s 
worst fears, you also give them the opportunity to come 
to terms with the situation and work through their feel-
ings. Without a diagnostic framework within which to 
understand their experience many people with demen-
tia will be le  frightened that they are going mad with 
little or no support.”
Nevertheless, the emphasis should be on supporting people 
with dementia to decide whether or not to be informed of 
the diagnosis and not on someone else making that decision. 
Just as people with dementia are entitled to take risks, they 
are also entitled to experience emotions, which are natural, 
human responses to events in life and may be bene cial in 
13. DNARs should never be applied as a blanket measure, must not be discriminatory and should not be based 
on assumptions about quality of life.
14. People with dementia who are living in a precarious situation or in extreme unsanitary conditions, which 
endanger their lives or put others in danger, should be taken to a place of care in accordance with estab-
lished legal procedures. See subsection on involuntary placement (p.39).
15. All consent should be recorded and monitored.
16. People with dementia should be informed of their right to question decisions made by service providers and 
substitute decision makers about their treatment, care and support.
17. People with dementia should be o ered support (e.g. by a neutral person such as an ombudsperson) if they 
wish to  le a formal complaint.
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coming to terms with what they are experiencing as a result 
of having dementia. Medical professionals may need sup-
port to communicate diagnoses to people with dementia.
Three recent systematic literature reviews of the diagnosis 
of dementia all report that the majority of people with and 
without cognitive impairment, within the primary care con-
text as well as in memory clinics, prefer to be informed of a 
possible diagnosis of dementia (Werner, Karnieli-Miller and 
Eidelman 2013, van den Dungen et al. 2014, Low, McGrath, 
Swa er and Brodaty 2018). On the other hand, it should be 
borne in mind that some people do not want to know and 
state this very clearly (Marzanski 2000). In some countries, 
there is increasingly a greater focus in policy and practice 
on promoting timely diagnosis and on asking people during 
the diagnostic procedure if they want to know their diag-
nosis and if not, whom they would like to be told on their 
behalf. Van den Dungen et al. (2014) also suggest cautiously 
exploring reasons not to be informed to help identify fear 
or misunderstandings about dementia.
Some carers do not want the person with dementia to be 
informed (Shimizu et al. 2008, Quinn, Jones and Clare 2017, 
Zou et al. 2017). The practice of disclosing the diagnosis to 
carers and not to people with dementia used to be quite 
common (van Hout et al. 2006). In a more recent study about 
timely diagnosis in the Czech Republic, Finland, Italy, the 
Netherlands and Scotland, considerable di erences regard-
ing disclosure of the diagnosis (based on caregiver reports) 
were revealed:
 “In all countries except Italy, the diagnosis was usually 
disclosed to the person with dementia by a health care 
professional. In Italy, 60% of the carers reported that the 
person with dementia had not been told the diagnosis, 
compared with 1.1% in Finland and 4.4% in Scotland, 8.2% 
in the Netherlands, and 23.2% in the Czech Republic. (…/…) 
The reasons for nondisclosure fell into 4 main categories: 
not wishing to upset the person, the person would not 
understand or was not aware, the family thought it unnec-
essary, and the doctor advised against telling the person. 
Across all countries, the diagnosis was less likely to be dis-
closed to a person with dementia that was late stage or 
severe (54%) compared with middle (69%) or early stage 
(80%), and this contributes to the higher nondisclosure 
rates in Italy and the Czech Republic, but notably over half 
of those diagnosed in the early stages of dementia in Italy 
were not informed” (Woods et al. 2018).
Informing relatives of a diagnosis of dementia, without 
the knowledge or agreement of the person with dementia, 
does not respect the right of people with dementia to pri-
vacy and breaches medical professionals’ obligations with 
regard to con dentiality. It is unethical as it fails to respect 
people’s autonomy and it may run counter to the princi-
ples of bene cence and non-male cence (although such 
concepts are sometimes used to defend non-disclosure). 
Furthermore, it places a potential burden on carers to dis-
close the diagnosis to the person with dementia themselves 
even though they are unlikely to be equipped with the nec-
essary information and understanding of the condition to 
be able to carry out this task e ectively, and might not even 
be in favour of sharing the diagnosis.
It should not be assumed that because someone has a 
diagnosis, they necessarily accept it or want to talk about 
having Alzheimer’s disease, for example. Some people may 
be aware of their diagnosis but prefer to refer to the condi-
tion by a di erent name (e.g. preferring to talk about having 
‘memory problems’) (Clare, Quinn, Jones and Woods 2016, 
Quinn, Morris and Clare 2018).
Bailey, Dooley and McCabe (2018) emphasise the need 
for doctors to tailor communication of the diagnosis 
to their patients’ preferences and awareness. They also 
need to consider which information can be discussed in 
the presence of carers and to create the right balance 
between honesty and hope when discussing prognosis 
and medication, bearing in mind how cognitive impair-
ment a ects understanding. Bailey et al. point out that 
misunderstandings may limit the opportunities that peo-
ple with dementia have to take an active role in decision 
making, and hence in exercising their legal capacity, oth-
erwise o ered by timely diagnosis. Disclosure is a delicate, 
complex and nuanced task. It can also be emotionally 
challenging, and many healthcare professionals would 
bene t from training and supervision.
The need to respect and promote people’s autonomy, by 
allowing them to choose whether or not to be informed 
of a diagnosis (rather than other people deciding on their 
behalf) and to manage any disclosure in a sensitive and 
appropriate manner, is re ected in the National Dementia 
Strategy (Department of Health 2009) of England:
 “Objective 2: Good-quality early diagnosis and interven-
tion for all. All people with dementia to have access 
to a pathway of care that delivers: a rapid and com-
petent specialist assessment; an accurate diagnosis 
sensitively communicated to the person with demen-
tia and their carers”.
32 |  DEMENTIA IN EUROPE ETHICS REPORT 2020
Recommendations on communicating the diagnosis of dementia
In order to be in a position to exercise legal capacity, the following recommendations surrounding the disclo-
sure of the diagnosis are proposed.
1. People with dementia should have a legal right to decide whether or not to be informed of their diagnosis.
2. Whilst care should be taken to avoid causing unnecessary anxiety and su ering, information about the diag-
nosis should not be withheld solely on the grounds that a person has dementia, memory problems and/or 
communication di  culties.
3. People with dementia have the right to choose/authorise who (if anyone) should be informed of the diagnosis 
on their behalf or in addition to themselves and to specify anyone who should not be informed. Responsi-
bility for the disclosure of the diagnosis should be clear and transparent.
4. It should be documented whether, by whom and to whom the diagnosis has been communicated.
5. The diagnosis, if disclosed in accordance with the wishes of the person with dementia, should be commu-
nicated clearly.
6. Medical professionals should directly ask their patients, sensitively and in advance, whether they would 
like to be informed if they had dementia and about their preferences regarding other people (e.g. their rel-
atives) being informed.
7. The next of kin, partner and potential carers of the person with dementia should be informed of the diag-
nosis of dementia if they so request, provided that the person with dementia agrees to this and does not, 
or did not previously, request that they should not be informed.  Healthcare professionals should encourage 
people with dementia to involve relatives and close friends in the disclosure procedure.
8. Medical professionals should not reveal the diagnosis to close relatives, friends and/or carers of the per-
son with dementia as a means to avoid personal responsibility for communication of the diagnosis to the 
person with dementia.
9. Medical professionals who do not inform their patients of a diagnosis of dementia should be obliged to 
record this in the patient’s medical  le, along with a justi cation for this decision.
10. People who are informed of someone else’s diagnosis of dementia in connection with their work (either vol-
untary or paid) should be obliged to treat such information with con dentiality.
11. Additional information should be provided in a timely manner (i.e. when the diagnosis is disclosed or soon 
a er, see below). This should include information about the person’s general state of health, prognosis, 
treatment possibilities, and potential risks and side-e ects of anti-dementia drugs. It should also cover 
psychosocial and non-pharmacological approaches to managing symptoms and cognitive decline, the avail-
ability of services to which the person is entitled, the name of the doctor who will have overall responsibility 
for the person’s ongoing care/treatment, and a discussion about advance care planning.
12. Written information should always be provided as a back-up.
13. People with dementia may have di  culty taking in all the information provided at the time of diagnosis and 
be in a state of shock. For this reason, it should be possible for them to have a second meeting with their 
doctor at a later date in order to obtain further information/clari cation concerning the diagnosis. They 
should also have access to other forms of post-diagnostic support.
14. Every person diagnosed with dementia should be provided with up-to-date contact details of the national 
and local Alzheimer associations at the time of diagnosis, along with information about the kinds of ser-
vices and support that the associations o er and information about local services.
15. A system should be devised in order to ensure that all relevant medical professionals receive appropriate and 
up-to-date information about Alzheimer associations and local support services. It may be necessary to work in 
close collaboration with the State and/or professional medical bodies/associations in order to achieve this goal.
16. Attempts should be made to provide comprehensive information in such a way as to maximise the ability of 
the person with dementia to understand. Attention should be paid to any possible di  culty understanding, 
retaining information and communicating, as well as the person’s level of education, reasoning capacity, 
current understanding of dementia and cultural background.
17. More guidance should be developed and training made available to healthcare professionals on how to 
communicate a diagnosis of dementia.
18. The above-mentioned rights relating to the disclosure (or non-disclosure) of a diagnosis of dementia should 
be covered by national legislation.
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Advanced care planning and 
advance directives
Advance directives help ensure that a person’s decisions 
about care and treatment are respected even when they are 
no longer able to make and express them. They should ide-
ally be made in the context of comprehensive advance care 
planning. There is a considerable body of research and phil-
osophical debate on the issue of personhood and person 
status in relation to advance decision making (e.g. whether 
the person making the advance directive is the same person 
as the one for whom it will eventually be used, if not why an 
advance directive should be respected and whether some 
people should still be considered as ‘persons’ at all etc.).27 As 
Mäki-Petäjä-Leinonen (2016, p.148) points out, “the way we 
approach changes in capacity is thus revealing of our under-
standing of personhood as it forces us to pose the questions 
of whether the person remains the same or becomes di er-
ent”. Our focus here is on the issue of legal capacity, noting 
that advance directives come into force when and only when 
it has been established that decision-making capacity has 
fallen below a certain threshold deemed necessary to make a 
particular decision (Parker 2016, p.391). Nevertheless, the phil-
osophical questions remain and cannot be easily separated. 
Scholten and Gather (2018) and Scholten et al. (2019) note 
that respecting wishes expressed in an advance directive 
is dependent on recognition that a person, at the time that 
a decision needs to be made, lacks the ability to make it. 
This justi es non-respect of their current legal capacity (i.e. 
serving as an instruction for health and social care profes-
sionals not to act in accordance with current wishes but 
in accordance with those expressed in the advance direc-
tive). A diagnosis of dementia is not su  cient to justify 
overriding current wishes. If a person is able to make a par-
ticular decision, it should be respected. This brings us back 
to the issue of what it means to make a decision and how 
decision-making capacity is linked to legal capacity. Some 
writers emphasise the need to balance previously expressed 
wishes and current wishes, by exercising “careful thought, 
compassion and wise judgement” in each case taking into 
account the impact on the person with dementia if their 
current wishes are not granted (Hope and McMillan 2011, 
Mäki-Petäjä-Leinonen 2016). Proponents of a critical inter-
ests approach would emphasise, rather, the importance of 
historical lifetime values and beliefs.28
The concept of advance directives seems to run counter 
to the provisions of article 12 of the CRPD with regard to 
every person being considered as having decision-making 
27 See also Alzheimer Europe’s report on the use of advance directives by people with dementia (2006) and on ethical challenges a ecting the 
involvement of people with dementia in research (2019) for more details about our position and a summary of some of the key debates: https://www.
alzheimer-europe.org/Publications/Alzheimer-Europe-Reports 
28 See Dworkin R (1993). Life’s Dominion: An Argument About Abortion, Euthanasia, and Individual Freedom. Vintage  Books.
capacity and no one being deprived of their legal capac-
ity (Scholten et al. 2019). Nevertheless, as Scholten and 
Gather (2018) point out, the Committee promotes the right 
of people with disabilities to engage in advance planning, 
describing it as an important way to inform others of their 
will and preferences at a time when they may be unable to 
do so. The use of advance directives could therefore be seen 
as useful merely when people are unable to communicate 
their will and preferences or also within the context of sup-
ported decision making, even for 100% support. However, 
the latter would not logically be possible because supported 
decision making is based on a person retaining legal capac-
ity whereas an advance directive comes into force when a 
person has been declared as lacking legal capacity. Advance 
directives are legal documents in many countries, for which 
refusals of treatment are considered as legally binding, and 
their entry into force is dependent on assessments of deci-
sion-making capacity resulting in the loss of legal capacity.
People should have the right to decide how future deci-
sions related to care and treatment are handled. This might 
involve making no plans, appointing someone to decide 
on their behalf, making an advance directive or combin-
ing an advance directive with a designated person with 
authority to override wishes expressed therein. The CRPD 
calls for an end to substitute decision making but advance 
directives can be used precisely to appoint a substitute deci-
sion maker or to prevent substitute decision making. Surely, 
people should be free to choose to draw up a document 
that comes into force upon loss of their decision-making 
capacity, resulting in loss of legal capacity. Scholten and 
Gather state,
 “Indeed, it is precisely the point of advance directives 
that a person’s treatment preferences when compe-
tent should override her preferences when incompetent” 
(2018, p. 230).
Moreover, an advance directive can be withdrawn at any 
time and in most countries the right to withdraw a direc-
tive is not dependent on the same level of decision-making 
capacity as that required to make one. This raises questions 
about what is considered an acceptable level of support, 
how assessments of capacity are made and about the con-
ditions for withdrawing an advance directive, especially when 
a person is already considered as lacking the legal capacity 
to draw one up.
Advance directives are o en too broad or too narrow and 
do not  t neatly to the situation and decision to be made. 
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Scienti c advances are constantly being made which have 
possible implications that the person did not know about 
when the advance directive was drawn up. Alzheimer Europe 
advises people to consider this and whether they might want 
to designate in the advance directive a person to help with 
the interpretation of their wishes, and even to override them 
if they do not seem to re ect the spirit of the person’s known 
will and preferences.
The use of advance directives is o en considered in the con-
text of isolated decisions but decisions o en concern issues 
that build on others and span across periods of time. They 
also have implications for other people, which emphasises 
the need to involve signi cant others when drawing them 
up and/or to inform them of choices that have been made. 
Advance directives can be incorporated into a more relational, 
ongoing approach to decision making and autonomy but 
the issue of their validity resting on decision-making capac-
ity and loss of legal status remains problematic and an 
ethical dilemma, namely that the means to exercise auton-
omy is dependent on loss of legal capacity which according 
to the CRPD fails to recognise the right to exercise autonomy.
Finally, legislation, which requires advance directives to be 
renewed at regular intervals (e.g. every 5 years) and consid-
ers those which are not renewed as invalid, discriminates 
against people who lack the decision-making capacity 
required to renew an existing advance directive and yet 
may live a further 20 years or more. Their wishes might not 
have changed but their advance directives are no longer 
considered as legally binding because of their loss of legal 
capacity to renew them.
Recommendations on advance care planning and advance directives
1.  Governments should:
 provide a clear statutory basis for e ective advance directives with appropriate safeguards and a frame-
work of procedures to ensure their e ectiveness 
 set up appropriate systems for the registration, use and review of advance directives 
 legally recognise the role of proxies, appointed by the authors of the advance directives, and develop 
relevant safeguards for their involvement in the interpretation of wishes described in the advance direc-
tive or in decision making 
 raise awareness amongst the general public and health and social care professionals about the use of 
advance directives, including potential advantages as well as possible risks.
2. Doctors should not follow instructions/wishes expressed in the advance directive if the person currently has 
the capacity to make a particular decision in a particular situation, with or without appropriate support.
3.  Due consideration should be taken of the person’s currently expressed wishes, needs and fears even for 
decisions which the person is unable to make even with support.
4.  Decisions not to comply with wishes expressed in valid advance directives should be documented in patients’ 
medical  les and an explanation should be given to signi cant others, relevant supervisory bodies and 
healthcare proxies.
5.  People should be allowed to con rm their desire for their advance directive to remain valid should they at 
some point lack the capacity to renew it or to transfer decision-making responsibility to a named person of 
their choice.
6. Legislators should consider a clause allowing people, if they so wish, to determine their own conditions for 
the entry into force of their advance directives and of the possible role of a trusted person/healthcare proxy 
(substitute decision maker) in this process.
7.  Due to di  culties in obtaining an appropriate level of precision (which is neither too vague nor too speci c 
to be of practical use), people should be encouraged:
 to consult doctors and other quali ed healthcare professionals when considering whether/how to draw 
up an advance directive within the context of advance care planning 
 to write statements of values in addition to advance directives 
 to discuss wishes about future care and support with relatives and any appointed healthcare proxies.
8. In order to guarantee equity in the provision of health care and to ensure that people have a real choice, the 
availability of and access to good quality palliative and end-of-life care services/facilities for people with 
dementia should be improved.
DEMENTIA IN EUROPE ETHICS REPORT 2020 | 35
Participation in research
Research is a general term which covers all kinds of stud-
ies designed to  nd responses to worthwhile questions by 
means of a systematic and scienti c approach. It covers a 
vast range of studies, involving a multitude of approaches 
and numerous disciplines (e.g. psychology, sociology, biol-
ogy, genetics, ethics, law and anthropology). There are many 
di erent ways to carry out research but roughly speaking 
there are two main approaches, namely qualitative and 
quantitative. Increasingly, both approaches are used in the 
same study even though each is historically rooted in a dif-
ferent philosophical paradigm.
In 1964, building on the Nuremberg code and the Decla-
ration of Geneva (mentioned earlier), the World Medical 
Association adopted a set of ethical rules and regulations 
to be applied to research involving human experimenta-
tions. (e.g. to biomedical, experimental and clinical research). 
Whilst not legally binding or enforced under international 
law, it was developed by the medical community and has 
become a cornerstone document for human research ethics. 
There are numerous frameworks and documents to guide 
researchers in the conduct of ethical research such as the 
biomedical ethical principles of Beauchamp and Childress 
(2001) which emphasise not only respect for persons (their 
autonomy and dignity), bene cence (doing what is good for 
someone) and non-male cence (i.e. protection from harm), 
but also the need for justice/equity. Another example is the 
ethical criteria for clinical research described by Emanuel 
et al. (2000) which provides guidance to help ensure that 
clinical research is robust, has value and is meaningful, pro-
viding society with accurate answers to questions that were 
worth asking. It  covers: 1. value (linked to the enhancement 
of health or knowledge), 2. scienti c validity (methodologi-
cally rigorous), 3. fair subject selection (guided by scienti c 
objectives not vulnerability or privilege, with a fair distribu-
tion of risks and bene ts), 4. a favourable risk-bene t ratio, 5. 
independent review (with the possibility to approve, amend 
or terminate studies), 6. informed consent and 7. respect for 
enrolled research participants (protection of privacy, possi-
bility to withdraw and monitoring of participants’ wellbeing). 
These principles and guidance were developed in the context 
of biomedical and clinical research but have been adopted 
and used in a much broader research context.
Some research (e.g. clinical trials and some biomedical and/
or genetic research) is governed by speci c laws, which do 
not apply to other forms of research. However, all research 
must be conducted within the constraints of a legal and 
ethical framework, re ecting amongst other things the need 
for informed consent (or appropriate substitute consent), 
respect for human dignity and compliance with safety and 
data protection requirements.
Informed consent and equity
The principle of informed consent is also one of the most 
fundamental foundations for the conduct of ethical 
research and, in addition, a legal prerequisite for the con-
duct of biomedical and some forms of clinical research. The 
aim of informed consent is to protect participants from 
harm (in keeping with the principle of non-male cence) 
whilst respecting their autonomy and avoiding deception 
or coercion (Beauchamp and Childress 2001). It is also linked 
to the principle of justice in that people who seem unable 
to consent, but were not provided with accessible informa-
tion and appropriate support, may be wrongly deprived of 
treatment or of the opportunity to take part in research, 
or on the contrary given treatment or involved in research 
which might not correspond to their will and preferences.
Involving people in research without their consent could 
be considered illegal if legislation (e.g. in relation to clinical 
trials) stipulates that a person must give informed consent 
and that to do so, they must have decision-making capac-
ity. The MacArthur Competency Assessment Tool for Clinical 
Research (MacCAT-CR) (Appelbaum 2007, Appelbaum and 
Grisso 2001) is sometimes described as the ‘gold stand-
ard’ for the assessment of capacity to consent to clinical 
research, although not necessarily on its own (Howe 2012).
Strict formal requirements for the participation of people 
from vulnerable groups in research exist based on national 
laws but also on European and international treaties such 
as the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine (1997) 
and the Declaration of Helsinki (1964) and the Nuremberg 
Code (1946). In such cases, lacking the capacity to give 
informed consent not only results in participation being 
dependent on the decision of a substitute decision maker 
but also on di erent conditions for participation being 
applied (e.g. linked to risk and burden) and having little or 
no say in the matter. Nevertheless, it could also be argued 
that such provisions make it possible to involve people in 
research who, historically, were totally excluded.
The Council of Europe’s Additional Protocol on Human 
Rights and Biomedicine (2005) only allows people who are 
unable to consent to participate in biomedical research 
without a direct bene t if the research entails only mini-
mal risk and minimal burden. Additionally, article 15 of this 
document further stipulates that the results must have 
the potential to produce real and direct bene t to partici-
pants’ health, that the research could not be carried out on 
people capable of giving consent, that the potential par-
ticipants have been properly informed of their rights and 
of safeguards, that authorisations from legal representa-
tives have been obtained, that previously expressed wishes 
have been taken into account and that the potential par-
ticipants have not objected to participation. The issue of 
direct bene t may be side-stepped subject to ful lment of 
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the above-mentioned conditions provided that, amongst 
other conditions:
 “the research has the aim of contributing, through sig-
ni cant improvement in the scienti c understanding 
of the individual’s condition, disease or disorder, to the 
ultimate attainment of results capable of conferring 
bene t to the person concerned or to other persons 
in the same age category or a  icted with the same 
disease or disorder or having the same condition; the 
research entails only minimal risk and minimal burden 
for the individual concerned; and any consideration of 
additional potential bene ts of the research shall not 
be used to justify an increased level of risk or burden.”
In this example, loss of legal capacity means more than loss 
of the right to make decisions; it means that the people so 
deprived of their legal capacity cannot participate according 
to the same rules and conditions applied to other people. 
There is no longer a level playing  eld. People with demen-
tia who are unable to give informed consent (according to 
fairly rigid standards which do not necessarily re ect shared 
or supported decision making) would not, for example, have 
the right to take part in research into a new drug treatment 
to prevent heart disease or to be a control in a clinical trial 
(valid reasons for exclusion aside). People with dementia 
may still  nd themselves unfairly excluded from research 
because of biased sampling approaches, discriminatory 
inclusion and exclusion criteria, gatekeepers who are either 
being over-protective or thinking about their own wellbe-
ing or decisions made by ethics boards (Alzheimer Europe 
2019). Denying people with dementia the same opportuni-
ties that other people have with regard to participation in 
research amounts to an informal restriction of legal capacity.
Risk assessment
Assessments of risk, bene t and burden cannot easily be 
made for whole groups of people and there is a risk of pater-
nalism, leading to a lot of people being overprotected and 
excluded from research without having any say in the mat-
ter. Drawing on a relational ethics perspective, Fisher (2009) 
suggests that :
 “Formulating regulations and ethical judgments solely on 
the bases of opinions expressed by experts in the schol-
arly community and IRB members risks treating subjects 
as ‘research material’ rather than as moral agents with 
the right to judge the ethicality of investigative proce-
dures in which they participate” (2009, p.5).
As unique individuals, people with dementia have their 
own perceptions of danger and of the level of risk that 
they are willing to take. This is also the case with regard 
to evaluations of potential bene t. There is therefore a 
risk of overprotecting people with dementia, infantilising 
them and depriving them of their autonomy (Jongsma and 
Schweda 2018).
Casarett and Karlawish (2000) highlight the changing 
nature of priorities in relation to risk, pointing out that 
when approaching death, for example, the things that some 
people  nd important may change, with a greater value 
being placed on dignity, meaning, control and strengthen-
ing relationships amongst other things. Similarly, a person 
who is very close to death might not assess the possibility 
of serious risk in the same way as a person who has not yet 
reached that stage. Some risks may be considered as being 
more signi cant and others less so (Casarett and Karlawish 
2000). This depends greatly on the individuals concerned 
and on their awareness and understanding of their prog-
nosis. People who are considered as lacking capacity, partly 
based on their perceived inability to assess risks and the 
personal relevance to them, may sometimes be denied the 
right and opportunity to do something that is in keeping 
with their values and goals in life by others who may have 
di  culty coming to terms with their own inevitable loss 
and in acting in accordance with the known will and pref-
erences of the person with dementia.
Participating in research may, for some people at various 
stages of dementia, correspond to new priorities. Legis-
lation and practices which deprive them of their formal 
or informal legal capacity interfere with their dignity and 
right to autonomy. Some would consider current legislation 
and guidelines, which restrict legal capacity, as over-re-
strictive and as being overly focused on non-male cence at 
best, and as representing hard paternalism at worst. On the 
other hand, allowing everyone the right to decide whether 
or not to participate in research irrespective of their under-
standing of the risks and bene ts (if any) involved could 
be perceived as failure to protect vulnerable people from 
exploitation and abuse.
Proxy consent to research
A study involving substitute decision makers of people with 
dementia suggests that proxies (i.e. substitute decision 
makers) o en make decisions based on best interests (e.g. 
hoping that research will improve the person’s condition 
or their quality of life) and to a lesser extent on altruism 
(Sugarman et al. 2001). Several other studies have shown 
that relatives of chronically ill older people are o en not 
very good at predicting the decision that a person would 
have made (Alzheimer Europe 2011). This suggests that they 
are not using an interpretation of will and preferences as 
a basis for decision making or are not successful in deter-
mining what these are. In some cases, relatives and other 
informal carers may feel under pressure to take on a role 
that they are not comfortable with. Sugarman et al. (2001) 
point out that some proxies for dementia research  nd 
decision-making responsibility burdensome and that this is 
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sometimes linked to the degree of risk involved, the extent 
to which the person with dementia is able to participate in 
decision making, and the extent to which the proxy or the 
person with dementia has come to terms with the diagno-
sis. In keeping with a care ethics approach, it is important 
to consider the interests of all involved in a particular issue. 
Whereas the focus is understandably on the person with 
dementia and on respect for their autonomy, wellbeing and 
dignity, it is important to consider the rights and wellbeing 
of the people who are sometimes asked to make decisions 
on their behalf.
People with dementia may still sometimes be involved 
without their knowledge, with the approval of a substi-
tute decision maker or on the basis of minimum ability 
to understand what is involved or having forgotten (either 
completely or occasionally) having been informed and 
having consented to it. It is therefore important to ensure 
that consent is an ongoing process and not merely a one-
o  signature on a piece of paper. Any such involvement 
should be ethically justi able and authorised by an eth-
ics board. An example of such involvement would be for 
research involving people with advanced dementia who 
lack the capacity to give informed consent, even with all 
possible support, who do not show signs of not wanting 
to be involved and there is reason to believe that they 
would have agreed to participate had they been able to 
express a preference. This is entirely di erent to the use of 
deception in research, for which there are arguments for 
and against,29 and which we are not condoning through 
our reference to people not being aware that they are par-
ticipating in research. 
A fl exible and inclusive approach to informed 
consent
New approaches to informed consent are needed, which 
are more  exible, geared towards the needs of the indi-
vidual and incorporate elements of shared and supported 
decision making but also with neutral bodies to decide on 
individual cases (Alzheimer Europe 2019). This would need 
to be su  ciently straightforward in terms of procedures, 
cost and time involved to ensure that the nature of the 
procedure did not result in further exclusion of people with 
dementia from research and further restriction of their legal 
capacity. Whilst cost and e ort, as well as the complexity 
of such an approach, do not provide a justi cation not to 
develop or adopt it, it may be more challenging and result 
in inconsistencies obtaining ethical approval. Any proce-
dure that is excessively bureaucratic, time-consuming or 
complicated from the perspective of researchers risks the 
exclusion of the people whose interests it seeks to promote 
29 For more information on this issue, please see section on deception in: https://www.alzheimer-europe.org/Ethics/
Ethical-issues-in-practice/2011-Ethics-of-dementia-research/Protecting-the-wellbeing/Recommendations/(language)/eng-GB#fragment2 
(by jeopardising their chances of being involved for the rea-
sons mentioned earlier) and this would be unethical.
Traditional competency-based approaches to informed 
consent to research have been criticised for failing to take 
adequate account of the situational aspect of capacity 
and the importance of interdependence and relationships 
(Dewing 2007). They usually also require a signature which 
may be di  cult for some people with or without demen-
tia. Some researchers have proposed alternative methods 
based on verbal and behavioural consent. Many people with 
dementia are able to give informed consent if appropriate 
adjustments are made and necessary support provided. 
Process consent is an approach and method to obtain ongo-
ing consent from people “who have an extremely limited 
capacity, who would generally be thought to be incapable 
of legally informed consent by others, but on observation 
can communicate and express their wishes in other ways” 
(Dewing 2007, p.63). It is a person-centred approach which 
is also in uenced by the concept of social justice and the 
importance of relationships. Process consent has been 
implemented, following ethics approval, in the United King-
dom, Ireland and Australia for several qualitative research 
projects involving people with dementia in the  eld of ger-
ontology. However, it is doubtful whether it would ever be 
widely accepted by pharmaceutical companies or ethics 
boards for participation in clinical trials or for other bio-
medical research where there are risks of physical harm 
and fears of people who are considered unable to consent 
being used for the bene t of others. Such concerns are  rmly 
based on the principle of legal capacity being dependent 
on decision-making capacity, with various exceptions and 
adaptations being considered as valid forms of decision 
making. They may also be linked to fear of litigation.
Dewing (2007) describes the approach as a way to work 
towards inclusion rather than exclusion of people with 
dementia in research but recognises that there will still 
be a cut-o  point at which some people will not be able to 
make or communicate even small choices. Process consent 
o ers an alternative to the current over-emphasis on cogni-
tive capacity, is  exible and focuses on individuals and their 
residual capacities and other abilities. It is not yet known 
whether this approach could be further expanded beyond 
the speci c area of gerontological research and there are a 
few challenges surrounding the observation and interpre-
tation of states of wellbeing. However, Dewing (2007) draws 
attention to the risk of researchers too readily accepting 
the gold standard of informed consent and emphasises 
the need to seek alternative methodologies for consent. 
The COVID-19 pandemic has resulted in some research-
ers proposing, and ethics committees accepting, recorded 
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telephone consent, the use of electronic/online informed 
consent forms and online video consent for research involv-
ing people with dementia in some countries.
With regard to supported decision making for people with 
dementia, it is important to ensure that support and rele-
vant materials are also adapted to a broad range of people 
with dementia (e.g. to people with low levels of literacy, 
language skills and education or with additional impair-
ments etc.). People with dementia who are also members 
of various sub-groups may have experienced additional 
stigma in the past and be distrustful of  gures of author-
ity (Alzheimer Europe 2019). For people with more advanced 
dementia, there is a risk of con ating di  culties with lan-
guage and communication with the capacity to consent or 
to assent to participation in research.
Recommendations on participation in research
1.  Guidelines which serve to exclude complete groups of people from certain types of research should be revised 
and amended so as to allow individuals who wish to participate in any kind of research the same right to 
do so as other people.
2. Researchers (and where appropriate ethics boards) should:
 describe in research protocols the method used to identify a person who could support the patient in 
the informed consent process, if needed, give details of their plans to seek ongoing informed consent 
and provide justi cation if this is not planned 
 allow for the use of simpli ed information sheets and for information to be presented in a more read-
able format, like a lea et 
 ensure that informed consent does not consist of a one-o  event if the research is ongoing over a period 
of time 
 even where a person does not have capacity to consent, be observant of other indicators that the person 
does not wish to participate in the research (e.g. physically moving away) 
 bear in mind that although a diagnosis of dementia may justify an evaluation of a person’s capacity to 
consent to research, it does not automatically mean that a person lacks such capacity 
 develop and propose to ethics committees alternative and novel methods of obtaining informed consent 
which are neither exclusionary nor paternalistic (e.g. simplify the process of recording consent such as 
allowing participants to tick rather than initial boxes on the form) 
 take measures to include people with dementia in the informed consent process, including when they 
are deemed to lack capacity (e.g. provide information and ask for assent) 
 closely monitor participants during research and check whether they are still willing to participate and 
understand what participation involves 
 use validated tools, wherever possible and when available, to obtain consent from people from minority 
groups or with speci c characteristics which necessitate special measures 
 translate consent forms for people whose  rst/best language is not that of the original form, but try to 
ensure that the translated form is also culturally appropriate 
 be willing and proactive in discussing the issue of shared, supported and substitute decision making 
with potential participants with dementia and other relevant people 
 ensure that people with dementia are encouraged, where possible, to make their own decisions relating 
to participation in research, bearing in mind that some may prefer to appoint a substitute decision maker 
 not seek the opinion of a substitute decision maker if the person with dementia has the capacity to 
decide for themself.
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Coercive measures
In this section, we look at coercive measures such as seclu-
sion and restraint, which involve restrictions of freedom (to 
a room, area or building) and the use of various measures 
to restrict or prevent mobility and movement. Such meas-
ures are sometimes justi able but also risk encroaching 
on people’s human rights as they are applied without a 
person’s consent or despite their protests and may have 
serious adverse e ects ranging from psychological/emo-
tional trauma to physical injury and even death. Coercion 
is called ‘benevolent’ if it is performed with the intention 
of preventing people from harming themselves but there 
is always a tension between the desire to respect auton-
omy and the desire to promote wellbeing, which includes 
protection from harm (German Ethics Council 2018). This 
does not apply to structural coercion, such as the restric-
tions imposed on people’s everyday lives in care homes and 
institutions, which limit their choices and are linked to the 
needs and functioning of the organisations rather than the 
needs and wellbeing of the residents. This would not be con-
sidered as benevolent coercion. The term coercion is o en 
associated with drastic measures and dilemmas linked to 
autonomy versus paternalism but as Hem, Molewijk and 
Pedersen (2014) noted in their focus group discussions with 
Norwegian  healthcare personnel, it is also about relation-
ships, communication and cooperation, and the key ethical 
challenges are o en linked  to the perception of power and 
respect.
According to the German Ethics Council (2018) benevo-
lent coercion is similar to paternalism, which also involves 
overriding a person’s will, with the sole or primary aim of 
protecting a person or their interests from harm. This would 
be so  paternalism if the perpetrator believed that the per-
son would agree to the act or decision, were they able to 
make a fully responsible decision, and hard paternalism if 
the act or decision was in clear contradiction of the person’s 
fully responsible and self-determined will. Fully responsible 
actions are further de ned as being dependent on a  person's 
ability to consent, refuse or choose between di erent avail-
able options, based on an understanding of the intended 
action (including foreseeable personal consequences and 
secondary consequences) and the ability to place the deci-
sion made in the context of the person’s own life vision. The 
German Ethics Council (2018, p. 10) concludes :
 “There is a broad consensus regarding the claim that 
under certain conditions so  paternalistic acts can 
be morally legitimate, provided the care recipient is 
undoubtedly not yet capable, no longer capable, or 
temporarily or permanently incapable of making a fully 
responsible decision in the given situation.”
Whilst the focus of this paper is on the ethical issues linked 
to the use of coercion, it is worth noting that the whole 
rational/justi cation for the use of coercion, albeit benevo-
lent coercion, rests  rmly on the concept of decision-making 
capacity and is linked to formal and informal legal capacity. 
The evaluation of decision-making capacity is central to 
the ethical and/or legal use of coercive measures. In Ger-
many, for example, the Federal Constitutional Court and 
the German Ethics Council both recognise the legal and 
moral justi cation for the use of coercive measures, as a last 
resort, in certain conditions (German Ethics Council 2018).
This section is divided into four main  subsections:
1. formal restrictions of freedom/involuntary placement,
2. informal restrictions/involuntary stay,
3. the use of restraint and
4. restrictions of freedom and the use of restraint during 
the COVID-19 pandemic.
Some of the issues addressed in a particular subsection 
will also apply to the others but will not be repeated. We 
recognise that the terminology used may be di erent in 
di erent countries.
Formal  restrictions of freedom/involuntary 
placement
Many people with dementia are moved into a residential, 
nursing or care facility without their consent, even with 
clear indications of dissent. This is usually but not always 
the result of a process in a court of law during which they 
are seen, heard and legally represented. Article 14 of the 
CRPD states that people with disabilities should “enjoy the 
right to liberty” and that “if persons with disabilities are 
deprived of their liberty through any process, they are on 
an equal basis with others”. As with guardianship meas-
ures, legal provisions related to involuntary placement are 
not yet in line with the requirements of the CRPD as the 
process of involuntary placement is based on people being 
denied the right to decide for themselves if they want to 
move into a residential/care facility. The issue of needing 
to balance respect for autonomy and dignity with concerns 
about bene cence and non-male cence, and discussions 
surrounding paternalism, are relevant in this context.
The legal justi cation for restricting the freedom or choice 
of residence of people with mental disorders is usually that 
they have a mental disorder and are considered a danger 
to themselves or others. This is discriminatory because 
people with no mental illness or disability would not be 
treated in the same way. Taking the example of a person 
who is suspected of, or considered likely at some point to 
commit a terrorist act (i.e. endangering the lives of other 
people and perhaps taking their own life) , they could not 
be interned on the basis of the mere likelihood of doing 
harm. It is a common principle in law that a person’s free-
dom cannot be restricted on the grounds that they might 
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commit a crime but have not yet done so and might never 
do so. Despite the key di erence between being consid-
ered likely to intentionally harm others and being in need 
of care and support, there are in theory alternatives to the 
involuntary placement of dependent adults but such alter-
natives (such as a live-in personal assistant/carer for each 
dependent person) would be expensive and require large 
numbers of suitably quali ed people, which societies at 
large do not consider feasible.
Proportionality and reasonable accommodation
The concepts of proportionality and reasonable accommo-
dation are related to the issue of freedom of movement 
and to each other. Proportionality refers to the principle 
that the least restrictive measure should be considered  rst. 
There are competing interests/concerns between respecting 
the principles of autonomy and bene cence (promoting a 
person’s wellbeing) on the one hand, and respecting the 
principle of non-male cence (not doing harm by failing to 
act in case of danger or unmet needs) on the other hand. 
Nevertheless, people should not be restricted in their daily 
lives (e.g. prevented from living alone or going out for a 
walk) if a less radical measure can be found (e.g. remote 
monitoring technology and assistive technology, a live-in 
carer, a home alarm or emergence button on a mobile phone 
 or sheltered accommodation). Such proportionality is linked 
to the principle of reasonable accommodation because 
there is usually a less restrictive way of managing a par-
ticular situation but it does not always exist as a standard 
service and usually comes at a price in terms of time, money 
and e ort, as mentioned above.
Governments are ethically and legally required to make rea-
sonable accommodations in keeping with article 2 of the 
CRPD, which governments in Europe have all signed. This 
requirement is not, however, absolute as it is stated that 
it should not entail disproportionate or undue burden and 
there is no guidance in the CRPD as to what constitutes 
disproportionate burden (Ferri 2018). There is a risk of prej-
udice and the devaluation of certain groups of people (e.g. 
people with dementia, older people and people with disa-
bilities) a ecting evaluations of whether certain measures 
constitute a disproportionate burden (e.g. concluding that 
the investment needed for such measures could be better 
used elsewhere and opting for alternative , more ‘cost-ef-
fective’ solutions).
With regard to the principle of non-male cence, which 
is about “not doing harm”, the WHO de nition of health 
should also be considered. This describes health in terms 
of physical, mental and social well-being, and not merely 
the absence of disease or in rmity. Sartorius (2006) argues 
in favour of an understanding of health based on a balance 
within oneself and with the environment, whereby people 
with an impairment or disease are considered as being:
 “healthy to a level de ned by their ability to establish 
an internal equilibrium that makes them get the most 
they can from their life despite the presence of disease. 
Health would thus be a dimension of human existence 
that remains in existence regardless of the presence of 
diseases, somewhat like the sky that remains in place 
even when covered with clouds”.
Discussions about care needs, which may result in potential 
restrictions of freedom and where there are competing con-
cerns about respecting di erent ethical principles, risk overly 
focusing on impairments and diagnoses . They risk giving 
insu  cient attention to social health and, as mentioned 
earlier,  to the right to take certain risks. It would be unethi-
cal to restrict a person’s freedom by moving them into a 
residential care home based on concerns about self-neglect 
or causing a  ood or gas explosion (even with their agree-
ment, if it is presented as the only option), if other options 
had not  rst been tried. It might, for example, be possible 
to organise regular and frequent home care assistance or 
to install smart devices in the person’s home.
Every day, people with dementia are uprooted from their 
 communities, lifelong personal and social relationships, 
separated from pets, regular hobbies and the pleasure of 
spending time outdoors, and from the security of a famil-
iar environment, and placed in ‘safe’ environments. Once 
placed, some  nd themselves sitting all day alone or with 
strangers but with a clean bed, a nutritious meal and being 
safe from physical harm. Whilst some care homes provide 
opportunities for social contact, which is a positive thing, 
measures which restrict people’s freedom are o en dispro-
portionate to people’s real needs and personal interests, 
and could have been avoided if reasonable accommoda-
tions had been implemented. Moreover, despite numerous 
good quality care homes and dedicated sta , others exist 
in which people are neglected and mistreated, do not have 
the means to defend their rights and have no contact with 
those who could have done so on their behalf.
People who are considered as lacking legal capacity may be 
consulted in decisions about di erent options but lack the 
right to insist on one option instead of another. The other 
parties involved in the decision-making process have dif-
ferent concerns and competing interests:
 Governments need to justify the allocation of resources 
fairly across di erent members of society (e.g. children, 
older people and people with disabilities) and with regard 
to di erent areas of life (e.g. health, education, employ-
ment or national defence) .
 Health and social care departments have budgets which 
guide what they feel they can o er.
 Informal carers may have competing responsibilities 
and demands on their time .
 Social care providers may have sta  ng problems.
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These may all impact on discussions about what is consid-
ered reasonable. People who have legal capacity and hence 
rights, rather than mere preferences to be considered, are 
surely better placed to argue what is reasonable, bearing 
in mind that the discussion is about their lives and health 
(physical, mental and social). Supported decision making 
could be helpful in this respect.
The right to community living
Community-based services are o en considered the best 
approach to the care of older people who require care or 
support and people with disabilities. Older people and peo-
ple with disabilities are entitled, according to the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union (2000/C 364/01):
 “to lead a life of dignity and independence and to partic-
ipate in social and cultural life” (article 25 on the rights 
of the elderly) and
 “to bene t from measures designed to ensure their inde-
pendence, social and occupational integration and 
participation in the life of the community” (article 26 the 
rights of persons with disabilities).”
People with dementia are nevertheless o en moved into 
residential care facilities against their will and because they 
do not have the legal right to continue living at home. This 
may be based on a legal process and be considered as being 
‘in their best interests’ or the only solution possible. However, 
whereas most issues related to restrictions of legal capacity 
may be linked to decision-making capacity, there is clearly 
more to involuntary internment than the ability to make a 
decision and to express one’s will. There are  nancial issues 
at stake because enabling a person to remain at home may 
require a considerable investment in time, e ort and money.
In the CRPD, article 19 covers the right to live in the com-
munity. It is linked to full inclusion and participation in 
society and has three key elements, namely choice; individ-
ualised support to promote inclusion and prevent isolation, 
and making services accessible to people with disabili-
ties. According to the Council of Europe Commissioner for 
Human Rights (2011), “this right is violated
 when people with disabilities who need some form of sup-
port in their everyday lives are required to relinquish living 
in the community in order to receive that support;
 when support is provided in a way that takes away peo-
ple’s control from their own lives;
 when support is altogether withheld, thus con ning a per-
son to the margins of the family or society; or
 when the burden is placed on people with disabilities to 
 t into public services and structures rather than these 
services and structures being designed to accommodate 
the diversity of the human condition.”
The reasons for involuntary placement may be expressed 
in terms of the inability to live independently (e.g. to wash, 
get food in, keep the home clean etc.) but these are issues 
that many people achieve to varying degrees. There are 
scales, assessments and expert opinions but the decisive 
factors may well be based on value judgements. Taking the 
example of adoption, in some countries the criteria applied 
to couples wishing to adopt children would, if applied to 
the rights of biological parents to bring up their children, 
result in a massive reduction in biologically-related people 
living as families. Coming back to decisions about possible 
involuntary internment, there is a risk of a person’s ability 
to maintain a clean home becoming an issue, the right to 
live o  baked beans on toast becoming an issue, the right 
to live like a recluse being questioned and the late payment 
of bills being considered as a lack of capacity to manage 
one’s own a airs.
Even if such issues, whilst previously considered one’s own 
business, can justi ably be considered a welfare and safety 
issue, there are other potential solutions. The right to legal 
capacity would and should apply to the right to choose 
where to live and with whom (alone, with a relative or friend, 
or in shared accommodation) and it could be argued that 
‘allowing’ a person to live in poor or dangerous living con-
ditions would amount to neglect and harm. Respecting 
legal capacity inevitably challenges the legitimacy of insti-
tutionalisation (involuntary placement) and calls for the 
development of appropriate supported decision making 
in relation to community living, combined with access to 
appropriate, a ordable and accessible community support 
services. For this to be possible, commitment is needed 
from governments and the  nancial resources to make such 
support possible.
Meanwhile, guardianship measures still exist in some 
countries with the e ect that guardians (as well as other 
people) may request an evaluation of a person’s ability 
to continue living in the community. Once a person has 
been deprived of the right to live in the community, alone 
or with others, life in an institution leaves little opportu-
nity for people to express their autonomy in others ways 
(e.g. deciding when and what to eat, participating in social 
events in the community, drinking and smoking, choosing 
when to get up in the morning etc.). The cost of providing 
appropriate care and support will most probably always 
be a factor that is raised in discussions about whether 
and how to enable a person to continue living in the com-
munity and as mentioned earlier about what constitutes 
reasonable accommodation. This raises questions about 
the perceived value of older people and people with dis-
abilities in society. Do issues about the cost of care and 
support actually come down to the perceived value of peo-
ple from these groups? Are there issues about perceived 
contribution to society, with more value being placed on 
future rather than past or prolonged contribution? If so, 
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how does this relate to the recognition and promotion of 
dignity of people from these groups?
Refusal of people with dementia to be assessed for 
care needs
In some countries, the necessity for governments to con-
sider possible alternatives before resorting to involuntary 
placement is enshrined in laws and regulations. However, 
the possibility to provide the necessary care and support 
within the person’s home or community may be limited 
by that person’s refusal (or that of their carer) to let health 
and social welfare providers  into their home. Decisions to 
restrict a person’s freedom may in some cases be in uenced 
by fear of litigation (e.g. for neglect or non-assistance to a 
person in danger). Healthcare professionals may, alterna-
tively, be hesitant to intervene in situations where there is 
little concrete evidence of danger (hence the need for evalu-
ation) but also sometimes to avoid intervening in a di  cult 
situation or to avoid o ering services where resources are 
limited (Mäki-Petäjä-Leinonen 2016). Risks to the person 
with dementia of not getting timely assessment include 
malnutrition, self-neglect, dehydration, over-medication, 
under-medication, abuse and, if the situation deterio-
rates, loss of the opportunity to continue living at home. 
Mäki-Petäjä-Leinonen (2016) highlights the di  culty faced 
by healthcare professionals when the law is not su  ciently 
clear about this situation and where an exaggerated respect 
for autonomy may in some cases amount to neglect or 
abandonment.
Awareness that a system exists, which can deprive a per-
son of their legal capacity and force them to leave their 
home, may be worrying to people who have been noti ed 
of the need for an assessment. If a person had legal capac-
ity and this included the right to stay in their home for as 
long as they wanted, this would be a neutral situation of 
30 See also the subsection on “Self-esteem and humiliation” (p.47).
potential bene t to them (i.e. to obtain the necessary sup-
port to enable them to do so). A person who has already 
been deprived of legal capacity (e.g. has a guardian) or fears 
losing it could quite understandably wish to avoid assess-
ment, particularly as it involves some degree of judgement 
based on established norms and  values. A person may, for 
example, live o  burgers, drink a litre of wine per day and 
only wash a few times a month. This may be acceptable up 
to the point that the person’s decision-making capacity is 
challenged, upon which failure to live according to estab-
lished norms may endanger the right to freedom and risk 
the loss of legal capacity. Having a diagnosis of dementia 
may increase the likelihood of the person’s decision-mak-
ing capacity being challenged.
Loss of social status
The process of being involuntarily detained due to having 
dementia and representing a possible danger may be lik-
ened to other forms of detention such as that of people with 
other mental disorders and people who have committed 
crimes. In some countries, older people may also have mem-
ories of workhouses for the poor and houses of correction 
for homeless or disorderly people in which conditions were 
intentionally extremely harsh. People from these groups are 
or were typically  stigmatized. Consequently, people who 
make this comparison may experience a feeling of injustice, 
 self-stigmatization, shame and loss of social status. Invol-
untary placement, including being moved into a care home 
against one’s will, involves more than a loss of freedom to 
choose where one resides. It is also a way of life which can 
in some cases be dehumanising and fail to respect peo-
ple’s dignity. If people who are involuntarily detained are 
not treated humanely and with dignity, respecting as far 
as possible their right to self-determination, it cannot be 
said that the measure respects the principle of bene cence 
or promotes their wellbeing.30
Recommendations on formal  restrictions of freedom/involuntary placement
1. Appropriate resources, practices and infrastructure should be provided to enable people with dementia to 
be cared for in their own  homes for as long as is reasonably possible and  they so desire.
2. The practice of supported decision making should be promoted in all discussions with the person with 
dementia about possible restrictions of freedom.
3. In accordance with the principles of subsidiarity and discrimination, services and support should be devel-
oped that provide an alternative to involuntary placement in situations where people with dementia have 
been deemed as lacking legal capacity and as representing a danger to themselves.
4. Such services and support, including a range of alternative living arrangements, should be adapted to the 
needs of people with dementia, taking into account individual preferences and wellbeing, in addition to 
concerns about safety.
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Informal admission to residential care/
involuntary stay
People with dementia are sometimes detained (placed in 
an establishment) on a long-term or daily basis due to their 
failure to protest or leave the building. If a person has not 
been legally detained, the various measures of protection 
o ered by various laws and conventions which guarantee 
the right to liberty and security of the person (such as arti-
cle 5 of the ECHR) do not apply. A person who has not been 
detained may therefore have less protection than a person 
who has. This would be linked to the fact that restrictions 
being imposed on people who have not been formerly 
detained would constitute an illegal deprivation of free-
dom but there may be no one monitoring that and people 
may not know their rights or how to enforce them.
It is to be hoped that people with dementia are usually 
admitted into care homes for legitimate reasons (e.g. 
because they need support and care which can be best 
or only provided in such homes and without which they 
would be at risk of harm) and in accordance with legal 
requirements. However, people with moderate to advanced 
dementia are at risk of being admitted into care homes 
without their consent and without any formal legal process 
by subtle means. This includes the use of deception such 
as not telling them that they are moving there by using the 
guise of respite care or a stay in hospital to disguise the 
transition, and not responding to requests to go home until 
they give up or forget they have a home. A typical example 
would be a person with dementia agreeing to go to nursing 
home or respite care for a limited time (perhaps linked to a 
temporary shortage of care or their partner being in hospi-
tal) and their requests to go home being ignored or skilfully 
managed up to the point that they give up, forget or “settle 
in”, becoming detained in fact but not in law. Psychological 
or emotional pressure is also sometimes used such as mak-
ing people feel that they are a burden to others and being 
unreasonable to insist on remaining in their own home. 
The use of threat is another way to make a person agree 
to go into care (e.g. threatening to take a person to court), 
to deprive them of their legal capacity and to force them 
to move into a care home. This could provoke feelings of 
shame, humiliation, fear, loss of control and stigma. There 
may also be issues re ecting structural discrimination in 
that appropriate services and support to enable a person 
to continue living at home might not exist or be a ordable.
People with dementia may also sometimes fail to protest 
against measures to deprive them of their liberty because 
5. No person with dementia should be detained “in fact but not in law” and thus deprived of the legal safe-
guards attached to involuntary placement.
6. There should be greater monitoring of how legislation to involuntarily detain people with dementia is used 
and how this could be amended to re ect a supported decision-making approach.
7. The conditions for the involuntary placement of a person with dementia should not only include proof that they 
are in danger or at risk if not so detained, but also that alternative less restrictive measures are not possible .
8. People with dementia should be supported during any process for involuntary placement  to ensure that 
alternatives to residential care and other measures of reasonable accommodation have been o ered.
9. Before a  nal decision is made to deprive a person of their freedom, it should be possible for people, if they 
wish and if it is feasible, to test alternative possible solutions.
10. Steps should be taken to ensure that legislation on involuntary placement is suited to the situation and 
condition of people with dementia (e.g. not limited to psychiatric institutions or to the possibility of cura-
tive treatment).
11. Health and social care professionals should be provided with guidelines and training on how to assess capac-
ity and potential risk in relation to speci c situations, and on the necessity to consider alternative solutions.
12. People with dementia should have the right to appeal to the court against the decision to involuntarily 
detain them, against the choice of the establishment and against the way they are treated once detained. 
To make this right meaningful, they should have access to independent advocacy.
13. Judges, lawyers and representatives/advocates should be better informed about the social and psycholog-
ical aspects of dementia and about the nature of capacity and incapacity in relation to dementia, so as to 
avoid stereotyping a ecting their decisions related to involuntary placement.
14. Regular and timely assessments of care needs and potential threats to the safety of people with dementia 
should be carried out, and appropriate support provided if necessary, as a means to avoid involuntary place-
ment resulting from a crisis situation.
15. It should be obligatory to document any restriction of freedom, to inform the person with dementia (or their 
legal representative) of any restriction of freedom and to inform the latter of their legal rights in relation to that 
restriction as well as of the contact details of any advocacy or legal aid to which they are entitled.
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they don’t realise that they are free to resist or to leave. 
They may be confused, have di  culty understanding what 
has happened to them, have di  culty communicating 
their desire to leave or fear ‘making a fuss’ and getting on 
the wrong side of people whom they respect as  gures of 
authority (such as doctors) or fear (based on a relationship 
of dependency). In the context of day care, lack of volun-
tariness can also be witnessed through protests to go to 
day care centres, expressed verbally (and o en ignored) or 
through behaviour such as refusing to get into a vehicle to 
go there or banging on the door to be let out (o en result-
ing in people being tricked or in the use of physical force).
It is important to bear in mind that coercion is not only 
about ethical dilemmas linked to autonomy versus pater-
nalism but also about relationships, communication and 
cooperation. Hem et al. (2014) point out that coercion occurs 
within the context of relationships and that it is essential for 
people who are subjected to coercion to feel respected and 
well taken care of. In the context of involuntary placement, 
van den Hoo  and Goossensen (2013) report the experi-
ence of feeling listened to as one of key factors determining 
whether people feel respected as human beings.
The use of restraint
De nition and forms of restraint
There are numerous de nitions of restraint, which o en 
focus on a particular form of restraint (e.g. physical restraint) 
or a particular context (e.g. in hospitals or care homes). In 
this report, we will adopt a broad de nition of restraint 
as being:
 “Any method, device, substance, act or procedure which 
restricts a person’s freedom of movement in the pri-
vate or health and social care setting, irrespective of 
the intent to restrain” (adapted from Alzheimer Europe 
2012, p.24).
There are di erent forms of restraint. Some of the terminol-
ogy overlaps but the main forms include:
 Chemical restraint: the use of drugs/medication to con-
trol or change people’s behaviour rather than to treat 
medical symptoms. The intention/purpose is important, 
in this case, as a drug that is used in an appropriate man-
ner and in the appropriate dose, if and when required 
for the bene t of the person concerned, would not be 
considered as chemical restraint. On the other hand, 
there are di erences of opinion as to what constitutes 
appropriate use, an appropriate dose and the need for 
the drug to be taken. Some would argue that the use of 
antipsychotic drugs is not appropriate for the treatment 
of BPSD (behavioural and psychological symptoms of 
dementia) and does not e ectively treat medical symp-
toms  because of the risks and side e ects linked to its 
use.
 Physical force: People with dementia are sometimes 
physically restrained not through devices, equipment or 
chemicals but by means of hands-on contact. The use 
of force might, for example, include pushing or pulling 
a person (e.g. into a van, building, chair or bed), grab-
bing hold of their arms to force them into a particular 
place or prevent them from leaving, or pinning them 
down or immobilising them (e.g. in order to adminis-
ter treatment or  'care'). Physical violence might also be 
used such as slapping, hitting or shaking the person. 
This would also be classed as abuse and violence, as 
might any illegitimate use of restraint.
 Coercion: Coercion involves the use of threat, intimida-
tion or another form of pressure to force another person 
to do something that they would not do by choice. Again, 
this does not necessarily involve the use of devices or 
chemicals. Coercion may involve the in iction of phys-
ical or psychological pain or pressure but sometimes 
a credible threat achieves the desired result. O en the 
initial use of force is what makes future threats credi-
ble. In other cases, the threat is based on deceit as the 
thing that is threatened could not occur but the person 
does not know this.
Recommendations on informal admission to residential care/involuntary stay
1. The lawfulness of restrictions of liberty occurring in residential respite care, day care facilities and other 
places where people with dementia reside voluntarily should be investigated with a view to the develop-
ment of guidelines and an accessible system of safeguards.
2. Legislation should cover the deprivation of freedom of people with dementia at home (e.g. not being per-
mitted to leave the house or being locked in a room).
3. Procedural safeguards should be developed to protect the rights and wellbeing of people with dementia in 
residential respite care and day care, and in other places where they are not free to leave but have not been 
lawfully detained.
DEMENTIA IN EUROPE ETHICS REPORT 2020 | 45
 Mechanical restraint: This includes the use of various 
physical devices such as  xed tables, reclining seats 
which some people would not be able to get up from 
without assistance, bed-rails and belts or straps to  x 
people to chairs and beds.
 Environmental restraint: This would cover measures 
to restrict the freedom of movement of people with 
dementia by means of adaptations made to the living 
environment such as complicated locking devices, cam-
ou aging exists, using mirrors, poor lighting, absence 
of handrails, lack of signposting etc.
 Psychological restraint: The use of deception to lead 
people to believe that they are not free to leave without 
actually forbidding them to leave. Other psychological 
means of restraint include the use of emotional black-
mail (which would also be coercion), false promises 
and measures which challenge a person’s self-esteem 
and dignity such as ridicule, infantilisation (treating 
someone like a child), objecti cation, ignorance and 
humiliation.
 Technological restraint: Assistive technology (AT), espe-
cially surveillance and monitoring devices, o en receives 
attention in relation to ethical issues as it tends to be 
associated with the restriction or loss of freedom. How-
ever, whilst surveillance and tracking devices can be used 
to restrict freedom, they can also be used in an ethical 
manner to promote autonomy and increase freedom 
(Niemeijer et al. 2010, Zwijsen et al. 2012). It has neverthe-
less been suggested that it would be wrong to consider 
AT as “morally neutral” because some devices and sys-
tems include characteristics which a ect the rights of 
those using them and cannot be removed as they are 
“substantially rooted in the conception of the applica-
tion” (Casas et al. 2006).
Justi cation for and attitudes towards the use of 
restraint
Restraint is currently used across di erent healthcare 
settings for some of the frailest and hence most vulnera-
ble members of society (JBI 2002). Its use for people with 
dementia is rarely justi able and, if used, should be last 
resort because research and professional experience has 
shown that restraint can usually be avoided. However, excep-
tional circumstances and situations may arise in which the 
use of restraint could be considered justi able from a nurs-
ing/medical and ethical perspective.
Aside from the issue of whether restraint is ethically and 
legally justi able in a particular situation, a common rea-
son given for its use is to protect people from harming 
themselves, particularly as a result of falling (Karlsson et al. 
2000, Hamers and Huizing 2005). It is o en linked to fears 
of litigation. However, it has been argued that such fears 
are o en unfounded and result from a lack of knowledge 
about liability for negligence and physical injury (Robbins 
1996). Moreover, physical restraint may actually increase 
the likelihood of falls and cause severe injury (see next 
subsection). In addition, it could be argued that too great 
an emphasis is placed on the prevention of harm at the 
risk of overlooking the need to promote autonomy and 
general wellbeing. Other reasons o en cited by healthcare 
professionals include managing agitation and aggression, 
controlling behaviour, preventing  'wandering', providing 
physical support and preventing people from removing 
dressings and catheters, or otherwise tampering with med-
ical devices (JBI 2002).
Some measures are quite subtle and some people might 
genuinely use them without really realising that they are 
in fact forms of restraint. Examples include chairs with fold 
down/ xed tables, low or tilted chairs that are di  cult to 
get up from, cradle beds, complicated door mechanisms 
(which are not locked but require a sequence of actions 
to open them), certain architecture or design, the use of 
lighting and darkness, some electronic monitoring devices 
and camou aged exits. These measures are not  measures 
of restraint per se but are sometimes used for that purpose 
or with that result.
Informal carers may sometimes feel that they have a moral 
duty to care, or simply care based on a loving relationship 
with the person with dementia or a sense of solidarity. Some 
point out that they had no option, did not choose to be 
a carer or just dri ed into care (Alzheimer Europe 2001). 
Non-related informal carers, such as neighbours and vol-
unteers, which are less common, may care for a variety of 
reasons (e.g. based on religion, community spirit, reciprocity 
or friendship). Family carers may also experience con icting 
demands which lead to the use of physical restraint. This 
might include professional obligations, competing family 
demands, the need to leave the home (e.g. for shopping 
or for administrative matters) and personal reasons (e.g. 
based on leisure activities, socialising or having a break).
It should not be assumed that informal carers who use 
restraint, do so out of ignorance or a desire to harm some-
one with dementia. They may sometimes see no possible 
alternative (e.g. because they need to leave the house or 
leave the person unattended for a while to buy food, to work 
or to attend to a child). For many people who are depend-
ent on others for care, their home becomes a prison. At the 
same time, carers are also entitled to freedom. This can be 
a di  cult balancing act, bearing in mind that there could 
be a  re whilst a person with dementia is con ned to the 
home or restrained and that someone could choke or fall 
(as a result of the restraint) within a matter of minutes (Klie 
2015). Klie points out that the belief that restraint is the 
only solution does not make the action legally justi able 
and that in Germany, informal carers would be expected to 
inform guardianship authorities with the aim of obtaining 
approval for the restraint or obtaining support so as to avoid 
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the use of restraint. This applies to everyone, regardless of 
where they live and who is providing or receiving care. Fail-
ure to obtain authorisation would render a carer liable to 
prosecution. In many countries in Europe, however, such 
support would not be available and informal carers would 
still be faced with an ethical dilemma.
In the context of professional care, restraint is o en used 
because of understa  ng, lack of competent sta , the 
desire for peace and quiet for residents or sta , and lack 
of knowledge about alternatives to restraint and about 
the consequences of using restraint (Hantikainen 1998, 
Kirkevold and Engedal 2004, Gastmans and Milisen 2006). 
The routine use of physical restraint (especially bed rails) 
or for reasons which are unclear has also been reported 
(Cohen-Mans eld et al. 1992 in Hantikainen 1998, Kirkevold 
and Engedal 2004, Meyer et al. 2008). As physical restraint is 
o en used arbitrarily, it is not always documented. Kirkevold 
and Engedal (2004) suggest that lack of legislation  on the 
use of physical restraint may explain why it is not always 
reported or reasons given for its use.
There are different tiers of responsibility within care 
establishments, namely the responsibility of legislative 
authorities and health care systems, the responsibility of 
various institutions or homes, personal responsibility and 
responsibility as a member of a team, and that professional 
carers o en  nd their range of options for action somewhat 
restricted (German Ethics Council 2018). There are o en sev-
eral issues at stake. Professional carers have a professional 
duty to care and this involves accomplishing a range of 
tasks within a given time. Failure to accomplish tasks on 
time may be problematic for them and be interpreted as a 
sign of laziness or incompetence. Certain practices, such 
as the use of restraint, may be overtly or covertly condoned 
or even promoted in some care homes, thereby making it 
di  cult for sta  not to use them as it would mean going 
against the hierarchy. This can be considered as an ‘instruc-
tion to discriminate’ whereby sta  are obliged to act in a 
discriminatory way. Some homes may simply turn a blind 
eye to various practices in the interests of e  ciency and 
cost saving.
Newerla (2017) suggests that acute care establishments 
such as hospitals are primarily driven and motivated by 
economic concerns and that people with dementia are 
o en perceived as threatening or disrupting established 
routines and the bureaucratic/economic functioning of 
such organisations. People with dementia are o en expe-
rienced as unpredictable and disruptive, failing to comply 
with the long-established power relations and the mantra 
that everything can be managed. They come to be seen as 
‘the problem’ and are transformed into ‘docile bodies’ by 
means of sedation (Newerla 2017, p.197). Professional carers 
become entangled in the system, caught between what 
they feel they have to do and what they know and feel 
they should do, with little or no freedom for manoeuvre. 
This sometimes takes a toll on their physical and emo-
tional wellbeing. Newerla (2017) argues in favour of training 
and increased awareness about dementia amongst care 
professionals but recognises that the ability to provide 
holistic care and to look for  exible and creative solutions 
(e.g. to avoid the use of restraint) can be hampered by the 
care ethos, and by economic and structural constraints 
of organisations.
The reasons and situations described above should not be 
interpreted as justi cations for the use of restraint. They 
simply highlight the dilemma sometimes faced by pro-
fessional and informal carers which consists of balancing 
competing demands, wishes and obligations. Caring for a 
person with dementia should involve doing what is in their 
best interests and re ects their wishes, which rarely if ever 
involves the use of restraint. Yet, as mentioned earlier, peo-
ple with dementia o en lack the power to protest, may be 
easily manipulated and, being dependent on carers, are in 
a vulnerable position. The onus is therefore on informal and 
professional carers to respect people with dementia and to 
act ethically towards them.
Problematic situations are not caused solely by people 
with dementia. They are also a re ection of the way that 
the care of people with dementia is organised by society 
which re ects economic, political and social factors, which 
in turn may be a re ection of the value accorded to people 
with dementia. De ning a person’s behaviour as problem-
atic or challenging begs the question “for whom and why?”
The negative impact of restraint
Numerous examples of the negative impact of physical 
restraint can be found in the literature. These include med-
ical/physical, mental/psychological, social/behavioural 
consequences, mobility/agility and actual death. Exam-
ples are provided below :
 Medical/physical consequences include bruising, acute 
functional decline, decreased peripheral circulation, 
cardiovascular stress, bladder and bowel incontinence, 
constipation, muscle atrophy, pressure ulcers, nerve 
damage, infections, asphyxiation, strangulation, car-
diac arrest and even death (Evans et al. 2002, JBI 2002, 
Cotter 2005, Cotter and Evans undated, Gastmans and 
Milisen 2006). Such e ects are not linked solely to the 
use of physical restraint as older people with cognitive 
and physical impairments may be more prone to such 
harmful e ects compared to those with no impairments 
(Gastmans and Milisen 2006). Evans et al. (2003) sug-
gest that as estimations of the number of actual deaths 
linked to the use of restraint are mainly based on retro-
spective studies (e.g. consulting death certi cates), it is 
likely actual cases may be much higher.
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 Mental/psychological consequences include serious psy-
chological disadvantages, psychological trauma due to 
restraint serving as a symbolic reminder of past  victimi-
sation, increased cognitive decline, apathy, depression, 
disillusionment (Evans et al. 2002, Flannery 2003, Gast-
mans and Milisen 2006).
 Social and behavioural consequences include impaired 
social function and behavioural symptoms such as 
aggressiveness and regressive behaviour (Evans, Wood 
and Lambert 2003, Cotter 2005, Hamers and Huizing 
2005). Chemical restraint can also result in changes in 
someone’s personality, which may have a knock-on 
e ect on a person’s relationships with others.
 Consequences linked to mobility and agility include 
decreased muscle strength and balance, decreased 
mobility, increased risk of falls and injury, even result-
ing in death (see below) (Tinetti, Liu and Ginter 1992, 
Capezuti et al. 2002, Evans et al. 2002). With regard to 
mobility, Luo, Lin and Castle (2011) found that the use 
of trunk restraint was associated with a higher rate of 
falls and fractures amongst people with dementia com-
pared to people without dementia. The use of full bed 
rails was associated with a lower risk of falls for people 
with and without dementia. People may fall as a result 
of struggling over barriers (such as bed rails) or as a 
result of fatigue or unsteadiness following an e ort to 
free themselves from a restrictive measure (Cotter 2005).
 The use of various forms of restraint, such as mechanical, 
physical and chemical restraint, can sometimes result 
in death. An analysis of 26 deaths occurring whilst peo-
ple were being physically restrained in Munich between 
1997 and 2010 revealed three natural causes, one suicide, 
11 cases of strangulation, 8 cases of chest compression 
and 3 cases of dangling in a head-down position (Ber-
zlanovich, Schöpfer and Keil 2012). Cotter (2005) draws 
attention to the risk of people who have been physi-
cally restrained becoming trapped between the headrest, 
mattress and bed rail which can lead to asphyxiation 
and strangulation. With regard to chemical restraint, 
Banerjee (2009) assessed the risks and bene ts of using 
antipsychotics for people with dementia and concluded:
 “If, at any one time, we are treating approximately 180,000 
people with dementia with antipsychotic medication in 
any year, and we make the conservative assumption that 
the average treatment episode is the 6–12 weeks used 
in trials, this equates to the following:
 an additional 1,800 deaths per year; and
 an additional 1,620 CVAEs, around half of which may be 
severe” (Banerjee 2009, p.28).
Self-esteem and humiliation
Being subjected to restraint can be humiliating. There 
are two key concepts linked to the potential humiliating 
e ect of loss of freedom of movement through the use 
of restraint, namely people being treated as if they were 
objects or sub-human, and the experience of loss of control 
(which lies at the very centre of legal capacity).
According to Avishai Margalit (1996), a decent or civilised 
society is one whose institutions do not humiliate people 
under their authority and whose citizens do not humiliate 
one another. Humiliation is described as:
 “any sort of behaviour or condition that constitutes a 
sound reason for a person to consider his or her self-re-
spect injured” (1996, p. 9).
It can only result from the acts or omissions of humans 
(i.e. not solely as a result of having a certain condition). 
Although humiliation cannot occur in the absence of humil-
iators, it may occur without the humiliators necessarily 
having intended to humiliate a person. A decent society 
is further de ned as one that  ghts conditions which 
constitute a justi cation for its dependents to consider 
themselves humiliated. In the case of dementia, the sound 
reason might not necessarily be the result of logical rea-
soning and people with dementia might not necessarily be 
able to communicate their sense of humiliation but such 
humiliation may nevertheless be sensed and experienced. 
In the context of involuntary internment and the use of 
coercion, there are acts and omissions on the part of individ-
uals, institutions and governments that are likely to result 
in people with dementia having sound reason to consider 
their self-respect injured.
People are sometimes being described as empty shells, zom-
bies, having no mind and no longer being the person they 
used to be (Alzheimer Europe 2013) and treated like objects. 
This can be linked to stigmatization whereby people are 
identi ed as having a certain socially salient characteris-
tic that is labelled, negatively stereotyped and devalued, 
leading to negative emotional reactions towards them and 
discrimination (Link and Phelan 2001). Stigmatization always 
occurs in the context of unequal power relations. Loss of 
legal capacity involves a considerable loss of power and in 
situations where restraint and coercion are used, the power 
imbalance is particularly clear.
It is, however, important to distinguish between treating 
humans as if they were objects and treating them as objects. 
It is unlikely that people are really perceived as things. It 
would be quite pathological to genuinely believe that a 
person was no longer a person (although this may be the 
case for some people vis-à-vis others in a persistent vege-
tative state). It is about perceiving the human aspect in a 
human being. Margalit (1996) gives the example of servants 
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of wealthy people who choose not to ‘see’ them and in a 
way to treat them as if they were objects, and for the serv-
ants to render themselves as inconspicuous as possible, to 
act as if they were minding their own limited business and 
ignoring everything else so that their masters can overlook 
them with ease. Seeing a person as human and looking 
at people ‘in detail’, according to Margalit, means looking 
beyond the physical body parts - a kind of psychological 
perception such as seeing worried eyes, kind eyes or bored 
eyes. Such perception might not always be accurate but 
when someone sees someone as human, they cannot see 
that person otherwise. Failure to recognise or acknowledge 
personhood and human status is an extreme form of deval-
uation within the process of stigmatization (Go man 1963). 
Narchi and Ritzi (2019) suggest that people  nd it easy to 
justify the use of restraint when, instead of seeing people 
with dementia as having dignity, they perceive them as 
heavily damaged organisms.
According to Margalit, people cannot directly control what 
they see but can try to change their way of looking at peo-
ple and develop “a-stigmatic” vision (i.e. to ignore stigmata 
and to see people precisely in their human aspect). This 
way of seeing is a combination of perception and thought. 
Thich Nhat  Hanh describes this as looking beyond labels 
and recognising that labels are not reality.
 “We must train ourselves to look at each other beyond 
labels, and to see our true nature” (Nhat Hanh 2019, p.70).
People who are obliged in the course of their professional 
duty to use restraint or coercion on people with dementia 
may face an ethical dilemma. Those who are subjected to 
restraint or coercion may feel that they are being treated as 
objects or as subhuman and thereby have sound grounds 
to consider their self-respect injured even in cases where 
they are not perceived in that way or where those carrying 
out the act or omission felt that they had no alternative.
The other aspect of humiliation is loss of control, consisting 
of the deliberate in iction of utter loss of freedom and control 
over one’s vital interests, and, subsequently, rejection from 
humanity. The humiliation goes beyond the cruelty of con-
 nement or restriction. It is symbolic of subordination - of 
being denied the equal right to exercise choice and protect 
one’s very existence. This constitutes an existential threat. 
The perpetrator, especially if an institution, has power over 
victims who feel helpless and unable to protect their vital 
interests. In the case of restraint, such helplessness may be 
linked to the loss of legal capacity, informal regulations and/
or the physical, mechanical, technological or other restric-
tive measures adopted. In rare situations where the use of 
restraint or coercion may be ethically and legally justi able 
and applied with consideration and respect, the person with 
dementia may  nevertheless be unable to understand and con-
sequently feel humiliated and experience existential threat.
Dignity, freedom and embodiment
As a philosophical discipline, “phenomenology is the study 
of ‘phenomena’: appearances of things, or things as they 
appear in our experience, […] thus the meanings things have 
in our experience” (Smith 2018). Like other disciplines, phe-
nomenology in the 20th and 21st centuries experienced the 
so-called “body turn” or “corporeal turn”, involving a para-
digm shi  towards the study of corporeal aspects of human 
experience (Alloa 2012). With regard to the human body, phe-
nomenology applies the following distinction: Firstly, the 
body appears as a three-dimensional object among other 
objects. It is merely an objective body that can be called 
‘corpus’ in Latin and ‘Körper’ in German. Secondly, the body 
can also be the means through which the world appears 
to us and through which we enact our freedom. For this 
phenomenon the German term ‘Leib’ can be used. In the 
absence of a direct translation, Leib could be paraphrased 
as ‘embodiment’ or ‘living body’ (Coors 2020). In French 
phenomenology, terms like ‘la chair’, ‘le corps vivant’ and 
‘le corps mien’ have been proposed. Encompassing both 
objective and subjective aspects, embodiment focuses on 
the psychophysical unity that is the human living body.
Re ecting this corporeal turn, recent scholarship has 
introduced the observations of the phenomenology of 
embodiment into the discourse on measures of restraint 
especially in older people with dementia (Ritzi and Kruse 
2019). The restraint of a human being’s freedom does not 
take place in an invisible realm of ideas but directly con-
cerns the psychophysical unity of the living body. Indeed, 
from a phenomenological perspective, it can be argued that 
human dignity and human freedom directly appear and 
manifest themselves in a bodily manner. The living body 
is the possibility and to a large extent the realisation of a 
human being’s personal freedom. A person realises them-
selves through their embodiment (Fuchs 2008).
Fuchs (2008) also notes that throughout life, a person has 
bodily experiences with the world and that these experi-
ences are re ected in bodily habits over time, which can 
be called embodied cognition (‘Leibgedächtnis’): Automatic 
sequences of movements, well-rehearsed habits, the skilful 
use of instruments etc. Here, a part of the person’s memory 
and biography has become, so to speak,  esh and blood and, 
interestingly enough, remains there for a long time even 
in dementia. Thus, it can happen that the biography of a 
person with advanced dementia no longer expresses itself 
verbally, but still in a bodily manner – re ecting what Kruse 
(2017, p. 337) calls ‘islands of the self’ (‘Inseln des Selbst’).
On an even more fundamental level, with regard to human 
freedom and freedom restraining measures, it can be stated 
that it is not only the biography of a person that manifests 
itself in a bodily manner. Rather, as stated above, it is the 
freedom of the human being that manifests itself through 
embodiment. Thus, through realising freedom the living 
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body is also the expression and manifestation of human 
dignity. Indeed, it would be wrong to say that physical or 
mental violence only harms the body of a person and not 
the person themself. A violation of dignity can concretely 
express itself in the bodily humiliation of the human being 
(see also previous subsection on Self-esteem and humilia-
tion , p.47). The abstract dignity and freedom of a person is 
violated and restricted concretely in their body. This applies 
especially to measures of restraint (Ritzi and Kruse 2019).
While this is immediately obvious in the case of  xations 
that are close to the body and other (e.g. spatial) precau-
tions, it should be explicitly pointed out that also, and 
especially when administering psychotropic drugs, an inter-
vention in the ‘sovereignty of the living body’ occurs. This 
is particularly problematic, ethically speaking, when these 
drugs are administered with the mere aim of sedation (i.e. 
as a form of chemical restraint). The concept of embodi-
ment makes the severity of such interventions clear. Hence, 
Ritzi and Kruse (2019) show that drug sedation may appear 
peaceful and gentle from the outside, but that there is a 
more serious interference with the person’s living body, 
since this measure penetrates into the interior of human 
beings and deprives them of the possibility to freely con-
trol their bodies. They conclude that measures of restraint 
intervene in the bodily manifest freedom of the person and 
represent a form of humiliation and violation of bodily sov-
ereignty. Alternative measures must always be exhausted.31
Respect for autonomy
The issue of autonomy with regard to the use of restraint 
and coercion is not solely about being deprived of the 
freedom to decide what to do or not do, with whom and 
how. The initial loss of freedom of choice is linked to other 
losses of freedom such as the freedom to physically move, 
to respond to one’s physical needs, to present a certain 
image of oneself, to protect oneself against humiliation 
and possible abuse, to socialise with other people and to 
accept risks. Respect for autonomy is not more important 
than other ethical principles but in the case of restraint, it 
lies at the heart of several ethical issues and the eradication 
of the use of restraint would help avoid certain unethical 
situations in the context of care.
The autonomy of care sta  is not being respected if they are 
expected to use certain forms of restraint in order to ful l 
their required tasks and if they are uncomfortable with this 
either professionally or personally. One way to express their 
autonomy is to voice their concerns or cease working for a 
particular establishment. However, if such use is widespread 
and accepted by apparently respectable establishments and 
more highly educated healthcare professionals, it is possible 
31 See subsection on Measures and approaches to avoid the  perceived need for or  actual use of restraint.
that they may question the legitimacy of their concerns. 
For this reason, it would be bene cial to include training 
in ethical re ection in the formal training of care sta  and 
as in-house or external continuing education. Training in 
ethical issues related to the care of people with dementia 
would also be bene cial for managers of care homes as it 
might lead to a more positive attitude towards care sta  
who express ethical concerns.
If restraint is only ever used in exceptional circumstances 
and as a last resort, this means that alternative solutions are 
found or that the person concerned eventually agrees to the 
proposed intervention. Part of the process of avoiding coer-
cion is therefore to seek the person’s informed consent and 
to provide the person with the necessary support to make 
an informed decision. However, if the person knows that the 
measure will be applied regardless of whether they consent 
or not, and if the methods of persuasion are not respectful 
of that person’s dignity, such consent if eventually given 
(perhaps reluctantly or without full conviction) would be 
meaningless, a mere formality resulting from some degree 
of coercion (German Ethics Council 2018).
Security versus well-being
In rare cases, it might be ethical to use restraint but there 
is always a risk that its initial use is continued therea er, 
when there are no longer grounds to justify its use. Restraint 
is o en justi ed on the grounds that it is necessary to pre-
vent a person from coming to harm (e.g. when there is 
no time to investigate possible causes for the behaviour 
or to try other options). We have already argued that far 
from preventing harm, restraint may actually lead to acci-
dents and even death. We have also considered, earlier in 
this report, whether and if so to what extent people with 
dementia should be protected from harm. As a potentially 
vulnerable group (and in the light of fears about litigation 
for failing to protect them), people with dementia may be 
over-protected. This reduces their autonomy, may fail to 
respect their dignity and overall, is not compatible with 
enhancing their quality of life. O en greater importance 
is attributed to safety than to wellbeing, especially when 
it concerns other people who are considered as vulnerable 
and for whom someone is responsible.
There is a risk, when de ning whole groups of people (such 
as people with dementia) as vulnerable, of restricting their 
legal capacity irrespective of their actual needs or capacities, 
based on stereotypes and assumptions. The CRPD Com-
mittee has described this as discrimination on the basis of 
perceived disability (Waddington and Broderick 2018). This 
typically occurs when people with dementia are character-
ised on the basis of the stereotype of advanced dementia 
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and blanket ‘protective’ (restrictive) measures are applied 
to people who don’t need them.
It may be considered acceptable for people to engage in 
acrobatics and mountaineering, even to surf in shark-in-
fested water, to cross busy roads, handle hot liquids and 
manipulate machinery but not for an elderly lady with 
dementia to get up out of her chair when she chooses in 
order to stretch her legs, chat with other residents, make a 
co ee or go to the toilet. The refusal of this right, whether 
based on a formal or informal restriction of capacity, may 
in the long run have far-reaching e ects such as social iso-
lation, depression, premature loss of mobility, poor physical 
health, not feeling ‘at home’ and functional incontinence. 
It may result in feelings of shame and humiliation, which 
touch on issues of dignity and personhood. Gastmans and 
Milisen (2006) suggest that although physical integrity may 
be considered as a fundamental value, this value should 
not always take priority over others and that consequently, 
overall well-being should be promoted. This would include 
social, psychological and moral aspects of wellbeing.
Goethals et al. (2012) reviewed qualitative literature on 
nurses’ decision-making in the case of physical restraint. 
Concerning the issue of security and wellbeing, they point 
out that nurses’ decisions to use physical restraint are o en 
dominated by concerns about safety even though they take 
into consideration other values such as bene cence, free-
dom and respect for autonomy when deciding on the use 
of restraint. They also consider the wellbeing of sta  and 
all residents/patients in their care. This is an issue which 
probably also applies in the context of people’s own homes 
where there are other family members to consider. In a care 
environment which prioritises safety over wellbeing, nurses 
(and care sta ) may be torn between their own values and 
their perceived or imposed professional responsibilities. 
Weiner et al. (2003) describe them as “acting as ‘double 
agents’, trapped between professional and ethical obliga-
tions towards patients’ rights and the obligation to carry 
out employers’ policies, which may involve cost-saving 
and e  ciency measures” (p. 513). The use of restraint may 
also damage the relationship of trust between people with 
dementia and professional carers.
Measures and approaches to avoid the perceived 
need for or actual use of restraint
Various forms of assistive technology, as well as approaches, 
procedures and attitudes, may help prevent the perceived 
or otherwise justi ed need to use restraint on people 
with dementia. Narchi and Ritzi (2019) provide examples 
of devices and equipment such as low/ oor beds, crash 
mats, non-slip mattresses and stocks, sensory mattresses, 
light switches and other detectors, alarm systems, hip pro-
tectors, helmets, easy walkers (walking support with inbuilt 
seat) and various mobility aids. They also draw attention 
to practices and the environment or design of buildings 
such as maintaining mobility, adequate lighting, removal of 
obstacles which might lead to falls, speedy response to calls 
for assistance, biography work, cooperation with informal 
carers, attention to people’s needs and wishes, continence 
management, assistance with communication, structured 
activities and respectful interaction.
Referring to Kant’s famous question, “What should I do?”, 
Narchi and Ritzi suggest that in the context of decisions 
surrounding the use of restraint, this could be formulated 
as follows:
 “What should I do in this speci c [acute hospital] care 
situation, which it seems can only be resolved through 
the use of restraint” (2019, p. 275).
The German Ethics Council describes four criteria to be 
respected in cases where restraint is believed to be mor-
ally and legally justi ed. These are:
1. The means of restraint must be suited to the goal, and 
should be necessary and proportionate.
2. The protection from harm must not be disproportion-
ate in the sense that it risks causing other irreversible 
damage.
3. The risk of harm cannot be avoided by other less extreme 
measures.
4. Consent should be sought if the person for whom 
restraint is considered necessary is capable of making 
an autonomous decision.
Narchi and Ritzi (2019) propose further key questions or 
points that carers could ask themselves and re ect on so 
as to ensure that these criteria are indeed met. Please see 
Appendix 3.
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Recommendations on the use of restraint
For government, policymakers and service providers
1. Policymakers and service providers should strive to provide the least-restrictive environment for people with 
dementia in need of care, support or treatment.
2. The allocation of resources at all levels should re ect the commitment to achieving the least restrictive envi-
ronments for care, support and treatment.
3. An awareness-raising campaign should be developed to inform people about the relevant legal and ethical 
issues linked to the use of restraint.
4. A legal framework and guidelines should be developed to protect people with dementia from the unjusti a-
ble use of restraint.
5. The use of restraint on people with dementia should be considered as unethical and a form of abuse unless 
justi cation can be provided to prove the contrary.
6. An independent organisation should be established with responsibility for investigating the use of restraint 
to which people with dementia (and other residents in homes), carers and healthcare professionals can report 
their concerns anonymously.
7. This organisation should be granted the power to make unannounced inspections, to issue recommendations 
to organisations to change their practices and to take appropriate legal action if necessary.
8. Governments should set targets to reduce the prescription of antipsychotic medication for people with dementia.
9. Regular medication reviews should be required to help prevent doctors simply switching to alternative medi-
cation (i.e. to replace one antipsychotic drug with another type of medication that has a similar e ect).
10. Clear guidelines should be developed for doctors and nurses on the prescription and use of antipsychotic 
medication for people with dementia, covering the dangers of such medication and the need to reduce such 
prescriptions.
11. Doctors, nurses and care sta  should be provided with training on alternatives to using medication to treat 
BPSD (e.g. the use of psychosocial interventions).
12. Training should be provided to help doctors, nurses and care sta  understand the factors that might contribute 
to BPSD (e.g. a noisy environment, anxiety, pain and frustration) and how to mitigate them.
13. In cases where the police (or other relevant authorities depending on the country) might be called in to restrain a 
person with dementia or ensure their transferral to a care facility, they should have at least a basic understanding 
of dementia and take measures to minimise distress and discomfort linked to the use of any measures of restraint
General
1. Restraint should only be tolerated in extreme situations where the physical and mental integrity of the per-
son with dementia is in serious and imminent danger and as a last resort, unless there is no time or it would 
be too risky to attempt another approach.
2. Such situations are considered extremely rare and should be avoided by careful general planning and re ection.
3. Before restraint is used on people with dementia all other less invasive means must have been tried.
4. If ever justi ably used, restraint should be applied with particular attention to the person’s psychological 
and emotional wellbeing, and  in a respectful manner which communicates recognition of a person’s value, 
dignity and need to feel protected from harm. Even if necessary, proportionate and justi able, it may still 
be experienced as traumatic.
5. The expected bene t of the restraint used must signi cantly outweigh the likely harm to the person con-
cerned, including humiliation, existential fear and loss of dignity, self-respect and trust.
6. Whilst guidelines may be helpful, a person’s wellbeing or welfare should not be determined in the abstract 
or with regard to the interests of third parties, but must be based on each person’s individual circumstances 
and point of view, including their biography, history and cultural background.
7. The restraint of a person with dementia who is unable to consent should be permitted only a er discus-
sion within a multidisciplinary care team and with the relatives, carers and advocates of the person with 
dementia. In some cases, this may not be feasible because of the urgency of the situation but should take 
place as soon as possible a erwards.
8. Restraint should not be used without the consent of a person’s legal representative/guardian, if there is one.
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9. The person who is restrained should be involved as far as possible in decisions regarding the actual imple-
mentation of the measure.
10. The reason for the restraint and its likely duration should be discussed with the person concerned, who 
should be treated with compassion and made to feel safe.
11. Cultural and linguistic barriers should be addressed. If necessary, interpreters should be involved and cul-
tural and religious needs considered. This necessitates intercultural awareness, sensitivity and competence.
12. In most cases, the use of restraint should not be considered an option but rather a failure to provide good 
care (which may not always be the fault of the carers but rather that of a care organisation).
13. Restraint should be used for the shortest time possible and the restrained person should not be le  unattended.
14. Restraint should never be used on a routine basis even if initially prescribed by a doctor.
15. Before considering how to deal with BPSD and challenging behaviour, it should be determined for whom 
such symptoms and behaviour are disturbing.
16. Judicial approval should be obtained for the use of any form of restraint. If necessary (e.g. in emergency sit-
uations) this should be obtained retrospectively.
17. Any use of restraint should be documented.
For professional caregivers
1. Care homes should:
 have a clear policy about not using restraint
 develop and implement a policy of zero tolerance of restraint (subject to rare exceptions)
 support and provide care home sta  with alternative means to enable them to provide restraint-free 
care, including environmental changes, activities, care and nursing procedures, medical and psychosocial 
approaches, safety equipment, the use of assistive technology and awareness raising about dementia 
(see JBI 2002 for examples)
 investigate any use of restraint that may have occurred in an exceptional situation to determine whether 
there was any alternative, whether judicial approval was sought, even retrospectively, and how a similar 
situation could be avoided in the future 
 ensure that measures of restraint are not readily available to personnel who provide care or treatment 
to people with dementia
 ensure that the demands of the organisation with regard to the provision of care do not encourage care 
sta  to restrain residents
 discuss with the carers and relatives of residents with dementia the need to promote autonomy and of 
the necessity to allow some degree of risk
 have a clear policy for dealing with possible injuries which residents may su er in the course of their 
stay, including responsibilities in possible cases of litigation.
2. Doctors and health and social care professionals should:
 receive training in the use of non-pharmacological interventions to deal with behavioural and psycho-
logical symptoms of dementia (BPSD) and challenging behaviour
 be informed about the risks involved in using restraint on older people and people with dementia
 receive training on how to re ect on the ethical issues linked to the use of restraint
 be informed about the ethical and legal implications linked to the provision of care as well as to the 
use of restraint
 ensure that when psychotropic medication is administered on a PRN basis, the reason for administering 
it at a given time is documented and regularly reviewed
 record all use of restraint (e.g. type, duration and reason), as well as measures taken to reduce its incidence
  be knowledgeable about alternatives to the use of restraint
  if restraint is needed and justi able, be knowledgeable about milder forms of restraint that could be 
tried  rst
  have access to alternatives to the use of restraint
  conduct case discussions with all involved actors before any use of restraint. These case discussions 
should take into account the life rhythm and biography of the person with dementia.
3. With regard to psychotropic medications doctors should:
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 be obliged to justify that any prescription of psychotropic medication is appropriate, e ective, clinically 
justi able and proportionate to the perceived need
 ensure that any prescription of psychotropic medication is time limited and regularly reviewed.
 consider whether BPSD and challenging behaviour are caused by other factors which might require spe-
ci c treatment or non-pharmacological approaches
 never prescribe psychotropic medication to be administered on a routine basis
 ensure that the potential bene ts outweigh the risks for each person receiving them and be able to jus-
tify this
 reassess the appropriateness of the prescription for any person with dementia already taking antipsy-
chotic medication should be reassessed
 not simply replace the use of psychotropic medication (i.e. in accordance with recommendations to 
reduce this practice) with other types of medication serving the same purpose (i.e. using alternative 
medication as a means of restraint).
For informal carers
1. Informal carers should:
 be informed about the legal and ethical issues linked to the use of restraint
 be provided with training to deal with BPSD and behaviour which they may  nd challenging
 have access to a ordable, appropriate and timely support as well as respite in order to address issues 
which might lead to the use of restraint
  know about and have access to alternatives to the use of restraint.
Restrictions of freedom and the use of restraint 
during the COVID-19 pandemic
Impact of measures adopted during the COVID-19 
pandemic
During the COVID-19 pandemic, some people with demen-
tia living in residential care or nursing home settings have 
had their freedom restricted, o en accompanied by a total 
restriction on visits from relatives, friends and guardians. 
Others have been asked to self-isolate or cocoon, and for 
friends and family to stay away. Lockdown measures have 
further exacerbated the social exclusion and isolation of 
many people with dementia. In some countries, large num-
bers of people living in care homes have been deprived of 
access to intensive care treatment and others discharged 
from hospital without having been tested for the coronavi-
rus, and moved back into residential care settings, thereby 
potentially endangering the lives of co-residents. There have 
also been reports about the blanket application of DNARs 
(do not attempt resuscitation orders) being placed on res-
idents in care homes.32 Emergency measures have been 
introduced via emergency legislation in several countries, 
in some cases simplifying and speeding up assessments, 
overriding the need to see and hear people directly and elim-
inating the necessity to involve substitute decision makers 
in the process for involuntary placement.
32 See also section on Treatment, care and support. 
Such measures, although intended to be temporary, may 
have a devastating and long-lasting impact on people’s 
lives, leading to emotional and psychological su ering and 
a deterioration in physical, cognitive and mental health. 
Many people with dementia have died during con nement 
or as a result of contracting the virus from residents or even 
sta  (from whom they had no possibility to distance them-
selves and who o en were not aware that they had the virus 
themselves due to lack of testing). Measures adopted dur-
ing the coronavirus pandemic, which is still ongoing, have 
also had disastrous e ects on families and close friends of 
people with dementia. The full consequences of COVID-19 
measures are not yet known and at the time of writing this 
report it is not known how the distribution of a possible 
vaccine will a ect people with dementia.
Two main justi cations for restrictions of freedom have 
been put forward. The  rst is to protect vulnerable peo-
ple in keeping with the ethical principles of bene cence 
and non-male cence. However, this is not very convinc-
ing in the light of the lack of precautions in many homes 
to protect people with dementia (e.g. sta  having no or 
insu  cient protective clothing and materials, sta  and 
residents not having access to testing and in some cases, 
residents being denied access to hospital treatment and 
others being released back into the home without prior test-
ing). The Fundamental Rights Agency estimates that by the 
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end of May 2020, testing of care home residents and sta  
was only planned or underway in a third of EU countries. 
In many countries, protective clothing has been scarce or 
inadequate, even in government-run establishments, and 
the situation for private care companies has o en been 
even worse. A report by the Swedish Corona Commission on 
care of older people during the pandemic concluded that:
 “the absence of clear guidelines and lack of PPE in LTC 
[long-term care] settings contributed to the spread of 
the virus. It took unreasonably long to clarify and de ne 
the need for PPE in LTC, there were no channels to report 
needs or organise delivery”.
Residents in some homes would clearly have been safer 
in their own homes or for those who have relatives, living 
with them. There have been several accounts in the media 
of families  ghting, o en unsuccessfully, for the release of 
their relatives from care homes. Others have no relatives 
able to care for them at home and few if any visits, and are 
forced to live in an environment in which they sometimes 
have no opportunity to protect themselves from harm.
The second justi cation is linked to the declared need to 
protect national health systems from becoming overloaded 
and unable to function. This seems to favour the protection 
of a system over the protection of the needs, wellbeing and 
lives of a particular group of real people, although clearly, 
a total breakdown of a health care system would result in 
no one’s needs being met. The justi cation could neverthe-
less be considered as discriminatory in that keeping older 
people out of hospitals so as to free up beds for others 
(i.e. younger people or people without dementia) results 
in two di erent levels of care; one for care home residents 
(including many people with dementia) and one for other 
people, with the former o en receiving a lower standard of 
care (e.g. because of the lack of availability of medical spe-
cialists, life-saving and sustaining medical equipment and 
a sterilised environment). We will come back to the issue 
of discrimination later in this section. The justi cation is 
also  awed in that thousands of people died in care homes 
whilst huge newly constructed or transformed hospitals lay 
empty (e.g. in England) and numerous essential and elec-
tive treatments were cancelled or postponed. The number 
of people consulting doctors and emergency departments 
decreased dramatically, which means that thousands of 
people have missed out on the detection and treatment 
of serious illnesses.
Across Europe, the number of deaths in each country has 
been calculated in di erent ways and in some countries, the 
statistics only covered people who died from coronavirus 
in hospital. People who died at home or in care homes did 
not ‘count’ and the scale of the potential neglect of some 
groups of people is not known. As many people who died 
within the community were not tested for coronavirus, this 
was also not recorded on their death certi cates, thereby 
overlooking many people with dementia, especially in care 
homes, who most likely did die of coronavirus. Vital proof 
that might reveal that measures were not successful in pro-
tecting them from harm is therefore lacking.
Were measures taken justi able?
Most members of society can choose whether to comply 
with various measures, such as distancing, self-isolating 
and wearing face masks and in some cases to face pen-
alties for failure to comply with such measures. People 
with dementia in care homes or who are dependent on 
others for care and support o en lack that same freedom 
and decisions are more or less imposed on them. Regu-
lations and procedures within care homes could be seen 
as constituting an informal loss of legal capacity whereby 
residents are denied the right to make their own decisions 
with regard to matters concerning their daily lives. During 
the pandemic, the measures they are subjected to in some 
countries (e.g. con nement, distancing, loss of family life 
and restricted access to essential treatment) are imposed 
by governments and involve a mass loss of legal capacity 
of potentially vulnerable groups .  This is in no way linked to 
decision-making capacity or amenable to deviations from 
procedure in relation to support that could be provided by 
family and friends. This observation is about approaches 
adopted by governments and does not re ect a criticism 
of the many health and social care professionals who have 
struggled to provide appropriate and timely treatment, sup-
port and care to people with dementia and informal carers 
despite fears for their own safety, and that of their families, 
and increased workloads resulting from reduced levels of 
sta . Some health and social care professionals have lost 
their lives as a result of continuing to provide care.
As mentioned in the introduction to this report, there is 
o en a close relationship between law and ethics. There 
is o en an assumption that laws should be ethical, and 
people therefore o en question whether that is the case. 
In the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), there 
are articles covering the right to life, liberty and security of 
person (article 3), not to be subjected to torture or to cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment (article 
5), to be recognised everywhere as a person before the law 
(article 6), to protection against discrimination (article 7), 
not to be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile 
(article 9) and not to subjected to arbitrary interference with 
his privacy, family, home or correspondence (article 12), to 
name but a few. However, according to the United Nations 
Human Rights O  ce of the High Commissioner Covid-19 
response (2020, p.1),
 “Even without formally declaring states of emergency, 
States can adopt exceptional measures to protect 
public health that may restrict certain human rights. 
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These restrictions must meet the requirements 
of legality, necessity and proportionality, and be 
non-discriminatory.”
The WHO points out33 that quarantine and other restrictions 
of freedom must always be part of a comprehensive package 
of public health and social measures, should fully respect 
people’s dignity, human rights and fundamental freedoms, 
should be in accordance with the law, pursue a legitimate 
aim, be proportionate and not arbitrary or discriminatory.
According to  Ireland's Ethical Framework for Decision-Mak-
ing in a Pandemic (Department of Health 2020), legitimate 
restrictions of an individual’s freedom can be justi ed:
 in cases where exercising that freedom places other 
people at risk,
 where best available scienti c evidence indicates that 
such measures will achieve the intended goal,
 provide that the measure is proportionate to the antic-
ipated bene t,
 provided that no less restrictive measure would be e ec-
tive and that failure to implement that measure would 
result in signi cant harm,
 provided that the measures do not involve unfair 
discrimination,
 provided that the people whose liberty is restricted in 
order to protect others are given extra support and well 
looked a er.
The emphasis of the above is on restrictions of liberty being 
for the protection of other people and on restricted peo-
ple being well cared for. This has not always been the case 
for many people with dementia (and older people) in care 
homes who might have bene ted more from other mem-
bers of society having their freedom restricted in the same 
radical way. A key issue is perhaps that of the collective good 
and public health goals, whereby the emphasis is put on 
protecting the healthcare system, which serves the whole 
population, with certain groups of people being labelled 
as jeopardising it as a result of their particular vulnerabil-
ity (discussed later).
Factors a ecting the justi ability of restrictions of 
freedom
Legality
Recently, some relatives of people with dementia in care 
homes who have been denied the right to visit have argued 
that the rights of people with dementia to family life and to 
33  With reference to Article 3 of the International Health Regulations (2005), UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights General Comment 
14 (2000), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) (1976) and the Siracusa Principles  (1984).
34 Also in Article 23 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights.
receive visits are being denied and that consequently, their 
fundamental rights are not being respected. The pertinent 
provision relating to the right to family life lies in Article 16(3) 
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,34 which states:
 “The family is the natural and fundamental group unit 
of society and is entitled to protection by society and 
the State.”
In keeping with recent cases in the European Court on 
Human Rights, family life is a broad concept covering a 
range of personal ties involving people living together and 
the existence of close personal ties, regardless of the mari-
tal status of the people concerned (ECHR 2020). During the 
pandemic, partners (some having been together for dec-
ades), their children and other members of their families 
have been denied all direct, physical contact or presence. 
The loss of contact with relatives and close friends may be 
a factor contributing towards a further, in many cases seri-
ous, deterioration of the condition of people with dementia. 
In keeping with the concept of health as also incorporat-
ing social health, the losses experienced by people with 
dementia con ned within residential care settings may be 
disproportionately high.
Although, as explained earlier, governments have the right 
to introduce certain restrictions to protect public health, 
in its paper Ethics & COVID-19 – Restrictive Measures and 
Social Distancing (March 2020), the WHO insists on the 
necessity for oversight and accountability mechanisms 
to be in place to allow people who are impacted by public 
health restrictions to challenge the appropriateness of those 
restrictions. Appropriateness is further linked to the issue 
of discrimination as it is also stated in numerous national, 
European and international texts that discrimination is 
prohibited on a range of di erent grounds such as race, 
colour, sex, sexual orientation and gender identity, disabil-
ity, language, religion, political or other opinion, national 
or social origin, property, birth or other status. For people 
with dementia, whose legal capacity is being formally or 
informally restricted through the imposition of such meas-
ures, the opportunity for them or their relatives and friends 
to challenge the legality of these measures is somewhat 
limited, and likely to become more so as time passes. Ret-
rospective challenges are likely to be even more di  cult.
Necessity
There is usually more than one possible approach to take, 
especially in catastrophic situations for which the future 
development is unknown. Many governments across Europe 
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have claimed that their decisions to adopt certain meas-
ures were necessary (i.e. to control the virus and thereby 
protect the healthcare system and/or vulnerable popula-
tions) based on ‘scienti c evidence’ but have nevertheless 
relied on di erent research or drawn di erent conclusions 
from research  ndings. Despite close collaboration with 
researchers, the actual decision makers tend to be politi-
cians with responsibilities not only for the health of their 
citizens, but also for economic and political stability. It was 
and is still not known how the situation will progress and 
Fritz et al. (2020) suggest, with regard to claims about ‘fol-
lowing science’, that:
 “…. this implies that the science alone will tell us what 
to do. Not only does this rhetoric shi  the responsibil-
ity for di  cult decisions on to “the science”, it is also 
wrong. Science may provide evidence on which to base 
decisions, but our values will determine what we do 
with that evidence and how we select the evidence to 
use. It is disingenuous and misleading to imply that 
value-free science leads the way. Both science and pol-
icy are value laden.”
Consequently, decisions taken about necessary action 
during the pandemic, which may have a huge impact on 
people’s lives, especially on potentially vulnerable popula-
tions, represent a perspective of what is necessary resulting 
from a speci c interpretation of the results of scienti c 
studies, not on ‘facts’ alone. It is essential for governments 
to be open about this, not to hide behind science or select 
the science to suit the decision.
Proportionality
There has been some discussion in the media about whether 
measures introduced during the pandemic were dispropor-
tionate in terms of their impact and burden on older people 
and people with dementia. The principle of proportionality 
means that approaches adopting, during the coronavirus 
in this case, should be proportional to the good that may 
be achieved and any harm that might be caused. Protective 
measures (i.e. to protect public health or health care sys-
tems) resulting in restrictions of freedom of whole groups 
(e.g. people with dementia living in care homes, people 
over 70 etc.) which cannot reasonably be monitored or chal-
lenged at the individual level, may result in disproportionate 
su ering compared to potential gain at the individual or 
societal level. If measures are not accompanied by adequate 
health and safety provisions for those whose freedom has 
been restricted, they should be considered unethical even if, 
technically speaking, legally justi able during public health 
threats. At the level of society and in keeping with a util-
itarian approach, whereby a particular action is ethical if 
35 Reported in the United Nations Policy Brief of May 2020.
it produces the greatest good for the greatest number, it 
is still di  cult to justify some of the measures adopted.
Another approach could have been to focus on protecting 
the health of those members of society who are most vul-
nerable by allocating most resources to their protection (e.g. 
testing, protective gear and access to intensive care treat-
ment), in recognition of interdependency and the equal 
value of all human beings. Statistics on people dying from 
COVID-19 in residential care facilities provide some indica-
tion of the disproportionate nature of COVID-19 measures 
for groups of people which typically include a high percent-
age of people with dementia. In France, for example, almost 
7,500 care home residents died of COVID-19 and this repre-
sented a third of all COVID-19 deaths.35 Alzheimer Scotland 
has called on the Scottish Government:
 “to take urgent action to understand the reasons why 
people with dementia are disproportionately repre-
sented in the deaths from coronavirus and the excess 
deaths during this pandemic” (Alzheimer Scotland 2020, 
p.19).
Dementia is typically accompanied by di  culties with lan-
guage and communication. Relatives and close friends 
contribute towards maintaining the psychological and emo-
tional wellbeing of people with dementia. They also o en 
play an important role in helping residents to communicate 
their needs, concerns and preferences to sta . Lockdowns and 
distancing measures make this di  cult, if not impossible. 
Because of the lockdown and no outsiders seeing what goes 
on in people’s own homes and in residential care settings, 
there have been fewer opportunities to monitor the wellbe-
ing of people with dementia who may be unable to protect 
their own interests. The restriction on visitors and the fear 
and anxiety surrounding COVID-19 may have increased the 
experience of loneliness, boredom and depression amongst 
people with dementia, and led to behaviour which other peo-
ple  nd di  cult to manage, which when combined with other 
factors may increase the risk of restraint being used. Howard, 
Burns and Schneider (2020) suggest that some of the increase 
in antipsychotic prescribing to people with dementia in care 
homes during the pandemic may well have been the result of 
worsened agitation and psychosis related to the con nement 
of care home residents to their rooms, and the cessation of 
group activities and visits from relatives.
The risk of harm linked to certain measures adopted during 
the pandemic raises questions about the proportionality 
of those measures in relation to people with dementia. A 
United Nations report on the impact of COVID-19 on older 
persons (2020) highlighted distressing reports of older peo-
ple in care homes experiencing neglect and mistreatment, 
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and those who are quarantined or locked down with rela-
tives or carers also facing a higher risk of violence, abuse and 
neglect. The Scottish Government recently acknowledged 
growing evidence of direct and indirect harms resulting 
from the pandemic (i.e. from the virus itself but also from 
the protective measures adopted). They labelled these the 
four harms of COVID-19, namely direct, indirect, societal 
and economic. Nicola Sturgeon further stated:
 “We have a duty to balance all of the di erent harms 
caused by the pandemic. We must consider the direct 
harm to health from the virus - which must be reduced… 
And we have to consider the wider harms to health and 
wellbeing that the virus - and the restrictions deployed 
to control it - are having on all of us” (cited in Alzheimer 
Scotland 2020, p.9).
Discrimination or arbitrariness
Discrimination on the basis of personal characteristics or 
situation (such as age, sex, gender identity, social or eth-
nic a  liation, disability, socio-economic status or place of 
residence) and the ranking of lives on the basis of value 
judgements or of assumptions about quality of life are 
unacceptable and contrary to numerous legal and ethi-
cal conventions and recommendations. The neglect of or 
discrimination against people with dementia, whether 
deliberate or due to oversight, constitutes unethical behav-
iour at governmental level in the form of failure to protect 
the rights and wellbeing of the most vulnerable members 
of society. The Director General of the World Health Organ-
isation stated in relation to the COVID-19 pandemic that:
 “All countries must strike a  ne balance between protect-
ing health, minimizing economic and social disruption, 
and respecting human rights” (WHO, April 2020).
Discrimination is not always a bad thing but the term is 
usually used to imply negative/unfair discrimination. Any 
discrimination must be a proportionate means to achieve 
a legitimate goal, which means a goal that is not based 
on a discriminatory reason but rather on a reason that is 
genuine and real (not just made up). For example, if peo-
ple with dementia were genuinely safer if con ned to care 
homes, were guaranteed an equally high level of care in 
such homes (including intensive care) and would risk their 
own safety and wellbeing if transferred to hospital, it would 
perhaps not be considered wrong to impose con nement on 
people in that group for an appropriate period of time. The 
pursuit of their safety and wellbeing could be considered 
as a legitimate goal, although some people might argue 
that months if not years of absolute con nement would 
36 See https://www.alzheimer-europe.org/Policy/Our-opinion-on/Dementia-Research-and-COVID-19
be disproportionate in terms of their health and wellbeing, 
their right to family life (including maintaining relation-
ships) and respect of their legal capacity (i.e. the right to 
decide to leave the home, to get fresh air, to receive visitors 
etc.). If the reason for the discrimination was based on the 
desire to prioritise other groups within society (e.g. people 
of working age, children, etc.) at the expense of the group 
in question, and the reason given (i.e. to protect people 
in care homes) was therefore not genuine, this would be 
unethical. Approaches and apparent solutions which result 
in a marginalised or  stigmatized group of people bearing a 
disproportionate burden should lead to particular scrutiny 
about whether they are discriminatory.
Measures adopted during the coronavirus pandemic have 
deprived many people of the same rights that other people 
had to protect themselves and others from harm. It also 
amounted to discrimination based on place of residence, 
but also, indirectly, on age and disability because the people 
living in such homes were predominantly older and disabled. 
The singling out of whole groups of people on the basis of 
shared characteristics (such as age, disability, dependency 
or place of residence) to achieve the greatest good is still 
discrimination and cannot be considered a fair allocation 
of resources (including care) if this is arbitrary and unjus-
ti ably targets typically devalued groups.
With regard to age discrimination in the context of scarce 
resources, there are reports of older people being put under 
due pressure to sign do-not-resuscitate orders before being 
given treatment (United Nations 2020). Whilst some dis-
crimination occurs at the interpersonal level (e.g. by health 
and social care professionals or care home managers), 
responsibility also lies with governments (i.e. for structural 
discrimination). In its position paper on the allocation of 
scarce resources during the COVID-19 pandemic, Alzheimer 
Europe (2020)36 recommended that: 
 “Governments and healthcare systems should take all nec-
essary measures to ensure that the needed infrastructure 
(in addition to su  cient human resources) is in place so 
as to avoid the need for triage decisions.”
The fact that many people who were (or are still being) 
denied adequate protection and the same quality of care as 
other members of society, lack the legal capacity to defend 
themselves and are largely  stigmatized groups within soci-
ety, cannot be overlooked. The frequent use of the term  'only' 
(e.g. only older people are seriously a ected) and concerns 
that the virus might not  'only' a ect older people or people 
with existing medical conditions is a constant indication 
of the perceived lack of value of certain groups of people, 
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to which many people with dementia belong. Many people 
with dementia, especially those living in care homes, lack 
the formal or informal legal capacity to ensure equal access 
to treatment and to be protected from harm. Resources have 
o en been used elsewhere and many people from vulnera-
ble groups have died. In some countries, their deaths have 
not always been recorded as being due to coronavirus (as 
there was no testing and they were not part of hospital sta-
tistics). They were cut o  from direct contact with friends, 
families and guardians who o en struggled to defend their 
rights without any direct access to them.
Solidarity and reciprocity
A community ethics approach is needed which focuses on 
societies as a whole and in which solidarity is the norm. 
One re ection of this can be found in the controversial 
slogan “Don’t kill  Granny" adopted in the north of Eng-
land to encourage younger people to respect distancing 
measures for the good of older people (rather than put-
ting the onus or obligation on the former to withdraw 
themselves completely from society). Mutual caring and 
respect between di erent members of society can be con-
sidered in the context of interdependency and solidarity, 
not only in relation to people con ned in care homes but 
also cocooned in their own homes. In her speech at the 
recent virtual annual conference of Alzheimer Europe in 
2020, Helen Rochford-Brennan (Chair of the European Work-
ing Group of People with Dementia) stated:
 I believe that older people paid a higher price because, 
cocooned, we stayed at home and made sure the health 
service was not overwhelmed. There’s a lot of chat about 
protecting older people but who are you protecting? I 
stood in solidarity with healthcare professionals and cit-
izens. I lit candles in the window; I put my  ag in the 
garden. But I expect that solidarity in return and I hope 
that young people stand with me as I navigate through 
COVID.
Reciprocity is also important with regard to people with 
dementia who have in the past and still do contribute 
towards society in di erent ways, but also with regard 
to people who provide care and support to people with 
dementia who are self-isolating, cocooning or whose lib-
erty has been restricted. A society cannot be considered 
ethical if it neglects or discriminates against vulnerable 
groups. Neither can it be considered ethical if it focuses 
entirely on the needs of one group, even a vulnerable 
group, whilst neglecting those of others (e.g. healthcare 
professionals), especially those in high-risk categories. 
Mechanisms should therefore be in place to protect the 
lives and wellbeing of healthcare professionals and related 
support sta  (e.g. by providing them with safe work-
ing conditions, PPE and tests for themselves and their 
patients/residents), whilst also recognising that some 
may have high personal risk factors and competing con-
cerns about their own safety and that of their families.
Recommendations related to restrictions of freedom during the COVID-19 pandemic
1. People with dementia should not be considered as a homogenous group in relation to the application of 
protective measures during the pandemic. Some people with dementia are in good health and able to fol-
low developments and comply with safety measures.
2. Care homes should facilitate contact between people with dementia and family members, particularly 
when face-to-face visits are not possible (e.g. through phone calls, virtual meetings or window visits etc.).
3. Face-to-face visits should be facilitated where possible, with all due precautions taken to protect the safety 
of the resident, other residents, the visitors themselves and care sta . This is particularly important for peo-
ple with dementia in an acute or extreme case of distress or in the last moments of life.
4. The bene ts of physical distancing should be weighed against the potential and likely harm to all involved 
as a result of their implementation.
5. Distancing measures should be proportionate to the actual risk of residents and sta  in each speci c home, 
and this should be controlled by relevant authorities.
6. Distancing and other safety measures should be considered on a case by case basis (e.g. in relation to each 
care home), also bearing in mind the needs and wishes of the individual residents.
7. Just as relaxations of certain legal measures concerning involuntary placement have been implemented in 
some countries, it should also be possible for families and close friends to apply to the necessary authori-
ties to care for a resident at home for a period of time.
8. Despite lack of resources, emotional stress and sta  shortages, physical, mechanical and chemical restraint 
should not be used to manage di  cult care situations. In extreme cases, if absolutely essential for the safety 
of the person concerned, any such use should be in accordance with legal requirements (i.e. with regard to 
authorisation, supervision, documentation, proportionality and revision).
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Civil and political life
People with dementia, as equally valued members of soci-
ety, must be enabled, wherever possible, to exercise their 
civil and political rights. This covers a wide range of topics 
such as the right to vote, to a fair trial, to government ser-
vices, to be on a jury, to a public education, to use public 
facilities, to stand for political o  ce, to write a will and to 
marry or divorce. In this section, we look at just a few issues:
 voting
 marriage and civil partnerships
 making a will/testament.
Voting
The importance of participation in political life
Political participation can take many forms, from involve-
ment in political parties and civil society organisations to 
following the news. A report by the European Union Agency 
for Fundamental Rights (FRA 2014)37 entitled The Right to 
Political Participation for Persons with Disabilities: Human 
Rights Indicators, focuses on two of the core components of 
political participation: the rights to vote and to be elected. 
These rights are particularly important for the function-
ing of the EU which, as set out in Article 2 of the Treaty on 
European Union (TEU), are “founded on the values of [...] 
democracy and respect for human rights”. The elections 
to the European Parliament every  ve years are one of the 
37 https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/ les/fra-2014-right-political-participation-persons-disabilities_en.pdf
main avenues for citizens’ participation in the Union, while 
being able to vote in municipal elections in the EU Member 
State in which a person lives is a key demonstration of the 
principle of free movement of people.
There is limited literature on the capacity (in the sense of 
the ability/decision making capacity) to vote. Appelbaum, 
Bonnie and Karlawish (2005) have developed a tool to meas-
ure voting capacity called the Competency Assessment Tool 
for Voting (CAT-V). They found a strong correlation between 
the severity of dementia and the capacity to vote. However, 
the issue of decision-making capacity in relation to voting 
is problematic because it contradicts the provisions of the 
CRPD and also because it could be argued that voting is a 
political right, not a matter of the capacity to make deci-
sions (Redley, Hughes and Holland 2010). Indeed, people do 
not all vote on the basis of a satisfactory understanding of 
political candidates’ position on various issues, may base 
their choices on unusual criteria and some are life-long 
voters of a particular political party irrespective of who 
represents it. None of this has much to do with decision 
making capacity and as the capacity to vote of people who 
are not disabled is not questioned or tested, any restrictions 
based on decision-making capacity are discriminatory and 
hence unethical.
The opportunity to be involved in political life, whether by 
standing for elected o  ce, joining a political party, or fol-
lowing political news stories in the media, is at the heart 
9. Governments should take necessary measures to ensure that any restrictions of the freedom of people with 
dementia are not discriminatory, are proportionate to risk and potential bene ts, and are accompanied by 
the following:
 setting up a specialised team and developing a plan to address the needs of vulnerable groups during 
the pandemic to prevent the spread of the virus, guarantee equal access to necessary care and treatment, 
and to restore normal services and support post-pandemic 
 ensuring priority testing and vaccination of all health and social care sta , at all levels (e.g. including 
service and auxiliary sta ) and irrespective of employment status (e.g. employed by the government, by 
private care providers or self-employed) 
 ensuring that necessary protective equipment and materials are available to service providers who come 
into contact with people with dementia in order to provide treatment, care and support in any setting 
 monitoring in terms of legality, necessity, proportionality, equity, fairness and respect for dignity 
 obligatory reporting of decisions made in relation to restrictions of freedom and access to emergency 
treatment 
 timely access to care, testing and vaccination 
 obligatory recording on death certi cates of the cause of death, specifying whether the cause (or sus-
pected cause in case the person was not tested) was COVID-19.
10. Governments should set up independent inquiries into the management of dementia care during the COVID-
19 pandemic and develop guidelines to help ensure that future pandemics or similar crises are managed in 
a way that is ethical and legal, particularly with regard to potentially vulnerable groups in society.
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of what it means to live in a democratic society. In addition, 
voting has been found to enhance social engagement and 
self-esteem (Bullenkamp and Voges 2004) and dementia 
does not necessarily preclude the desire or ability to vote 
(Karlawish et al. 2004). Failure to allow and enable people 
with dementia to vote fails to respect their autonomy and 
is discriminatory in that it does not permit people with 
dementia to participate in society on an equal basis with 
other citizens as laid down in the CRPD.
The FRA report (2014) analyses data on the situation of polit-
ical participation of persons with disabilities collected from 
across the 28 European Union (EU) Member States by the 
European Union Agency for the FRA and the European Com-
mission-funded Academic Network of European Disability 
Experts (ANED). The human rights indicators presented in 
the report show that legal and administrative barriers, inac-
cessible and cumbersome administrative procedures, and a 
lack of awareness about political rights (including di  cul-
ties accessing complaints mechanisms) can deny persons 
with disabilities the opportunity to participate in the polit-
ical lives of their communities. The research also reveals 
the absence of reliable and comparable data about persons 
with disabilities’ experiences of taking part in elections in 
the EU. Addressing these challenges as soon as possible 
is essential for increasing the legitimacy of public institu-
tions and creating more equitable and inclusive societies 
in which all members can participate fully.
The right to vote and measures to make this 
possible
Numerous CRPD articles underpin the realisation of the 
right to political participation. The interplay between these 
rights is re ected in many of the indicators in this report. In 
particular, the CRPD committee has established Article 12 
on equal recognition before the law as central to the con-
vention as a whole. By speci cally linking Articles 12 and 29, 
the Committee has expressed concern that in many states, 
including some EU Member States, the deprivation of legal 
capacity triggers a limitation on the right to vote.
Accessibility is also especially important. Article 29 of the 
CRPD requires state parties to ensure that “voting proce-
dures, facilities and materials are appropriate, accessible and 
easy to understand and use”. This is reinforced by Article 9 
which requires “Buildings, roads, transportation and other 
indoor and outdoor facilities” used by the public to be made 
accessible with “minimum standards and guidelines for the 
accessibility of facilities and services open or provided to 
the public”, “public signage in Braille and in easy to read 
and understand forms” and “forms of live assistance and 
intermediaries”. Article 9 further requires state parties to 
promote “access for persons with disabilities to new infor-
mation and communications technologies and systems, 
including the Internet”.
The Convention on the Rights of  Persons with Disabilities 
states in article 29 (Participation in political and public life) 
that:
“States Parties shall guarantee to persons with disabilities 
political rights and the opportunity to enjoy them on an 
equal basis with others, and shall undertake:
a) To ensure that persons with disabilities can e ectively 
and fully participate in political and public life on an 
equal basis with others, directly or through freely cho-
sen representatives, including the right and opportunity 
for persons with disabilities to vote and be elected, inter 
alia, by:
i. Ensuring that voting procedures, facilities and materials 
are appropriate, accessible and easy to understand and use;
ii. Protecting the right of persons with disabilities to vote 
by secret ballot in elections and public referendums with-
out intimidation, and to stand for elections, to e ectively 
hold o  ce and perform all public functions at all levels 
of government, facilitating the use of assistive and new 
technologies where appropriate;
iii. Guaranteeing the free expression of the will of persons 
with disabilities as electors and to this end, where neces-
sary, at their request, allowing assistance in voting by a 
person of their own choice;
b) To promote actively an environment in which persons 
with disabilities can e ectively and fully participate in the 
conduct of public a airs, without discrimination and on 
an equal basis with others, and encourage their partici-
pation in public a airs, including:
i. Participation in non-governmental organizations and 
associations concerned with the public and political life 
of the country, and in the activities and administration 
of political parties;
ii. Forming and joining organizations of persons with 
disabilities to represent persons with disabilities at inter-
national, national, regional and local levels.”
In this framework, the Council of Europe issued “Recom-
mendation CM/Rec (2011) 14 of the Committee of Ministers 
to member states on the participation of persons with dis-
abilities in political and public life”. The short version of this 
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recommendation provides a straightforward summary of 
the above38:
 “Taking part in political and public life: When you take 
part in political and public life, you can have a say in the 
way things are run in your community. You can make 
things better and fairer in your community. You can 
take part in political and public life in di erent ways. 
For example, you can:
 Choose who will run your country, region or city. You 
can do this when you vote in elections.
 Become a candidate in elections: Tell others about your 
ideas on how to make things in your community better.
 Get information about the way things work in your 
community.
 Get together with other people to share ideas and  ght 
for your rights.
 Start a political party or an organisation.
 Take part in public meetings and discussions.
 Say what you think about the way things are run in 
your community.
 Tell decision-makers what you think. Ask them to use 
this when they make decisions.
 Become part of the government or have public duties.”
 “People with disabilities o en  nd it di  cult to take part 
in political and public life. There are di erent reasons, 
for example:
 Laws in their country say that some people with disa-
bilities cannot take part in elections.
 Some governments do not listen to their opinions.
 Information about politics and important things is o en 
di  cult to understand.
 Sometimes, the places where elections or public meet-
ings take place are di  cult to  nd and enter.
 This means that these places are not accessible.
 Sometimes, the ways things, for example voting, are 
done make it di  cult or impossible for people with dis-
abilities to take part.
 People with disabilities o en get little help to overcome 
these di  culties.”
The Council of Europe recommendations seek to ensure 
that people with disabilities have the same rights but also 
the same opportunities to take part in political and public 
life as other people. People with disabilities need access 
to places, information, goods and services. Public build-
ings and places, including polling stations, must be easy 
to  nd and enter. Voting papers must be easy for every-
one to use. Important information must be easy to read 
38 https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-15&chapter=4&clang=_en 
39 https://rm.coe.int/16807954c3
and understandable, and people with disabilities must 
be able to use public transport to get to polling stations 
like everyone else. The way things are done, such as vot-
ing, must be easy for everyone.
Another important document related to the involvement 
of people with disabilities in public life is Recommendation 
CM/Rec (2018)4 of the Committee of Ministers to member 
States on the participation of citizens in local public life 
(adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 21 March 2018 
at the 1311th meeting of the Ministers’ Deputies).39 Article 6 
outlines the necessity to: 
  "i) create and promote possibilities for persons with 
disabilities to fully participate in all aspects of local 
public life, and take the necessary measures to allow 
and encourage them to do so; ii) develop and promote 
suitable forms of and structures for participation, 
removing obstacles and providing appropriate assis-
tance as required, to involve persons with disabilities, 
such as advisory boards, taking into account Recommen-
dation CM/Rec(2011)14 of the Committee of Ministers 
to member States on the participation of persons with 
disabilities in political and public life;”
The European Economic and Social Council (2019) neverthe-
less noted, a er having called for a li ing of restrictions on 
participation in the 2019 European elections, the persistence 
of legal restrictions due to the deprivation of legal capacity. 
The FRA (2020) suggests that one of the main restrictions to 
the right to vote is the deprivation of legal capacity which 
could a ect some of the 264,000 people in the EU who are 
subject to full guardianship.
Impact of restrictions of legal capacity on voting
As highlighted in the FRA report on the right to political 
participation of persons with mental health problems 
and persons with intellectual disabilities, and subsequent 
updates, the right to vote is o en linked in national legis-
lation to legal capacity. This means that people who have 
been deprived of their legal capacity, either wholly or in part, 
are prohibited from voting. This possible limitation of the 
right to political participation does not apply to everyone 
with disabilities. People with psychosocial or intellectual 
disabilities are disproportionately a ected. The CRPD states 
that each adult citizen has the right to vote on an equal 
basis with others. Re ecting this, the CRPD Committee has 
expressed concern over legislation that “allows for the right 
to vote of persons with intellectual or psycho-social disa-
bilities to be restricted if the person concerned has been 
deprived of his or her legal capacity”.
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Article 12 is relevant to the right to political participation 
because in many jurisdictions a person whose legal capacity 
has been withheld or restricted is – either automatically or 
through a judicial process – deprived of the right to vote and 
to stand for election. In some jurisdictions, people are also 
deprived of the right to join or form associations such as 
non-governmental organisations, political parties or trade 
unions. This calls into question the ful lment of the prin-
ciple of non-discrimination enshrined in Article 29 which 
states that state parties “shall guarantee persons with dis-
abilities political rights and the opportunity to enjoy them 
on an equal basis with others” (p. 36).
The CRPD Committee has commented extensively on the 
link between legal capacity and political participation. In its 
General Comment on Article 12, the Committee states that a:
 “person’s decision-making ability cannot be used to 
justify any exclusion of persons with disabilities from 
exercising their political rights, including the right to 
vote, to stand for election, and to serve as a member 
of a jury” (p. 37).
Obstacles to exercising the legal capacity to vote
Although Article 19 of the CRPD sets out the right to live in 
the community, many people with disabilities, including 
people with dementia, live in residential/care institutions. 
The CRPD is clear that people with disabilities enjoy rights 
on an equal basis with others, regardless of where they 
live. Legislative procedures and provisions may be needed 
to ensure that people living in institutions can exercise 
their right to vote (e.g. to provide alternative forms of vot-
ing, set up voting booths at institutions or allow mobile 
ballot boxes which can be brought to institutions). Such 
measures should take into account the importance of guar-
anteeing the secrecy of the vote and ensuring that people 
with disabilities can vote freely for the candidate or party of 
their choice without undue in uence from others, and can 
choose a person to help them express their choice or to vote, 
in keeping with supported decision making. In the case of 
people with dementia with limited decision-making capac-
ity and di  culties with communication (including di  culty 
with written instructions and indicating choice on a voting 
slip), it would be very di  cult to ensure secrecy and avoid 
possible manipulation or coercion by a supporting person.
It is important to consider also potential informal restric-
tions of legal capacity. Getting to a polling station can be 
di  cult. Some institutions are located in remote areas 
and there is a lack of available or accessible transport, or 
residents are unable to leave the institution without assis-
tance. There may also be some degree of gatekeeping with 
political candidates  nding it di  cult to get past care sta  
and reach people with dementia. Some of these barriers 
may be caused by lack of reasonable accommodation and 
structural discrimination but also by failure to promote 
voting amongst people with dementia. Living in residential 
care homes with limited opportunities to mix with other 
people in the community, combined with di  culties under-
standing written texts and the news on television, may all 
contribute to a lack of awareness of the issues and political 
personalities of relevance to elections, even that elections 
are being held. Some people have voted all their lives and 
their political views are in part an expression of who they 
are and of the ful lment of their societal responsibilities. 
Others may have less or no particular interest in voting but 
their lives continue to be impacted by decisions made by 
democratically elected politicians whom they did not elect 
or oppose. It could be argued that not making an e ort to 
promote voting by people with dementia (without exercis-
ing any pressure to vote) is in some way harmful and fails 
to respect their dignity as persons and as citizens.
Perhaps worse than actively failing to promote the right of 
people with dementia to vote is leading people to believe 
that they have no such right. According to a UK study 
(reported in Regan 2011), residents in residential homes for 
elderly mental in rm (EMI) in the UK have been denied the 
right to vote on the basis of an assessment of their capac-
ity by nursing and residential care home sta . People with 
dementia who are living in their own homes in the commu-
nity might simply go and vote whereas those living in care 
homes may be subjected to assessments of their capac-
ity. This amounts to discrimination and a possible abuse 
of power. It also raises the question of the competence of 
nurses and care sta  to evaluate the capacity to vote.
Much more e ort is required than simply providing infor-
mation and ensuring that people with dementia know that 
they have the right to vote. The responsibility for reasonable 
accommodation is applicable to a broad range of people 
but clarity is needed as to who is responsible for ensuring 
that people with dementia really can participate in political 
life, through voting, on an equal basis as other members 
of society. If there is no law or formal procedure outlin-
ing precise requirements and responsibilities, people with 
dementia may continue to be excluded from political life.
Legislation related to the legal capacity to vote: a 
few examples from within Europe
There are restrictions on the right to vote in several national 
laws. In Portugal, for example, the right to vote is part of the 
right to citizenship foreseen in article 26º of the Portuguese 
Constitution. It is a fundamental right. The current legal 
framework regulating legal capacity addresses the issue 
of adults who, due to their health condition, disability or 
behaviour, are unable to fully exercise or ful l their rights.
Legal capacity can only be restricted by law or by a court 
decision. With regard to the right to vote, there are two 
DEMENTIA IN EUROPE ETHICS REPORT 2020 | 63
possibilities: 1) there is a court decision stating that the 
person has no capacity to vote, in which case the person 
does not have the right to vote; 2) there is no court decision, 
in which case the person can vote unless they show signs 
of a severe limitation of mental functioning, even when 
there is no court decision about their capacity, and when 
the person lives in a psychiatric facility or the severe limi-
tation of mental function has been assessed by a board of 
two doctors.40 This is governed by speci c legislation on 
the di erent election procedures (i.e. to municipalities, to 
the Parliament or to the President of the Republic). A care 
home is not considered a psychiatric facility. A person liv-
ing in such a home who is considered as having severe 
limitation of mental capacity and would like to vote could 
nevertheless be prevented from doing so by a person from 
the polling station on the basis of an evaluation and deci-
sion made by a doctor who is present at the polling station. 
This means that, according to the current legal framework 
regulating legal capacity, in some circumstances the exer-
cise of some legal rights may be restricted (e.g. managing 
property or business, making a will etc.) but the right to 
vote preserved. It also means that people may see their 
right to vote denied without any prior court decision. This 
is not in line with the CRPD because the right to vote is 
being linked to an issue of capacity and not to a political 
right that anyone can exercise independent of their mental 
status. There are also a few ethical issues linked to voting 
rights for people who are not in psychiatric facilities. Peo-
ple with dementia, living at home or in a care home, who 
appear to have a severe limitation of mental functioning 
may have their legal capacity (i.e. their legal right) to vote 
restricted at the request of someone running a polling sta-
tion and on the decision of a doctor who has no access to 
the person’s medical  le or history and is not familiar with 
the person. It is easy to see how this could sometimes result 
in blanket decisions being made to prevent people known 
or suspected of having dementia from voting, based on 
ignorance and stereotyping. There are also issues of privacy 
and con dentiality linked to being singled out in public, 
assessed and declared as lacking the capacity to vote. This 
may be deeply humiliating, especially at local level where 
the person may be well known. The mere knowledge of this 
possibly happening could serve as a deterrent to some peo-
ple with dementia who may rightly or wrongly assume that 
they would be denied the right to vote.
40 This law does not cover care homes where many people with dementia live. 
41 Alajos Kiss v. Hungary, No. 38832/06, judgment of 20 May  2010.
42 Zsolt Bujdosó and  ve others v.  Hungary. 
43 Source: United Nations, Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (2011), Communication No. 4/2011, CRPD/C/10/D/4/ 2011.
European court cases linked to the non-respect of 
the legal capacity to vote
According to the FRA (2020), there were court rulings in Ger-
many, Poland and France in 2019 concerning legal restrictions 
on the right to vote. A constitutional court ruling in Germany 
required amendments to the Federal Elections Act a er ruling 
that the exclusion of people with guardians and people lack-
ing criminal responsibility for a crime violated the principal 
of universal su rage and the prohibition of discrimination 
on the grounds of disability. A Polish constitutional court 
ruled to restore the right of people without legal capacity to 
vote, and in France the right to vote of people with disabili-
ties under guardianship was recognised.
There have also been formal complaints in Hungary against 
the government for failure to respect the right of people with 
disabilities to vote (FRA 2014). The  rst case41 involved a man 
with a psychosocial disability who had automatically lost his 
right to vote as a result of being placed under partial guardi-
anship. The ECHR concluded that “an indiscriminate removal 
of voting rights, without an individualised judicial evaluation 
and solely based on a mental (decision-making) disability 
necessitating partial guardianship, cannot be considered 
compatible with the legitimate grounds for restricting the 
right to vote” (paragraph 44). Hungary subsequently changed 
its constitution in 2012. Under the current Fundamental Law, 
judges must base their decisions on the right to vote for peo-
ple deprived of legal capacity on an individual assessment. 
This is a positive change but still, in some cases, results in a 
person losing the right to vote through a court case involv-
ing an examination of decision-making capacity.
The second case42 was submitted by six people with intel-
lectual disabilities who had been placed under partial or 
plenary guardianship by judicial decisions and had been 
automatically removed from the electoral register under the 
provisions of the Constitution of Hungary. This led to them 
being excluded from the 2010 parliamentary and municipal 
elections irrespective of their ability or desire to vote, the 
nature of their disability, their individual abilities or the scope 
of the guardianship measure. The Committee found that 
Hungary had failed to comply with Articles 12 and 29 of the 
CRPD. The Committee also made several recommendations 
to the state party including compensation for moral dam-
ages, covering the legal costs incurred and several measures 
to prevent similar violations in the future by introducing leg-
islative as well as procedural changes.43
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People with di erent forms of impairment are a ected in dif-
ferent ways. Therefore, speci c measures should be developed 
addressing di erent needs in close cooperation with disabled 
people’s organisations. People with more severe impairments, 
as well as people with particular types of impairment (e.g. 
with intellectual disabilities), are o en some of the most 
isolated and excluded from political and social life. Ensur-
ing that they are also able to play a full part in the political 
process presents a particular challenge to EU Member States 
that should be addressed.
Recommendations on voting
1. There should be clear governmental guidelines on how to maximise the potential for people with dementia, 
especially in residential care settings, to vote.
2. A trained and neutral supporter should be made responsible for overseeing/providing assistance to people with 
dementia at the polling station and by ensuring that the procedure and environment is ‘dementia friendly’.
3. Special support should be provided in the case of electronic voting systems for people who are not familiar 
with the use of computers. This should be provided prior to and during voting.
4. Transport issues must be considered for people with dementia to ensure that they can get safely to and 
from  polling  stations.
5. A supporter of the person’s choice should be allowed to enter into the voting booth with the person with 
dementia in order to provide assistance, if requested by the latter.
6. Absentee voting (i.e. from a distance) should be possible for people with dementia, especially those in res-
idential care or hospitals. Safeguards are needed to ensure that it is the person with dementia who votes 
and that the ballot paper is posted to the correct place and before the deadline for votes.
7. Managers of care homes should ensure that residents are not prevented from voting due to administrative 
details linked to their current place of residence (i.e. they may need to be enrolled on a di erent voting reg-
ister. This depends on the regulations in each country).
8. Electoral o  cials should facilitate voting in care homes by enabling registration and voting in large care 
homes, which could bring residents from other homes for the same purposes at the appropriate time. The 
necessary funds should be provided to electoral o  cials to make this possible.
9. Residents with dementia in care homes should have access to timely information about upcoming elections 
and to relevant information available to the public during the election campaigns.
10. Residents with dementia in care homes should have access to campaigning political candidates (if they so 
wish).
11. Care homes and hospitals should have a person available to assist residents and patients desiring to vote, 
should they wish to ask for such assistance from that person. The assistance provided by that person should 
be provided on a non-partisan basis and people with dementia should have the right, if they prefer, to ask 
for assistance from any other person.
12. It should be possible for people with dementia to make an advance directive for voting (especially useful 
in the case of people who vote on a lifelong basis for the same party) but should have the right to cancel 
that speci c advance directive at any time, even if their legal capacity is eventually in some way restricted.
13. Nobody should be allowed to vote on behalf of a person with dementia unless such authority and guide-
lines were given by the person with dementia and it is legal to do so.
Marriage and civil partnerships
Formalised/o  cial relationships
The right to get married (and to contract a civil partner-
ship) is o en considered as being part of a broader right to 
citizenship and to having a family. In many countries, this 
right is addressed in the country’s constitution. We have 
included civil partnerships in the title of this section as the 
ethical issues linked to formalised/o  cial relationships 
(either through marriage or through other legally binding 
agreements) are similar but recognise that, in some coun-
tries, legislation may not apply to both.
In Portugal, article 67º of the Constitution states,
“The family, as a fundamental element of society, has the 
right to the protection of society and of the State and to 
the ful lment of all conditions that allow the personal 
ful lment of its members”.
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This right is also addressed in article 23 of the CRPD on 
Respect for Home and the Family. The introduction to arti-
cle 1 and subsection a) are particularly relevant:
“1. States Parties shall take e ective and appropriate meas-
ures to eliminate discrimination against persons with 
disabilities in all matters relating to marriage, family, par-
enthood and relationships, on an equal basis with others, 
so as to ensure that:
a) The right of all persons with disabilities who are of 
marriageable age to marry and to found a family on the 
basis of free and full consent of the intending spouses is 
recognized;”
From a legal perspective, Glezer and Devido (2017) compare 
the capacity to marry with that of entering into other legally 
binding contracts, with the ultimate goal of assessment 
being “to prevent manipulation of a potentially impaired 
or otherwise vulnerable person through exploitative con-
tractual arrangements and to balance respect for autonomy 
against bene cence and nonmale cence”.
Legislation on the right to marry varies considerably across 
Europe. It usually requires some level of understanding of 
the implications of marriage and sometimes the authorisa-
tion or con rmation of the necessary capacity by a guardian, 
court, administrative body, marriage o  cial or priest. In 
almost all countries in the European Union, a person needs 
to have some level of understanding of the meaning and 
consequences of marriage. However, in Sweden, where up 
until 1989, people who were under guardianship had to 
obtain special permission to get married, people can now 
get married without having to obtain permission from their 
trustee or custodian. There are no explicit requirements in 
Swedish law that the people contracting a marriage should 
understand the signi cance of it.44 In Finland, on the other 
hand, a person is always considered as having the legal 
capacity to marry but must demonstrate an understand-
ing of the meaning and consequences of the act (Alzheimer 
Europe 2016).45 Some countries have provisions that allow 
for a marriage to be annulled or declared void in case one 
of the two partners is found to have lacked mental capacity 
at the moment of marriage. This is the case in Ireland, Italy, 
Lithuania, Malta, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Switzerland and 
the UK (England). In Jersey, a marriage could be declared 
null and void on the grounds that the person did not have 
44 Alzheimer Europe (2016), for various sources in this subsection, see: https://www.alzheimer-europe.org/Policy/
Country-comparisons/2016-Decision-making-and-legal-capacity-in-dementia/Sweden 
45 For more details and references related to this subsection, please see Alzheimer Europe’s 2016 Yearbook on Decision Making and Legal Capacity in 
Dementia - https://www.alzheimer-europe.org/Publications/Dementia-in-Europe-Yearbooks/(language)/eng-GB 
46 This is a very old article that should have been changed according to the current legal framework on diminished capacity. It does nevertheless mean 
that it is only necessary to have some obvious signs which are probably symptoms of dementia. If a person has a very early diagnosis of dementia 
and seems to have relatively good decision-making capacity, this would not be considered “Demência notória” and the person would not be stopped 
from marrying.
47 https://co  nmew.co.uk/capacity-to-marry/ 
su  cient mental capacity at the time of the marriage to 
understand the nature of the marriage contract and that 
his/her spouse was aware of the incapacity. It is not clear 
how these legal provisions relate to civil partnerships which 
may be governed by other laws. 
In Portugal, the right to marry or enter into a civil part-
nership is considered as a personal right linked to respect 
for autonomy. However, under Article 1 601º b) of the Civil 
Code, a person who shows signs of dementia (“Demência 
notória”46) may be deprived of the right to marry, even if 
they have moments of lucidity. With the exception of Swe-
den, and perhaps Finland, it cannot be said that legislation 
re ects the provisions of article 12 of the CRPD. People with 
dementia who wish to marry do not automatically have the 
right to do so. Various laws refer to the capacity to marry, 
sometimes specifying the need for some understanding of 
the consequences of marriage. Two consequences of mar-
riage might spring to mind, namely sexual contact and the 
management and sharing of capital and possessions. Mar-
riage may also result in a person’s will being revoked. As 
the capacity to contract a marriage may be considered as 
requiring a lower level of decision-making capacity than 
that required to make a will (Rowlatt 2018),47 people with 
moderate to advanced dementia might  nd that they are 
not allowed to make a new will (or that if they did, it would 
risk being challenged later). In the UK, a statutory will might 
be possible but this would be based on the principle of best 
interests (Rowlatt 2018). Sexual contact is probably not a 
key consideration for people to understand because sex is 
not dependent on marriage and marriage does not grant 
either partner any automatic right in the sense that sexual 
acts must also be consensual between marriage partners 
and if not, can result in allegations of rape.
According to Glezer and Devido (2017), centuries ago, the 
concept of marriage and related procedures mainly re ected 
practical and economic goals, with little or no input from 
the bride or groom. Issues such as capacity and autonomy 
were not given much importance until some of the world’s 
major religions (i.e. Catholic, Jewish and Islamic) started to 
focus on the wishes of the bride and groom, and civic legal 
systems followed suit. Nevertheless, much of the debate 
about the legal capacity to marry (ignoring for the moment 
that the CRPD states that people should not be deprived 
of their legal capacity on the basis of disability or lack of 
decision-making capacity) revolves around  nancial issues. 
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Directly, this may be linked to concerns about the  nancial 
abuse of vulnerable people; indirectly, it may sometimes be 
linked to concerns about people’s inheritance.
People with dementia may sometimes be exploited and 
manipulated by unscrupulous individuals who would like 
to bene t from sharing in their wealth and property through 
marriage. Supported decision making could be helpful in this 
respect by helping to ensure that the person is aware of the 
issues at stake and of possible measures that can be taken to 
protect possessions and capital (and perhaps reassure exist-
ing relatives about their possible future inheritance). However, 
if people with dementia are to have the same opportunities 
as other people, this includes the right to take risks and to 
make seemingly unwise decisions. Many people marry others 
for their money or status and many people enter into such 
arrangements willingly despite knowing or strongly suspect-
ing that this is the case.
Restrictions of legal capacity in relation to marriages 
involving people with dementia may on the surface seem 
understandable in terms of protecting potentially vulner-
able people from possible exploitation. However, they also 
seem somewhat inappropriate considering the very personal, 
emotional, physical and for some people religious or spiritual 
nature of marriage. The interference of adult children (who 
may be appointed guardians) in such matters involves a role 
reversal with implications for social roles and self-esteem. 
The need for authorisation to marry also involves a forced 
symbolic regression to pre-adult status which is demeaning.
Glezer and Devido (2017) emphasise the importance of the 
person expressing a consistent choice, understanding the 
risks, bene ts and possible alternatives to the decision, not 
having a condition that is hindering rational thought and 
knows with whom they are entering into marriage. They nev-
ertheless point out that marriage is a form of contract but 
is very di erent from other contracts such as land leases 
and that there are relational as well as spiritual and religious 
implications and stakes. The direct application of principles 
of decision-making for consent to medical treatment such as 
those proposed by Appelbaum (2007) may also seem some-
what inappropriate. Therefore, although healthcare experts 
might be involved in assessing decision-making capacity, 
Glezer and Devido advise healthcare teams to seek expert 
consultation from relevant spiritual and religious commu-
nities in order to gain a better understanding of factors that 
may be in uencing some people’s decisions about marriage.
Informal relationships
It sometimes happens that a person with dementia moves 
into a care home, forgets at some point that they are mar-
ried or have a partner and starts a relationship with another 
person. In some cases, this might re ect the need for phys-
ical contact or a ection or be a case of mistaken identity 
(e.g. believing that another resident is their current or former 
partner) (Alzheimer’s Society 2020). Relatives and care sta  
may sometimes have concerns about the welfare or safety 
of a person with dementia who has started a new relation-
ship (irrespective of their marital status), fearing perhaps that 
they are being taken advantage of or abused, or that they 
may be at risk of contracting a sexually transmitted disease. 
There may also be concerns linked to  nancial issues (e.g. if 
the married couple has joint bank accounts and if the one in 
the care home starts spending large sums of money in con-
nection with the newly formed couple). Values and beliefs, 
re ected in attitudes towards money, relationships, morality 
and sexuality, may change in the course of a person’s life and 
in response to changed life experiences. Partners, o spring 
and friends may sometimes have di  culty accepting this.
Care sta  may  nd it di  cult to manage new relationships 
between residents who have dementia. Spouses or partners 
may also be a ected in di erent ways. For some, it may be a 
kind of release and an opportunity to start a new life them-
selves, whereas for others, it may be deeply disturbing or it 
may involve practical and emotional challenges. It is unfor-
tunately not rare for care home sta , spouses/partners or 
legal representatives to separate newly formed couples and 
prevent them from having a relationship. Whilst new rela-
tionships involving people with dementia can be awkward 
and challenging for other people sometimes, if the person 
with dementia is able to maintain a meaningful relation-
ship, it is likely that they are also able to understand the 
situation, with appropriate and sensitive support, and to 
work towards a resolution of various issues and concerns.
Divorce
The issue of divorce and legal capacity is also important 
but has received less attention. Apart from the emotional 
impact, particularly if one of the parties does not wish to 
divorce (or end a civil partnership), divorce can be equally 
devastating  nancially. According to Article 1781º of the Por-
tuguese Civil Code, changes in mental faculties, lasting for 
more than a year, which compromises (i.e. has a devastat-
ing e ect on) the couple living together, may be considered 
legitimate grounds for the other partner to request a divorce. 
If the person who wants to divorce has been declared by a 
court as needing support to fully exercise their legal rights, 
they can do this alone or through the “acompanhante” (sup-
porter), in which case the supporter would need to obtain 
authorisation from the court to request divorce proceed-
ings. It therefore seems that restrictions of legal capacity 
can have more far reaching consequences for people with 
dementia in relation to marriage than to divorce. In Finland, 
on the other hand, if it is clear that a relationship is over 
and that the spouse is merely using the marriage in order 
to  nancially abuse the spouse with incapacity, the guard-
ian of the latter is entitled to  le for a divorce on behalf of 
that person (Alzheimer Europe 2016).
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Overall, the restriction of legal capacity, especially if deci-
sion-making power has been given to the spouse/partner, 
could interfere with the ability to apply for a divorce and 
not to lose out on the settlement (i.e.  nancially but also 
regarding place of residence and access to the couple’s chil-
dren). Support would de nitely be needed in such cases not 
only of a lawyer but also of a neutral supporter (like a per-
sonal ombudsperson).
Recommendations on marriage, civil partnerships and informal relationships
1. People with dementia should not be declared as lacking the legal capacity to marry, divorce or start/end a 
partnership/relationship solely on the grounds that they have a diagnosis of dementia or are subject to a 
guardianship measure.
2. People should not intervene or interfere with decisions related to formal or informal relationships involving 
people with the dementia if the latter have the relevant decision-making capacity, are not being exploited, 
abused or taken advantage of, appear to be comfortable in starting, maintaining or ending a relationship, 
and are acting in a way that is in keeping with their known current values.
3. Guardians should not have the power to prevent people with dementia from marrying, divorcing or start-
ing/ending a partnership/relationship. They should, however, depending on the nature and extent of the 
powers granted to them, highlight any concerns they may have to the guardianship authorities about pos-
sible  nancial exploitation or abuse.
4. Genuine concerns about the wellbeing and safety of a person with dementia with regard to relationships 
should be communicated to the relevant people or authorities (e.g. the care home manager, relevant health 
or social care professionals or the police).
5. Governments should set up procedures to address the concerns of any person with a legitimate interest in 
the wellbeing of the person with dementia. The aim of such procedures should be to protect the person’s 
 nancial interests (e.g. by means of a prenuptial (before marriage) or postnuptial (a er marriage) agreement 
spelling out how the couple will divide their assets in the event their marriage dissolves), not to prevent the 
person with dementia from marrying, divorcing or starting/ending a civil partnership.
6. It should be possible for people with a legitimate interest to apply to a court for a provisional block on the 
transfer of property rights or  nances resulting from the marriage, divorce or civil partnership until a satis-
factory solution has been found and for this request to be challenged by the person concerned.
7. All discussions surrounding issues related to the decision of a person with dementia to marry, divorce or 
start/end a civil partnership, where there are doubts about their decision-making capacity, should be made 
in the context of an appropriate shared and/or supported decision making approach. This could, depending 
on the wishes of the person with dementia, involve supporters, ombudspeople, legal advisors, doctors and 
religious or spiritual leaders (if relevant).
Making a will/testament
Making a will di ers somewhat from other decisions with 
legal implications as it can be a very personal decision which 
is o en made in private, sometimes unknown even to close 
relatives. As with advance directives, it is one aspect of life 
where the principle of every person having legal capacity, 
regardless of disability and of decision-making capacity, 
is not easily applied and testamentary capacity can be 
challenged retrospectively (see subsection on challenging 
testamentary capacity retrospectively). Jacoby and Steer 
(2007) point out that dementia and personal wealth are 
both increasing and suggest that dementia and will mak-
ing are awkward bed-fellows.
Criteria for testamentary capacity (the legal 
capacity to write a will)
The capacity to make a will is one form of capacity amongst 
others. Lack of decision-making capacity in other areas 
of life cannot be considered as proof of the incapacity to 
make a will. At the same time, a person might write a will 
alone with no witnesses and the document would be con-
sidered legally valid in some countries. Nevertheless, it is 
possible that the will of a person who had dementia when 
it was written might be later challenged. A person is gener-
ally considered to have testamentary capacity if they ful l 
certain criteria, namely that they:
 understand the nature and e ect of a will (i.e. that it 
involves making provisions to dispose of their money, 
possessions and assets),
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 are of sound disposing mind (i.e. can recognise the 
extent and character of the property, not necessarily 
down to the last Euro, and dispose of it with under-
standing and reason),
 can understand and recall the claims of potential heirs 
(i.e. the expectations of people whom they might be 
including or excluding from the will),
 do not have a disorder of the mind, such as delusions or 
hallucinations, which would in uence their decisions (i.e. 
that might result in them making bequests in the will 
that would otherwise not have been included),
 are not subject to undue in uence or pressure from 
others,
 understand that making a new will revokes any pre-
vious wills.
The condition that testators should not have a disorder of the 
mind which could in uence their decisions raises a few issues. 
First, it is reminiscent of the status approach which equates 
a medical condition or impairment with decision-making 
capacity and considers this su  cient grounds to revoke legal 
capacity, regardless of a person’s actual capacities. Second, it 
does not account for lucid intervals and third, with regard to 
delusions, it does not di erentiate between paranoid idea-
tion (which is o en a suspicion which can be reasoned with 
or challenged) and a delusional belief (which tends to be 
 xed and resist reasoning or being challenged). According 
to Davis (2005), neither necessarily corresponds to a lack of 
testamentary capacity. Testators must only be free of inter-
fering delusions and this is not dependent on the absence 
or presence of a medical diagnosis. Shared and supported 
decision making, not limited to the involvement of people 
who might be considered as future bene ciaries, could be 
helpful in ensuring clarity on these issues and may be help-
ful in case of future challenges of a will.
The capacity to make a will does not preclude the right to be 
eccentric, to make decisions considered as weird or to make 
stupid or unwise decisions. In the case Smith vs. Smith (1891), 
it was decided that “stupid error” in reasoning or drawing 
conclusions was not proof of a lack of testamentary capacity. 
Similarly, there is also a long-established principle that capa-
ble testators have the right to dispose of their possessions 
and assets as they see  t even if motivated by malice, pride 
or bizarre reasons. People with dementia with testamentary 
capacity should not be denied these rights. However, in the 
case of dementia, due to stereotypes about lack of capacity, 
it may be more di  cult to prove retrospectively that unwise, 
eccentric or unexpected decisions are not signs of incapacity.
With regard to undue pressure, claims are sometimes made 
that someone has exerted undue pressure on an older or 
vulnerable person in order to bene t from some of their 
inheritance. Hall et al. (2009) point out that undue pressure 
48 medidas de acompanhamento de maior.
o en occurs in situations involving a power imbalance or 
dependency. The term  'undue in uence' refers to some-
thing which destroys the free agency of the testator and 
substitutes that of another (Perr 1980) (e.g. by means of 
coercion, compulsion or restraint resulting in the wishes 
expressed not re ecting those of the testator). Wishes may 
also be in uenced by fraud or deception. Perr (1980) sug-
gests that less in uence may be needed to control the will 
of a person whose functional abilities have been severely 
impaired by mental illness or a physical condition a ect-
ing mental functioning.
Testing/con rming testamentary capacity
Some authors describe testamentary capacity as the low-
est level of competence (less than entering into a contract, 
for example, in which the adverse party seeks an advan-
tageous position). A counter argument, however, is that 
testators may have adversarial relationships with other 
members of the family or there may be two or more par-
ties contending for an inheritance (Bursztajn and Brodsky, 
undated). Also, testamentary capacity, like other capacities, 
is situation-speci c which means that the decision-making 
capacity needed for simple, uncomplicated wills is much 
lower than that for more complex legacies (e.g. involving 
larger sums and complex family dynamics) (Shulman et 
al. 2007).
Doctors, notaries and members of the general public are 
sometimes asked to certify or bear witness to a person’s 
perceived testamentary capacity. In Portugal, for example, 
a notary has to be sure that a person has the capacity to 
make a will. According to article 173º, nº 1 c) of the Code 
of Notary, in case of doubt about the mental capacity of 
the person, notaries must refuse to perform the notarial 
act relevant to the will and seek medical certi cation of 
the person’s capacity (article 67, nº 4 of the same Code). It 
should be noted that in Portugal the will is written by the 
notary, not by the testator, who just signs together with 
two witnesses who cannot be relatives of the testator or 
of each other. The Portuguese Law is very strict about how 
a person’s will is expressed. It must be clear and gestures 
or monosyllabic responses to questions asked by notaries 
are not permitted. The will is a personal act and it is not 
possible to be made by a representative which would pre-
sumably rule out 100% support described in the CRPD. A 
court48 may also declare that someone lacks the capacity 
to make a will (e.g. when a person is subject to a certain 
guardianship measure). 
When it is di  cult to determine such capacity, neuropsycho-
logical instruments are used to support the court decision. 
However, some instruments that are used are not su  -
ciently developed, professionals are not trained to use them 
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and they have not been adapted to the speci c populations 
on which they are used. Creating, adapting and training 
people in their use is very important in order to respect the 
autonomy of people with limited decision-making capacity.
In Portugal, a speci c instrument has been developed to 
determine the capacity to make a will, based on a functional 
approach to legal capacity, but also taking into account cog-
nition, emotional aspects, personality and quality of life in 
order to provide comprehensive information about each per-
son’s functioning and the context, the interaction between 
the individual and family members and other people, con-
gruence or incongruence of functioning within everyday life 
(Sousa, Vilar, Firmino and Simões 2015). Other issues such as 
consistency between current and past values and preferences 
are also considered important, accepting that these may 
sometimes change as a result of lived experience.
Doctors, including general practitioners, are increasingly 
being asked by courts, notaries and testators to certify peo-
ple’s capacity to make a will. Some doctors feel ill-equipped 
and lack the necessary expertise to ful l this task. The capac-
ity to dispose of one’s possessions should not be confused 
with the capacity to consent to treatment. A certi cation 
of capacity by a doctor does not guarantee the validity of 
a will but merely provides high quality evidence in the case 
of a future legal challenge (Jacoby and Steer 2007). This is a 
considerable responsibility and if not done properly, does 
little to promote respect for a person’s autonomy. There is 
also an issue of trust. People with dementia place their trust 
in doctors to make an accurate assessment of their capac-
ity and in the legal system to ensure that their wishes are 
respected a er their death, which is something that they 
will never know. Jacoby and Steer (2007) (an old age psy-
chiatrist and a solicitor) have provided guidelines on how 
to assess capacity which, whilst based on the UK legal sys-
tem, contain some useful advice that could be helpful to 
doctors in other countries.49
Challenging testamentary capacity retrospectively
In most countries, a will can be challenged retrospectively 
based on an alleged inability to make a will. Such inability, 
if proven, would mean that the person was not considered 
as having had the legal capacity to make a will and the will 
could be considered null and void. It has been suggested 
that the growing number of people with dementia creates 
a fertile ground for challenges to wills (Shulman et al. 2007). 
Medical doctors are regularly asked to assess retrospec-
tively patients’ testamentary capacity. They o en rely on 
limited evidence from medical  les and prior scores on the 
Mini-Mental State Examination (MMSE – Folstein, Folstein 
and McHugh 1975) or other measures of cognitive function. 
49 See: https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1925203/ 
The MMSE is not a measure of testamentary capacity but 
it continues to play an important role in retrospective 
assessments of testamentary capacity. It is important to 
have instruments that speci cally measure testamentary 
capacity and preferably can also be used to some extent 
retrospectively.
Davis (2005) claims that most wills are challenged on the 
basis of the testator’s capacity to identify, evaluate and dis-
criminate between the respective strengths of the claims of 
their potential bene ciaries. Shulman et al. (2005) reviewed 
reasons for wills being challenged and found that the main 
reason was a dramatic or radical change from a previous 
will (72% of cases). The second main reason was alleged 
undue in uence (56% of cases). In just over half of these 
cases, the testator had no children and in almost half of 
cases the will being challenged had been written less than 
one year before the testator’s death.
O en challenges are made years a er the person wrote the 
will, based on memories of the person in the time leading up 
to their death when they had few remaining capacities, and 
not of the time when the will was written, when that person 
may have had the necessary capacity. There may also be a 
discrepancy between the assessment of capacity when the 
will was made and the retrospective assessment of capac-
ity in terms of information provided, people involved and 
access to supporting documents (Redmond 1987). The initial 
assessment is o en made by people who have little if any 
knowledge of the testator. There is sometimes a basic pre-
sumption that a person has testamentary capacity, unless 
there are clear signs that this might not be the case. When 
a will is challenged, medical records are consulted and rel-
atives and expert witnesses are interviewed who knew the 
person well. There may be di erences in how retrospective 
challenges to testamentary capacity are dealt with in dif-
ferent countries and how successful they are likely to be. In 
Portugal and most other countries, a will can be revoked if 
it can be proven that a person permanently or temporar-
ily lacked testamentary capacity when the will was made. 
However, Mäki-Petäjä-Leinonen (2010) points out that in 
Finland retrospective challenges to wills by relatives are 
rarely successful as it is di  cult to obtain evidence of lack 
of testamentary capacity.
Insofar as provisions exist for people to exercise their 
autonomy by stating their wishes in advance, some of the 
measures and discussions surrounding the need to protect 
vulnerable people from abuse could be considered dispro-
portionate and paternalistic. As wills come into force on 
a person’s death, harm to that person must be related to 
the person’s retrospective wellbeing, to the spirit of their 
expressed autonomy and to the person’s interests which are 
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believed to extend beyond death. This might be particularly 
relevant for people whose emphasis in life was on the fam-
ily unit or on some other signi cant relational ties or even 
values (e.g. based on philanthropy or altruism). Respecting 
wishes would therefore be a sign of respecting the will and 
preferences of a person and that person’s life values and 
goals. Challenges to a person’s will are much more likely 
to focus on the interests of people who felt they should 
have inherited something and that someone else should 
not. This is regulated in some countries where the children 
of a diseased person automatically have a legal right to a 
percentage of their parents’ patrimony.
Recommendations on making a will/testament
1. In keeping with supported decision making and bearing in mind the risk of abuse, every person should 
have access to an independent supporter to make a will and to include members of their entourage in this 
process if they wish.
2. Such support should aim to promote decision-making capacity and enable people with dementia to retain 
legal capacity to make a will for as long as possible.
3. A diagnosis of dementia should not be considered the sole justi cation for loss of testamentary capacity.
4. The stage of dementia and/or evidence of delusions should only be taken into consideration if they are 
considered relevant to and likely to have an adverse e ect on decisions made by the testator in their will.
5. Healthcare professionals who are asked to assess testamentary capacity, either currently or retrospectively, 
should check whether there are/were suspicious circumstances such as radical changes from previously 
expressed wishes or wills, and possible signs of undue in uence/pressure, deceit or fraud from members 
of the person’s entourage.
6. Governments should ensure that healthcare professionals and notaries have access to support and infor-
mation on how to assess testamentary capacity, especially in the case of people who already have some 
degree of cognitive impairment.
7. Expressions of individuality, eccentricity, unwise decisions or personal/emotional grounds for decisions 
should not be considered as evidence of testamentary incapacity (i.e. any more than they would be for a 
person who did not have dementia).
8. Testators who are concerned that their testamentary capacity might be challenged retrospectively should 
consider obtaining expert medical proof of their capacity (bearing in mind that this might also lead to closer 
scrutiny of such capacity) and/or visually recording their will (e.g. on videotape or digitally).
9. Appropriate and reliable assessment tools should be developed for doctors, notaries and lay witnesses.
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5. Conclusion
It is important to be attentive to the needs and wishes of 
people with dementia in order to ensure that they are ena-
bled to participate in society on an equal basis with other 
citizens in all areas of life. This includes recognising every-
one’s dignity and personhood, along with their hopes, fears 
and preferences. Legal capacity is not only about the right 
to make decisions about one’s own life but about having 
the opportunity to exercise that right (e.g. not only having 
the right to vote but also to receive information about the 
di erent candidates and to be able to get to the polling 
station on election day or to post one’s vote). It covers key 
decisions in life such as where to live, managing personal 
 nances and informed consent to medical treatment but 
also seemingly minor issues and freedoms such as going 
out for a walk, making oneself a cup of tea or co ee, buying 
someone a present or going on holiday. Sometimes little 
decisions can have a huge impact on people’s well-being 
and quality of life. They are also ways of expressing who we 
are and hence fundamental to our sense of self and identity.
In some situations, people with dementia may be unable 
to make a particular decision, even with all possible sup-
port, and there must be practices and procedures in place 
to ensure that substitute decision-making is possible. Such 
practices and procedures must be carefully designed and 
closely monitored to ensure that they are both legal and 
ethical. It is essential to work towards an inclusive society 
in which people with dementia are supported as much as 
possible to exercise their legal capacity, based on initial 
assumptions that this is possible with appropriate sup-
port and reasonable accommodations and better support 
for people involved in combined supported decision mak-
ing (see page  22).
Stereotypes and paternalistic attitudes o en lead to prac-
tices which interfere with people’s formal and informal 
legal capacity. Members of society need to work together to 
remove obstacles, whether they be legal or based on mental-
ities, traditions or taken-for-granted limiting assumptions 
(e.g. that’s just the way it is done, it has always been like 
that etc.). This is a task for everyone not just for lawmakers, 
policy makers, health and social care professionals and nota-
ries. Not everyone has the power to bring about changes 
directly, but everyone has the power to raise issues and 
challenge practices, procedures and attitudes. We hope 
that this report has been successful in raising awareness 
about the many issues related to legal capacity and deci-
sion making in the context of dementia.
72 |  DEMENTIA IN EUROPE ETHICS REPORT 2020
6. Glossary
Antipsychotic medication
Antipsychotics are drugs that are generally used to treat 
psychosis, which is the medical term used to describe symp-
toms of psychosis (seeing and hearing things that are not 
there).
Autonomy
The ability to make an informed and uncoerced choice in 
accordance with one’s own values and interests, albeit with 
necessary support.
Benefi cence
All forms of action intended to bene t or promote the good 
of other people.
COVID-19 pandemic (or coronavirus)
COVID-19 is the disease caused by a new coronavirus called 
SARS-CoV-2. A pandemic is a worldwide epidemic or one 
which covers a very wide area. It crosses international 
boundaries and usually a ects large numbers of people.
Covert medication
Covert medication involves the intentional administration 
of medication in a disguised form, usually in food and drink, 
resulting in someone unknowingly taking medication (i.e. 
without their consent).
CRPD
Abbreviation for the United Nations Convention on the 
Rights of Persons with Disabilities, which came into force 
in 2006.
Decision-making capacity
The ability to make a decision (with appropriate support 
if needed).
Dementia
A set of symptoms, including loss of memory, mood changes, 
and problems with communication and reasoning. There 
are many causes of dementia, the most common being 
Alzheimer’s disease and vascular dementia. Dementia is a 
progressive condition. This means that symptoms become 
more severe over time and that people with dementia typ-
ically need support and eventually care as their dementia 
advances.
Disability
According to the CRPD, disability “results from the inter-
action between persons with impairments and attitudinal 
and environmental barriers that hinders their full and e ec-
tive participation in society on an equal basis with others” 
(CRPD 2006, Preamble e).
Discrimination
Usually, discrimination refers to the situation in which 
people are treated di erently on the basis of certain charac-
teristics, whereby such di erential treatment is considered 
as being in some way detrimental to them or unfair.
Equality
Equality involves treating everybody in the same way with-
out taking into account di erences between people, which 
may be inherent, linked to circumstances or structurally 
determined.
Equity
Equity is not about simply providing everyone with the same 
opportunities but about fairness and equality in outcomes. 
Issues related to inequity need to be addressed when striv-
ing for equal opportunities and outcomes. This o en calls 
for some people to be treated di erently.
Guardianship
Guardianship, in the context of this report, is the term used 
to refer to situations where a legal representative (e.g. a 
guardian, tutor or curator) takes legally binding decisions 
for a person placed under a protective measure.
Impairments
Any loss or limitation, albeit physical, physiological, cogni-
tive, sensory, psychological or mental in nature, that may 
contribute (in combination with other factors) to disability.
Legal capacity
This term is used to refer to the right to make decisions for 
oneself, within the constraints of the law, which must then 
be recognised as being legal and hence respected.
Non-malefi cence
Not doing what might be harmful to or hurt somebody.
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Power of attorney
A power of attorney is a legal document that allows some-
one to act on someone else’s behalf (e.g. when the latter 
loses the decision-making capacity or simply wishes some-
one else to make decisions or transactions on their behalf).
Psychotropic medication
A psychotropic drug is one that a ects behaviour, mood, 
thoughts or perception. It’s an umbrella term for a lot of dif-
ferent drugs. Psychotropic drugs o en given on prescription 
include, for example, anti-anxiety agents, antidepressants, 
antipsychotics (see above), mood  stabilisers and stimu-
lants. Some of these drugs can have very serious side e ects.
Reasonable accommodation
Reasonable accommodation is a term used in the CRPD (see 
above) to describe reasonable adjustments or adaptations 
that should be made to ensure that people have the same 
opportunities (e.g. to use services, access buildings and 
play a role in society).
Restraint
In this report, the term ‘restraint’ is used to refer to any 
method, device, substance, act or procedure which restricts 
a person’s freedom of movement in the private or health 
and social care setting, irrespective of the intent to restrain.
Substitute decision making
A situation in which a person (e.g. with dementia) is unable 
to make a decision and another person, with the necessary 
and relevant authority to do so, makes a decision on that 
person’s behalf.
Supported decision making
Supported decision making involves providing the neces-
sary support for someone to make a decision whereby that 
person retains their legal capacity, even though they would 
not have been considered capable of deciding in the absence 
of that support.
Stigmatization
This is a process and a complex social phenomenon 
involving the identi cation and labelling of socially sali-
ent attributes, negative stereotyping, cognitive separation, 
devaluation and negative emotional responses, within the 
context of unequal power relations.
Testamentary capacity
This is a legal term used to describe a person’s legal and 
mental ability to make or alter a valid will.
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Appendix 1 – Details of the 
members of the expert working 
group
Dianne Gove, PhD, is Director for Projects 
at Alzheimer Europe. She was Chair of 
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Jean Georges has been the Executive 
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Professor in Care Ethics at the University 
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vocational schools and the upper sec-
ondary level of education at Heidelberg 
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Appendix 2 – Personal 
ombudsperson in Skåne (Sweden)
Information by Maths Jesperson kindly reproduced from 
http://po-skane.org/in-foreign-languages/ (2015).
A service which o ers supported self-decision for persons 
with severe psychosocial disabilities
I will tell you a little about our service PO-Skåne, which 
is a concrete example of supported decision-making for 
persons with mental health problems of the most di  -
cult sort (living entirely in a symbolic world of their own, 
living barricaded in their apartment or living homeless 
in the streets).
As the time is short, I will make this presentation in brief 
paragraphs.
 It’s hard to translate our Swedish word ‘personligt 
ombud’ into English, but I translate it here as ‘personal 
ombudsperson’ but will henceforth use the abbrevia-
tion PO
 A PO is a professional, highly skilled person, who works 
to 100 % on the commission of his client only. The PO 
is in no alliance with psychiatry or the social services or 
any other authority, and not with the client’s relatives 
or any other person in his surroundings
 The PO does only what his client wants him to do. As 
it can take a long time – sometimes several months – 
before the client knows and dares to tell what kind of 
help he wants, the PO has to wait, even though a lot of 
things are chaotic and in a mess
 This also means that the PO has to develop a long-time 
engagement for his clients, usually for several years. This 
is a necessary condition for developing a trustful relation 
and for coming into more essential matters.
The social model of disability says that the problem is not 
within the individual, but in the society which does not 
meet this person in such a way that he can function. This 
applies also to problems with legal capacity. It’s not a prob-
lem inside the individual – which should be met by forced 
intervention or guardianship – but society must relate in 
another way to this person, so that his disabilities regard-
ing legal capacity diminishes.
Supported decision-making is an example of this. If some 
persons have heard to express and communicate their 
wishes, the solution is not to put in a guardian, but to 
develop a relation and ways, which make it possible for 
this person to express and communicate what he wants.
In our service with personal ombudspersons the most 
important thing has been to develop ways to work which 
are adjusted to this special group of persons with mental 
health problems of the most di  cult kind. In other projects 
it is usually the clients who have to adjust themselves to a 
bureaucratic system, but we work in the opposite way. The 
PO’s have to be very  exible and creative and unconven-
tional in  nding ways to work with this group.
I will here give you some examples of conditions which we 
think are necessary if you really want to reach these per-
sons and practise supported decision-making with them:
 The PO doesn’t work Monday-Friday at o  ce hours only. 
The week has 7 days and each day 24 hours – and the 
PO must be prepared to work at all these various hours, 
because their clients’ problems are not concentrated to 
o  ce hours and some clients are more easy to contact 
in evenings and weekends. The PO has to work 40 hours 
a week but makes up a  exible working-scheme every 
week according to the wishes of their clients.
 The PO hasn’t got any o  ce, because “o  ce is power”. 
The PO works from his own home with the help of tele-
phone and internet – and he meets his clients in their 
home or at neutral places out in town.
 The PO works primarily according to a relation-model. 
As many clients are very suspicious or hostile, or hard 
to reach because of other reasons, the PO has to go 
out and  nd them where they are – and then he has to 
try to reach them through several steps: 1. Making con-
tact, 2. Developing a communication, 3. Establishing a 
relation, 4. Starting a dialogue, 5. Getting commissions. 
Each of these steps can take a long time to realize. Just 
to get contact can sometimes take several months. It 
could mean going out and start talking with a home-
less psychotic person in a park or talking through the 
mail drop with someone who lives very barricaded. Not 
until a relation is established and a dialogue has started 
can the PO start getting commissions from his client.
 There should be no bureaucratic procedure to get a PO. 
If a form had to be signed or an admission note was 
necessary, many psychiatric patients would back out 
and not get a PO – and it would probably be the per-
sons who need a PO most. To get a PO from PO-Skåne 
doesn’t involve any formal procedure. A er a relation is 
established the PO just asks “Do you want me to be your 
PO?”. If the answer is “Yes” the whole thing is settled.
 The PO should be able to support the client in all kinds 
of matters. The priorities of the client are usually not 
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the same as the priorities of the authorities or the rel-
atives. According to 10 years of experience the clients 
 rst priorities are usually not housing or occupation, 
but existential matters (why should I live? why has my 
life become a life of a mental patient? have I any hope 
for a change?), sexuality and problems with relatives. 
A PO must be able to spend a lot of time talking with 
their client also about these kinds of issues – and not 
just  x things.
 A PO should be well skilled to be able to argue e ectively 
for the client’s rights in front of various authorities or in 
court. All PO’s of PO-Skåne have some kind of academic 
degree from the university or some similar education. 
Most of them are trained social workers, but some are 
lawyers and some have other specialised training.
 There should be PO’s of various ethnic backgrounds to 
secure that psychiatric patients of ethnic minorities also 
get PO’s. It’s hard to develop a personal relation if the 
PO and the client have language-problems. PO-Skåne 
has for example one PO who was born in Somalia (and 
raised in the United Arab Emirates) and one from Iran 
and one from Romania.
 The client has the right to be anonymous for the authori-
ties. If he doesn’t want his PO to tell anybody that he has 
a PO this must be respected. PO-Skåne gets money from 
the community for the service, but there is a paragraph 
in the contract that says that the PO could deny to tell 
the name of their clients to the community.
 The PO doesn’t keep any records. All papers belong to 
the client. When their relation is terminated, the PO 
has either to give all papers to the client or burn them 
together with the client. No paper and no notes will 
remain with the PO.
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Appendix 3 – Criteria and 
questions to ask when considering 
the possible use of restraint in the 
acute hospital care setting
 This is an extract from a text by: Narchi J & Ritzi S (2019). 
Freiheitseinschränkende Maßnahmen bei Menschen mit kog-
nitiven Beeinträchtigungen im Akutkrankenhaus. Geriatrie 
up2date, 1(03), 267–280. https://doi.org/10.1055/a-1008-4347. 
Translated and reproduced with kind permission from Georg 
Thieme Verlag  KG.
1. Criterion of proportionality
 Is the restraining measure suitable, necessary and appro-
priate for the objectives for which it is to be applied?
 Is the restraining measure indicated from a nursing and 
medical point of view or are personal, organisational and 
economic interests the primary concern?
 Are there milder forms of restraining measures that 
promise the same or greater bene t?
 Are there alternatives to the restraining measure that 
promise the same or greater bene t?
 Is the restraining measure truly e ective in preventing 
the harm that needs to be averted?
 Is the intensity of the restraining measure appropriate 
to the situation concerned?
 Is the duration of the restraining measure appropriate 
to the situation concerned?
2. Criterion of non-malefi cence
 Does the restraining measure pose a risk of causing 
other physical or psychological harm?
 Does the restraining measure pose the risk of a danger 
to life (e.g. through strangulation)?
 Does the restraining measure increase the risk of falling?
 Does the restraining measure involve any adverse e ects 
on the healthcare situation (e.g. forced incontinence)?
 Does the restraining measure cause a loss of mobility 
and independence?
 Does the restraining measure directly or indirectly imply 
a form of humiliation?
 Does the restraining measure evoke mistrust, fear and 
imbalance of power?
 Does the restraining measure increase the occurrence 
of behaviour that is perceived as challenging (e.g. motor 
restlessness and shouting)?
 In the case of chemical restraint: Does the drug have 
harmful or irreversible side e ects on body and soul?
3. Criterion of last resort
 Have all other possible alternatives to the restraining 
measure been tried and found to be ine ective, leaving 
the restraining measure as the last resort?
 Have all mechanical alternatives to the restraining meas-
ure already been explored?
 Have all non-mechanical alternatives to the restraining 
measure already been explored?
 Does the nursing documentation indicate the ine ec-
tiveness of alternative means to the restraining measure 
(e.g. clear nursing reports, case discussions, protocols 
of fall events)?
 Is the restraining measure the last option in the deci-
sion-making process or rather the  rst course of action?
4. Criterion of self-determination
 Is the restraining measure compatible with the patient’s 
actual or presumed will?
 Can the patient’s actual will be ascertained?
 Can the patient’s presumed will be ascertained?
 Has the patient’s presumed will been investigated with 
the participation of the person concerned as well as rel-
atives, caregivers, physicians and nursing sta ?
 What is or was the patient’s presumed attitude towards 
the use of restraint and what reasons is this position 
based on?
 How would the patient feel about the use of restraint 
if he/she knew about the associated health risks and 
about suitable milder alternatives?
 Does the patient’s biography allow us to draw conclusions 
about his or her attitude towards restraint?
 Does the patient verbally or non-verbally communicate 
approval or disapproval (e.g. repeated shaking of the bed 
rail or attempts to remove the measure)?
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Conclusion
Freedom restraining measures may at  rst glance still seem 
indispensable when caring for people with cognitive impair-
ments in hospital. For many, it is hard to imagine professional 
care without them. Fortunately, however, research is increas-
ingly showing that this need not be the case: It may well be 
worthwhile to “do without” these measures i.e. to consider 
alternative interventions which can better meet the needs 
of people with dementia and cognitive impairments in the 
acute care hospital setting in a more holistic way.
For a re ected as well as professionally, legally and ethically 
informed approach to freedom restraining measures, it is 
important to be familiar with the basic categories, de ni-
tions and empirical data on the subject. We hope that this 
article helps contribute to this.
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